Jon Comlay, Author at Parklane Plowden

Expertise

Our Expertise

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.

Woman Dies Following Weight Loss Surgery and ‘Woeful’ Private Healthcare

A prominent North East businesswoman received “woeful” care following weight loss surgery at a private hospital, and died as a result of complications.   Nicola Fisher underwent a gastric sleeve operation at Spire Washington Hospital and developed a leak from her stomach as a consequence.   Following emergency NHS surgery in June 2023, less than two days after her discharge from Spire Washington Hospital, Nicola underwent several more rounds of surgery at Sunderland Royal Hospital over the following seven months due to ongoing complications.  At the inquest into her death, held at Sunderland Coroner’s Court, it was revealed that appropriate observations were not done by nurses at Spire Washington Hospital before her discharge, and medications were not given as expected. Nicola’s pre-discharge blood test results were also not checked prior to discharge.  Karin Welsh, assistant coroner, branded these failures “woeful” and said it had hampered her attempts to understand Nicola’s health at the time of her discharge, and establish whether there were missed opportunities to identify the leak and operate prior to her developing extensive infection in her abdomen.  Bharat Jangra, instructed by <a href="https://www.slatergordon.co.uk/our-experts/john-lowther/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">John Lowther</a> at Slater and Gordon, acted on behalf of Nicola’s husband, Peter, at the inquest.  This matter has received considerable coverage in the press:  <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14559119/Vibrant-businesswoman-died-multiple-organ-failure-following-weight-loss-surgery.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Daily Mail </a><a href="https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/25051446.sunderland-businesswoman-died-gastric-sleeve-surgery/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Northern Echo</a> <a href="https://www.sunderlandecho.com/health/coroners-report-into-death-of-washington-woman-following-gastric-surgery-highlights-woeful-aftercare-experienced-at-private-hospital-5059233" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Sunderland Echo</a>

Practice Direction 57AD – Disclosure in the Business and Property Courts

Introduction  A disclosure pilot scheme (known as PD51U) operated in the Business and Property Courts (the “BPC”) in a number of courts including Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle, and London from 1st January 2019.  Practice Direction 57A (“PD57A”) substantively reproduces PD51U and came into force on 1st October 2022.  Eighteen months on, my experience of PD57A is that it is still slowly filtering through to practitioners and courts, notwithstanding that for practitioners in Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle, and London, these provisions (or some very similar) have been in force for over five years.  This article hopes to de-mystify PD57A and provide some practical assistance to those still grappling with the provisions<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a>.  You will however still need a copy of the most up to date PD57A to hand, and I apologise in advance for the number of acronyms used.  When does PD57A apply?  The first thing to ascertain is whether PD57A applies to your case, or whether you’re still looking at disclosure under CPR 31.  The clue here is in the title of the article - PD57A applies to existing and new proceedings in the BPC (whether London or the provinces).  It does not apply in the County Court and it does not apply to proceedings which are  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Proceeding under Part 8</li>  <li>Within a fixed costs or capped costs regime</li> </ul>  Which Regime?  Under Appendix 5 of PD57A you will find provisions for a simplified disclosure regime for Less Complex Claims (“LCC”).  An LCC is a claim which by virtue of its nature, value, complexity, and the likely volume of Extended Disclosure (“ED”) may not benefit from the full procedure set out in the main body of Practice Direction 57AD.  Deciding whether your claim is a LCC is akin to deciding to which track your case should be allocated.  If the value of the claim (both financial and non-monetary) is less than £1M then the starting point is LCC, but the other factors (nature, complexity etc) can tip a claim under £1M into the full regime and cases over £1M into a LCC.  The parties can agree to treat a claim as LCC or the court can order it.  If your claim is LCC, you follow the provisions under Appendix 5, so this is something that needs to be agreed at the outset.  If LCC is not agreed, the LCC regime does not apply unless and until the court makes an order to the contrary.  The court may make such an order upon its own volition or by application by any party.  LCC Regime  My experience is that most practitioners agree to designate their cases as LCC and I have therefore considered this regime first so that when you read the main provisions you have in mind the parts which don’t apply or which are varied on the LCC.  However, I’m afraid you still have to read the notes for the Full Regime below as I have not repeated the relevant parts of the Full Regime here.  For LCC, Appendix 5 varies the provisions in the main body of PD57A – paragraph 1 of Appendix 5 provides that all the provisions of the main body apply unless they are expressly varied by Appendix 5.  The simplified LCC procedure is found at paragraph 10 of Appendix 5.  ED is confined to Models A, B, or D.  Models C and E are not available for a LCC (Models considered under Full Regime below).  The relevant Disclosure Review Document (“DRD”) for a LCC (which is referred to in the PD as the “LCCDRD”) is that set out at Appendix 6, and the timetable is that which appears at paragraphs 7 and 10 of the main body and Appendix 7.  The LCCDRD only needs to be completed where one or more parties are seeking ED.  If nobody wants ED or only Models A or B are proposed, there is no need to complete a DRD.  If, however, in circumstances where Model B is proposed, the parties believe that it would be of assistance to identify and agree upon on List of Issues for Disclosure (or to complete any other sections of the LCCDRD), they may agree to do so.  It is the Claimant’s responsibility to ensure that the LCCDRD is completed and a single agreed version filed with the court (although the parties can agree to pass this responsibility to another party).  Completing the LCCDRD – don’t forget that the relevant DRD for a LCC is at Appendix 6.  The only mandatory part of the LCCDRD is section 1 - “Issues for Disclosure and Disclosure Model Proposals”.  The rest of the LCCDRD should only be completed if applicable and relevant.  Paragraph 9 of Appendix 7 encourages the parties to confer about the LCCDRD in person rather than by letter/email, and my experience suggests that this is very good advice.  The timetable for completing the LCCDRD is set out at paragraph 13 of Appendix 7, and I have set this out below.  The parties may agree to revise the timetable provided it does not affect the date set for the CMC.  NOTE – the first deadline in the timetable is “within 28 days of the closure of statements of case”.   HOWEVER  - also remember that under paragraph 5 of the main regime, each party must provide to all other parties at the same time as its statement of case an Initial Disclosure List of Documents with copies of those documents.  Disclosure is not something that can be considered ‘later’.  It needs to be in the forefront of your mind from the start of your involvement with the case,  Timetable for completing the LCCDRD  <figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Stage to be completed</td><td>Deadline</td></tr><tr><td>Step 1</td><td>Each party should state, in writing, whether or not it is likely to request Extended Disclosure Models A, B and/or D on one or more issues in the case. At this point it should not particularise the Model(s) or the issue(s) in the case.</td><td>Within 28 days of the closure of statements of case</td></tr><tr><td>Step 2</td><td>Where one or more of the parties has indicated it is likely to request search-based Extended Disclosure (i.e. Models D), unless the parties agree otherwise, the claimant must prepare and serve on the other parties a draft List of Issues for Disclosure unless the equivalent of such a list has already been agreed between the parties (for example, as part of a fuller list of issues). At the same time, the claimant shall identify for each Issue for Disclosure which Model of Extended Disclosure it proposes for each party. If the claimant fails to take these steps, the defendant may, but is not obliged to, prepare and serve its own draft List of Issues for Disclosure on the other parties.</td><td>Within 42 days of the closure of statements of case</td></tr><tr><td>Step 3</td><td>A party served with a draft List of Issues for Disclosure and proposals on Models shall indicate within section 1 of the LCCDRD whether it agrees with the proposed Issues for Disclosure and corresponding Model(s) for Extended Disclosure by completing the “Issue Agreed” and “Model Agreed” columns in section 1. If the party does not agree, or wishes to propose alternative or additional Issues for Disclosure or other Models, it should set out its alternative or additional proposals in section 1 of the LCCDRD and briefly explain and set out in section 6 of the LCCDRD the reasons why it disagrees with the Issues for Disclosure or Models proposals of the other party the reasons for the alternative proposals it is proposing.</td><td>As soon as practicable but in any event no later than 21 days after service of the draft List of Issues for Disclosure</td></tr><tr><td>Step 4</td><td>Having sought to agree the List of Issues for Disclosure and proposals on Model(s) for Extended Disclosure, the parties should prepare and exchange drafts of the LCCDRD (with all applicable sections of the document completed) in accordance with the guidance in Appendix 7.</td><td>As soon as reasonably practicable and in any event not later than 14 days before the case management conference</td></tr><tr><td>Step 5</td><td>The parties must seek to resolve any disputes over the scope of any Extended Disclosure sought or any other aspect of the completion of the LCCDRD.</td><td>In advance of the first case management conference</td></tr><tr><td>Step 6</td><td>Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court, the claimant(s) shall be responsible for ensuring that the form is completed and a single agreed version is filed with the court.  Related correspondence and earlier drafts should not ordinarily be filed.</td><td>Not later than 5 days before the first case management conference</td></tr><tr><td>Step 7</td><td>The parties must independently file a signed Certificate of Compliance substantially in the form set out in Appendix 3 to the Practice Direction.</td><td>Not less than two days before the case management conference</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>   I cannot urge you strongly enough to engage with this process as early as possible and to meet the deadlines.  If you get to CMC and you have not complied with PD57A you may find that the court simply adjourns your CMC (costing you and your clients both time and money).  It also makes it very difficult (if not impossible) for the court to determine which Model to order if the issues for disclosure have not been identified.  Both of these examples have arisen in cases I have been involved in within the last month.  In relation to the completion of the LCCDRD, ‘issues for disclosure’ has the same meaning as in the main body of PD57A:  <blockquote class="wp-block-quote"> “Issues for Disclosure” means for the purposes of disclosure only those key issues in dispute, which the parties consider will need to be determined by the court with some reference to contemporaneous documents in order for there to be a fair resolution of the proceedings. It does not extend to every issue which is disputed in the statements of case by denial or nonadmission. (see paragraph 7.6 main body) </blockquote>   However, the issues for disclosure in a LCC must be brief, should rarely exceed 5, and should not be defined by reference to sub-issues if that will materially increase the length and complexity of the list.  The list of issues for disclosure is not the same as the list of issues for trial, and the parties should have regard to the function of the list as set out at paragraph 10.5 of Appendix 5, which includes helping the parties to consider, and the court to determine, whether ED is required and, if so, the appropriate Model, and to identify the documents and categories of documents that are likely to exist and are required to be disclosed.  If the parties cannot agree the terms of ED, the court will determine the issue at the CMC.   Full Regime/Main Body of PD57A  Save where expressly modified by Appendix 5, these provisions also apply to a LCC.  The regime starts with initial disclosure and paragraph 5 of the main body of PD57A provides that when a party serves its statement of case, it must also provide to all other parties an Initial Disclosure List of Documents that lists and is accompanied by the key documents that party has relied on and the key documents that are necessary to enable the other side to understand the case it has to meet.  This form of disclosure is known as initial disclosure and is not required where the parties have agreed in writing to defer or dispense with it. In the event of such agreement the parties should record their reasons so as to be available to the court if requested at the CMC. Any disagreements about whether initial disclosure should be dispensed with can be referred to the court.  There is no requirement for a party to search for documents or to disclose adverse documents by way of initial disclosure.  There is also no requirement for any document disclosed by way of initial disclosure to be translated.  In Breitenbach v Canaccord Genuity Financial Planning Ltd [2020] EWHC 1355 (Ch) it was held that documents that were said to be necessary to evaluate and weigh the Defendant’s prospects of success were not key documents, as this went beyond enabling the claim to be understood.  A party seeking disclosure in addition to or as an alternative to initial disclosure must request extended disclosure (“ED”).  Where ED is sought, the parties are expected to complete the Disclosure Review Document (“DRD”) set out at Appendix 2.  ED involves using Disclosure Models which are set out at paragraph 8 of PD57A:  Model A: Disclosure confined to known adverse documents As set out in the title  Model B: Limited Disclosure The key documents a party has relied on in its statement of case and the key documents that are necessary to enable the other side to understand the case it has to meet (ie, Initial Disclosure), plus known adverse documents.  Model C: Disclosure of particular documents or narrow classes of documents The court may order a party to give disclosure of particular documents or narrow classes of documents relating to a particular Issue for Disclosure.  Model D: Narrow search-based disclosure, with or without Narrative Documents Documents which are likely to support or adversely affect a party’s claim or defence or that of another party in relation to one or more of the issues for disclosure. Under D the parties are required to undertake a reasonable and proportionate search in relation to the Issues for Disclosure.  Model E: Wide search-based disclosure Documents which are likely to support or adversely affect a party’s claim or defence or that of another party in relation to one or more of the issues for disclosure, or which may lead to a train of inquiry which may then result in the identification of other documents for disclosure.  Although the parties can (and should where possible) agree the issues for disclosure and the Model, the court retains control and will determine whether to order ED at the CMC.  If the parties cannot agree, the court will determine disputes at the CMC.  A practical point – The parties may, at any time, ask the court to determine any disclosure issues, or provide guidance on any point concerning the operation of PD57A, by issuing an application notice.  This is worth remembering if there are significant areas of disagreement, as the standard time allowed for a CMC may not be sufficient to deal with CMC issues and disclosure.  I have recently had a CCMC adjourned to deal with budgets at a later date as the 90 minute hearing was largely taken up with disputes over disclosure.  Dealing with disclosure at a separate hearing before the CCMC would have been more appropriate.  The Court will only order search based models – C, D, E – if persuaded it is appropriate, and Model E will only be ordered in an exceptional case.  Paragraph 6.4 sets out the factors to be considered when determining whether ED should be ordered:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>the nature and complexity of the issues in the proceedings;</li>  <li>the importance of the case, including any non-monetary relief sought;</li>  <li>the likelihood of documents existing that will have probative value in supporting or undermining a party’s claim or defence;</li>  <li>the number of documents involved;</li>  <li>the ease and expense of searching for and retrieval of any particular document (taking into account any limitations on the information available and on the likely accuracy of any costs estimates);</li>  <li>the financial position of each party; and</li>  <li>the need to ensure the case is dealt with expeditiously, fairly and at a proportionate cost.</li> </ol>  There is no presumption that a party is entitled to search based ED, and it is for the party requesting ED to show that what is sought is appropriate, reasonable, and proportionate.  When it is necessary to decide any question of what is reasonable and proportionate under a particular Model, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case including 6.4 and the overriding objective.  At paragraph 2AA-63.1 the White Book 2024 states:  Approach to determining choice of disclosure model  <blockquote class="wp-block-quote"> In McParland & Partners Ltd v Whitehead [2020] EWHC 298 (Ch), Vos C at [50]–[52] provided guidance on the approach to be taken determining the appropriate disclosure model under the disclosure pilot scheme. The same approach will apply to PD 57AD. Where a party had made a reasonable request for further documentation and disclosure could not be agreed, Model C disclosure was appropriate. Where parties did not trust each other, Model D disclosure was likely to be the simplest, most appropriate choice. Care should also be taken to consider if different disclosure models should apply to different parties. There is no reason in principle why the same issue might not be subject to disclosure Model D for one party, while it is subject to disclosure Models B or C for another party. Model D disclosure may also be appropriate in respect of issues that are central to a party’s pleaded case: Lombard North Central Plc v Airbus Helicopters SAS [2020] EWHC 3819 (Comm), Bryan J, at [20]–[30] following McParland at [51]. </blockquote>   The DRD for cases proceeding under the full regime is found at Appendix 2, and the timetable pertaining to the same is at paragraph 7 of the main body of PD57A.   Again, there is a handy timetable provided (which can be found at the end of Appendix 2).   Timetable for completing the DRD  The timetable should be read in conjunction with paragraph 7 as paragraph 7 sets out exactly what each party needs to do.  <figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Stage to be completed</td><td>PD Ref.</td><td>Deadline</td></tr><tr><td>Step 1</td><td>Each party should state, in writing, whether or not it is likely to request search-based Extended Disclosure to include one or more of Models C, D or E on one or more issues in the case. At this point it should not particularise the Model(s) or the issue(s) in the case.</td><td>Para 7.1</td><td>Within 28 days of the closure of statements of case</td></tr><tr><td>Step 2</td><td>Where one or more of the parties has indicated it is likely to request search-based Extended Disclosure (i.e. Models C, D and/or E), the claimant must prepare and serve on the other parties a draft List of Issues for Disclosure unless the equivalent of such a list has already been agreed between the parties (for example, as part of a fuller list of issues). At the same time, the claimant shall identify for each Issue for Disclosure which Model of Extended Disclosure it proposes for each party. If the claimant proposes Model C Disclosure for any Issue for Disclosure it should indicate, using Section 1B of the Disclosure Review Document, the particular documents or narrow class of documents it proposes should be defined for that purpose. If the claimant fails to take these steps, the defendant may, but is not obliged to, prepare and serve its own draft List of Issues for Disclosure on the other parties together with its proposals on Models and any Model C requests.</td><td>Para 7.2</td><td>Within 42 days of the closure of statements of case</td></tr><tr><td>Step 3</td><td>A party served with a draft List of Issues for Disclosure and proposals on Models shall indicate using Section 1A (and, if applicable, 1B) of the Disclosure Review Document whether it agrees with the proposed Issues for Disclosure and corresponding Model(s) for Extended Disclosure (including any proposals as to how Model C Disclosure should be defined). If the party does not agree, or wishes to propose alternative or additional Issues for Disclosure, other Models and/or other Model C proposals, it should set out its alternative or additional proposals in Sections 1A and 1B of the Disclosure Review Document.</td><td>Para 7.9</td><td>As soon as practicable but in any event no later than 21 days after service of the draft List of Issues for Disclosure</td></tr><tr><td>Step 4</td><td>The parties must discuss and seek to agree the draft List of Issues for Disclosure, the Models identified for each Issue for Disclosure, and the wording of any Model C proposals. They should consider whether any draft Issue for Disclosure can be removed.</td><td>Paras 7.10 and 10.6</td><td>In advance of the first case management conference</td></tr><tr><td>Step 5</td><td>Having sought to agree the List of Issues for Disclosure, proposals on Model(s) for Extended Disclosure and the wording of any Model C requests, the parties should prepare and exchange drafts of Section 2 of the Disclosure Review Document (including costs estimates of different proposals, and where possible estimates of the likely amount of documents involved). Section 2 of the Disclosure Review Document should be completed only if the parties are seeking an order for Extended Disclosure involving a search-based Disclosure Model (i.e. Models C, D and/or E).</td><td>Para 10.5</td><td>As soon as reasonably practicable and in any event not later than 14 days before the case management conference.</td></tr><tr><td>Step 6</td><td>A finalised single joint Disclosure Review Document should be filed by the claimant. Related correspondence and earlier drafts should not ordinarily be filed..</td><td>Para 10.7</td><td>Not later than 5 days before the case management conference</td></tr><tr><td>Step 7</td><td>The parties must independently file a signed Certificate of Compliance substantially in the form set out in Appendix 3 to the Practice Direction</td><td>Para 10.8</td><td>Not less than two days before the case management conference</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>   Guidance on completing the DRD is found at paragraph 10 and in the explanatory notes which come after the DRD in Appendix 2.  Adverse Documents  “Adverse Documents” and “known adverse documents” are defined at paragraphs 2.7 and 2,8:  2.7 Disclosure extends to “adverse” documents. A document is “adverse” if it or any information it contains contradicts or materially damages the disclosing party’s contention or version of events on an issue in dispute, or supports the contention or version of events of an opposing party on an issue in dispute, whether or not that issue is one of the agreed Issues for Disclosure.  2.8 “Known adverse documents” are documents (other than privileged documents) that a party is actually aware (without undertaking any further search for documents than it has already undertaken or caused to be undertaken) both (a) are or were previously within its control and (b) are adverse.  Note as well that a company or organisation is “aware” if any person within the company/organisation with accountability or responsibility for the events or circumstances which are the subject of the case or for the conduct of the proceedings is aware, and at paragraph 2.9 it is expressly said that it is necessary to take reasonable steps to check the position with relevant persons who have left the company/organisation.  If an order for ED is made, the disclosure made must also include any known adverse documents not already disclosed.  If ED is not ordered, all known adverse documents must be disclosed within 60 days of the first CMC, and a Disclosure Certificate provided.   Complying with ED  Paragraph 12 sets out how to comply with an order for ED:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>service of a signed Disclosure Certificate (Appendix 4) confirming all known adverse documents have been disclosed</li>  <li>service of an ED Disclosure List of Documents</li>  <li>production of the documents</li> </ul>  Note paragraph 12.5 -  12.5 A party may not without the permission of the court or agreement of the parties rely on any document in its control that it has not disclosed at the time required for Extended Disclosure (or within 60 days after the first case management conference in a case where there will be no Extended Disclosure). For the avoidance of doubt the party and its legal representatives remain under the duties under paragraph 3.1 (the Disclosure Duties) and 3.2 above.  Where there has been a failure to comply with ED the court may make orders which may include ordering the service of a further, or revised Disclosure Certificate, to make further searches, provide a further or improved Extended Disclosure List of Documents, produce documents, or make a witness statement explaining any matter relating to disclosure.  A party applying for such an order should normally file a witness statement in support and must satisfy the court that making the order is reasonable and proportionate (paragraph 17).  A court may, at any stage, make an order varying an order for ED.  Any party applying for such an order must file a witness statement, and must satisfy the court that varying the original order is both necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings, and that it is reasonable and proportionate (paragraph 18).  Paragraph 14 deals with the right to withhold documents, paragraph 15 deals with confidentiality, and paragraph 16 deals with redaction.  Pursuant to paragraph 21, a party may at any time request a copy of a document mentioned in  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>a statement of case</li>  <li>a witness statement, summary, or affidavit</li>  <li>an expert’s report</li> </ul>  Costs  Parties are required to provide an estimate of what they consider to be the likely costs of giving the disclosure proposed by them in the Disclosure Review Document, and the likely volume of documents involved, in order that a court may consider whether such proposals on disclosure are reasonable and proportionate.  In cases where the cost budgeting scheme applies, if it is not practical to complete the disclosure section of Form H in relation to disclosure prior to the court making an order in relation to disclosure at the CMC, the parties may notify the court that they have agreed to postpone completion of that section of Form H.  The court will give a date at the CMC for completion of the disclosure section, and where possible the court will then consider (and if appropriate, approve) that part of the cost budget without an oral hearing.  Nicola Phillipson Parklane Plowden Chambers May 2024  This article has been written by a trusts and probate practitioner for the benefit of practitioners who attended Parklane Plowden’s Annual Trusts Conference in June 2024.  Therefore, whilst this article may be of use to other practitioners, please be aware of the intended audience.  This article is also intended to provide guidance only and should not be relied upon as legal advice.  <hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>  <a id="_ftn1" href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Please see disclaimer above – this article has been written with trusts practitioners in mind

Attorney General’s Regional Panel

Following the recent appointments to the <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/attorney-generals-regional-panel/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Attorney General’s Regional panel</a>, Parklane Plowden now has 11 members who are able to undertake instructions from government departments.  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/dominic-bayne/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Dominic Bayne</a> – Attorney General’s A Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/leila-benyounes/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Leila Benyounes</a> – Attorney General’s A Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/andrew-webster/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Andrew Webster</a> – Attorney General’s A Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/tim-wilkinson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Tim Wilkinson</a> – Attorney General’s A Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bronia-hartley/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bronia Hartley</a> – Attorney General’s B Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/richard-ryan/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Richard Ryan</a> – Attorney General’s B Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/robert-dunn/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Robert Dunn</a> – Attorney General’s C Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/amy-rumble/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Amy Rumble</a> – Attorney General’s C Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/may-martin/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">May Martin</a> – Attorney General’s C Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bharat Jangra</a> – Attorney General’s Junior Junior Panel</li>  <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/sophie-watson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Sophie Watson</a> – Attorney General’s Junior Junior Panel</li> </ol>  These appointments underline Chambers’ preeminent position on Circuit.  Should you wish to discuss the team or instruct any of our members, please <a href="mailto:clerks@parklaneplowden.co.uk" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">contact our dedicated clerking team</a>.

Interest Adds Up: Main v SpaDental Ltd [2024] EAT 200

Facts  The Appellant, a dentist, worked for the Respondent company, SpaDental Ltd, for several years. He claimed unpaid holiday pay on the basis that he was a ‘worker’ under section 230(3) Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”).  After litigating the issue from 2019 to 2022, it was established that he was indeed a worker for the purposes of section 230(3). A remedy hearing was listed. This case note is on the 2024 EAT hearing, which was an appeal concerning issues on remedy only.  The claim largely concerned holiday pay. The claim was made as one for unlawful deductions from wages under section 23 of the ERA.   Relevant Law  The main legal framework engaged was the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“WTR”).  Regulation 13 of the WTR sets out a worker’s entitlement to annual leave. This includes payment in lieu of untaken leave where the worker’s employment is terminated.  Regulation 16 deals with payment in respect of periods of leave.  Regulation 30 outlines remedy in the form of compensation. It gives an employment tribunal discretion to award an amount which is just and equitable – regulation 30(4).  Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC was also relevant. It does not impose a limit to the reimbursement of loss and damage sustained by a person, nor is there an exclusion of an award of interest to compensate for the loss sustained.   Issues  There were two issues to be considered:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Did the claim vest in the trustee in bankruptcy?</li>  <li>Was the Appellant entitled to interest on the holiday pay owed by the Respondent?</li> </ol>  The remaining issues were agreed. It was also agreed that EU law applied as the facts of the case occurred before the UK left the EU.    Focus is on the second ground of interest.   Submissions  On the second ground, the Appellant argued that interest was an essential component of compensation and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence applied. It was also submitted that policy reasons were a crucial consideration:  “Were it not so, employers would have a financial incentive for non-compliance with the WTR even if they might eventually be ordered to pay the holiday pay, and could gain a competitive advantage from non-compliance.”  at [75].  The Respondent argued that the principle of equivalence was irrelevant because the domestic provisions on interest in civil court cases are discretionary. The respondent accepted that the employment judge was entitled to consider the parties’ interactions, the passage of time and regulation 30.   Outcome  The EAT held that:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>The first issue was correctly decided at first instance – the Claimant’s claim brought against the Respondent to provide him with paid leave was a proprietary claim which vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.</li>  <li>The employment tribunal at first instance erred in its refusal to award any “interest-like” compensation.</li> </ol>  The interest in this case involved substantial figures. It added £42,082 on top of the original award of £83,573, calculated at 8% running from the mid-point of each leave year. The rate of interest was accepted as post-judgment interest.  EU law was not necessary to be considered and the principle of equivalence “does not add anything of significance to the present case” at [87].   Analysis on Interest Issue  This case is important for two main reasons:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>It clarifies (or perhaps expands) the discretion of the employment tribunal to award interest on compensation under the WTR.</li>  <li>It sets out clear factors that the employment tribunal should consider.</li> </ol>  Firstly, the employment tribunal does not have an express power to award interest accruing before judgment on compensation or other sums under the Working Time Regulations or Employment Rights Act. It is accepted that interest is granted for sex discrimination and equal pay awards following Marshall v Southampton and SW Hampshire AHA (No 2) [1994]. Here, the ECJ held that to not award interest would be contrary to Article 6 Equal Treatment Directive. Interest is now pursuant to the Industrial Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996. The 1996 Regulations apply to awards under the Equal Pay Act 1970, as well as awards resulting from successful sex, race and disability discrimination claims.  The judgment is significant because it may open the door to awards of interest on compensatory awards for other claims, like unfair dismissal. It was decided that the wording of Regulation 30 of the Working Time Regulations was wide enough to grant a compensatory award that includes interest or an “interest-like” payment. Therefore, it is possible that other tribunals will decide they have discretion to award interest in other cases too. Where the award is substantial or the time passed is significant, the interest can amount to a generous sum. It is therefore a crucial consideration in remedy hearings.  Secondly, Bourne J outlined 5 distinct factors at paragraph 62 to be considered when awarding interest in a Working Time Regulation case:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Regulation 30(4)</li>  <li>What is just and equitable</li>  <li>The nature of the company’s default</li>  <li>Any loss sustained by the Claimant</li>  <li>Significance of the sums involved</li> </ol>  Interest will not be awarded automatically following this case. It was not clear whether these are five strict criteria to be followed each and every time. It was also not established if all 5 factors are required for interest to be awarded.  Therefore, both parties should assess whether some, if any, factors are satisfied and assess this on a reasonable basis.  Marshall was the clear influence in this appeal. The Court in Marshall explained that “full compensation” for “loss and damage” includes the factor of reduction in value by effluxion of time. Bourne J in Main indicated at paragraph 86 that this “factor must be brought into account”. This is useful in practice in support of an argument that the 5 factors above are not exhaustive. In practice, parties should bear in mind the passage of time and how this will impact the final sum awarded. A common-sense approach is implicitly endorsed.  This case reminds practitioners to bear in mind interest on compensation in remedy hearings. Whether representing claimant or respondent, it may amount to a significant sum. The Tribunal is yet to establish any hard and fast rules, so this discretion and flexibility may be a useful advantage where relevant.  The full judgment can be found <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/676945103229e84d9bbde9f0/Mr_James_Main_v_SpaDental_Ltd_and_Timothy_Alexander_Close__In_His_Capacity_as_Trustee_in_Bankruptcy_of_Mr_Main___2024__EAT_200.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.

Parklane Plowden Chambers Strengthens Family Team with Children’s Law Silk

Parklane Plowden Chambers has welcomed a children’s law silk to its 38-strong family team as part of its strategy of continued expansion  Simon Bickler KC, who was called to the bar 1988 and took silk in 2011, joins from Leeds-based St Pauls Chambers where he was previously Head of Chambers.  Appointed as a Deputy High Court Judge sitting in family law in 2019, his practice encompasses all aspects of children’s law including abduction, private and public law.  Simon’s specialisms include child arrangement disputes, serious and non-accidental injuries and child fatalities, sexual abuse allegations alongside fabricated and induced illness and child relocation proceedings.  His clients include local authorities, parents, children’s guardians, extended family, foster carers and prospective adopters.  Commenting on his new tenancy, Simon said: “I’m pleased to join Parklane Plowden’s family team, which has a long-established reputation for its progressive outlook and expertise in both private and public law proceedings.  “The set has seen significant growth and I look forward to working with like-minded colleagues who support a broad range of clients in proceedings and are committed to delivering positive outcomes.”  Parklane Plowden senior practice director, Stephen Render, commented: “Simon is a highly experienced, renowned silk whose additional judicial role makes him a valuable asset to our expanding family team.”  “He has handled a range of complex cases which means he is well positioned to support clients during proceedings which are often accompanied by high-levels of emotion.”  Please click <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/simon-bickler-kc/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a> to access Simon Bickler KC's profile.

Consent, control, and ‘the silencing of the child’s voice in medical interventions’ – Re G [2025] Fam Law 254

We are pleased to share that Parklane Plowden family pupil, Avaia Williams, has recently published an article in the Family Law Journal (February 2025).  In this piece, Avaia provides insight into the High Court decision in Re G, where the court examined whether parental consent can authorise nasogastric feeding (and any necessary restraint) of a 12-year-old girl with anorexia nervosa who refused treatment. Central to the article is the tension between, on the one hand, established case law and parental responsibility, and, on the other, the paramount importance of the child’s rights and autonomy. Avaia discusses how the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, now considered outdated, complicates these cases and leaves ambiguity about the proper legal framework.  “The spillover of this reasoning into cases like Re G, where G's resistance to treatment was known, places the child's rights at the bottom of the hierarchy, effectively replacing their voice with parental consent shaped by medical advice. This is particularly concerning when the child is not capable of articulating their opposition or consent, further marginalising their autonomy.”  In addressing the court’s ruling that a parent can consent to treatment, even that which is repeatedly “invasive and traumatic” and will amount to a deprivation of liberty, the article questions whether the welfare principle and a child’s wishes truly retain their prominence when a child’s competence is in doubt. Avaia highlights the potential need for more robust judicial oversight:  “Going forward, notwithstanding the discussion in Re G, Trusts would be benefited by issuing cases to ensure proper oversight, particularly given there are going to be such circumstances where it is not clearly in the best interests of the child to restrain and enforce treatment. Until such a time as a revised Code is produced, best practice should ensure that the welfare principle is upheld, and that the child's voice (even if apparently ascertainable through parents) is properly heard.”  For further details on Re G’s implications for both families and practitioners, you can read Avaia’s full article in Family Law Journal (February 2025 issue) <a href="https://plus.lexis.com/uk/document/?pdmfid=1001073&crid=edb0238e-ea5f-4931-8e98-587e4b38ab49&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials-uk%2Furn:contentItem:6F9D-F753-RTC9-P43B-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=228780&pdteaserkey=&pdislpamode=false&pddocumentnumber=1&pdworkfolderlocatorid=NOT_SAVED_IN_WORKFOLDER&ecomp=5t5k&earg=sr0&prid=7cd62a4a-4ef6-4ca3-8b80-e894e703a355" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.   <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/avaia-williams-pupil/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Avaia</a> will be taking instructions in all areas of children law and Court of Protection (Health & Welfare) from 07 April 2025.

Exploring non-court dispute resolution methods in family cases

Listen to Parklane Plowden’s latest PLP Podcast – Exploring non-court dispute resolution methods in family cases  Parklane Plowden family barristers <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/giorgia-sessi/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Giorgia Sessi</a>, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/daniel-pitt/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Daniel Pitt</a> and head of the Family team <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/julia-nelson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Julia Nelson</a> explore non-court based dispute resolution methods, something which practitioners now have to advise clients to engage in meaningfully throughout cases.  Together they explore a range of non-court dispute resolution methods, including private financial dispute resolution (FDR) and arbitration as well as looking ahead to how AI is impacting the work of family lawyers.  Key questions covered include why legal practitioners should recommend a private FDR or arbitration, what cases they are most suited for and what impact the speed and flexibility has compared to court-based hearings.  They also discuss how to maximise the effectiveness of private FDRs alongside issues such as cost implications, judge selection, how to handle parties who back out or who do not want to settle and ensuring neutrality.  Listen to the podcast below.

PLP Hosts University of Leeds Debate Finals

On 03 March 2025, Parklane Plowden was delighted to host an impressive and talented group of speakers from Leeds Law Society and Lawyers Without Borders for the debate finals. Judged by our two Leeds pupils, Lydia Reed and Avaia Williams, the proposal was a challenge for any seasoned debater: “This house believes that democratic states should constitutionally prohibit the imposition of martial law."  Two teams competed in the heated finals, with Leeds Law Society emerging victorious. Delivering a powerful argument against the motion, demonstrating adept advocacy and reasoning.  The judges also awarded two ‘distinguished speaker’ acknowledgments for those speakers who showed talent and ability beyond that which would be expected. Matilda Forrest who took on the role of Leader of the Opposition, and Fatima Babar who was acting as Opposition Whip, both performed exceptionally and left a lasting impression on Lydia and Avi.  Parklane Plowden had hosted the previous two heats in the competition. James Murphy, Head of Chambers, judged the first-round concerning whether the internet should be provided as a basic human right; with Dominic Crossley presiding over the second-round debate on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill.  These events were organised by the Law Society's Debating Secretary, Evie Dutton.  Teams/Speakers  Leeds Law Society (winning team)  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Matilda Forrest (distinguished speaker)</li>  <li>Fatima Babar (distinguished speaker)</li>  <li>Abdul-Hafeez Ganiyu</li>  <li>Kailing Ruan</li> </ol>  Lawyers Without Borders  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>Maryam Khawaja</li>  <li>Sumana Madichetty</li>  <li>Zaara Ilani Binti Mohd Zin</li>  <li>Janith Prabashwara Perera Jayatilake Kankanamalage</li> </ol>  Quotes  "We had an insightful evening listening to the debate. It was encouraging to see so many enthusiastic debaters and we hope they enjoyed their visit to Chambers as much as we did hosting them." (Lydia Reed)  “It was a pleasure hosting the teams and observers from the University, supporting with outreach such as this is something that really matters to me and Chambers and we are dedicated to working with local groups and organisations to encourage talented young people to pursue the Bar. I had a really enjoyable time judging the debate, and it was surprising to learn that many of those speakers who joined us were only just in their first year, including our distinguished speakers.” (Avaia Williams)

When enough is enough – Court of Appeal Decides Against International Placement

Avaia Williams (Pupil) and Deborah Shield review the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the case of <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2025/214" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Re M (A Child) (Placement Order) [2025] EWCA Civ 214</a>. A decision concerning the placement options for a young boy, M, where the court was asked to grapple with placing the child for adoption or delaying proceedings and determination to support a possible family placement abroad.  The judgment, given by Lady Justice King, is infused with the concept that delay is prejudicial to a child, and that there comes a point within proceedings where ‘enough is enough’ and the nettle must be grasped.  Background  M was born during existing care proceedings relating to the parents other children. M was initially placed with the mother under an Interim Care Order, however, following breaches of the safety plan, M was placed into foster care.  The mother put forward M’s aunt and uncle, who lived in Pakistan, as alternative carers. These alternative carers were supported by the Local Authority until August 2024, at which point, the Local Authority moved to a plan of adoption within the UK.  By the time of the final hearing in October, a positive Children and Families Across Boarders (“CFAB”) assessment had been completed of the aunt and uncle. This assessment raised some concerns and uncertainties, such as the level of education that would be available to M and the impact on the family unit in Pakistan given the uncle may need to work extended hours and abroad. That being said, the assessment recommended the aunt and uncle as:  “suitable to be considered to care for the children (sic) if they are provided with financial support.”   Given the positive CFAB assessment, the aunt and uncle sought an adjournment at the final hearing to allow a full assessment of them to be carried out within the UK (as would be required to affect such a placement abroad). This was refused by the court, and a Placement Order was made. The judge’s reasoning was encapsulated by the placement with the aunt and uncle being “fraught with uncertainties”, at [41] the Court of Appeal quoted the judges reasoning that:  “…there is sadly no clear and confirmed timescale for the assessment to be completed, and no guarantee that it will be positive (though I accept, there are grounds for optimism that it would be based on the CFAB assessment). [M] has no existing relationship with the Aunt and Uncle (although they have seen him over video calls in the first few weeks of his life, he does not know them, and they speak a different language  I have balanced these very real and in my judgment legitimate concerns with the potential positives in the court sanctioning delay for assessment to take place, because, if positive, it would enable [M] to be placed with an extended family member, in a cultural and religious match, with the possibility for ongoing relationship (even if limited) with his parents and other family members.”  Grounds of Appeal  The aunt and uncle appealed on five grounds, that the judge was wrong to:  “i) Accept that Accept that a plan to place M with his aunt and uncle was “fraught with uncertainties”.  ii) Conclude that it would be akin to 6–12 months before a successful placement could be achieved if an assessment of the aunt and uncle were positive.  iii) Conclude that there was a real possibility that the assessment would be negative.   iv) Conclude that an adjournment was not within M’s reasonable timescales for achieving a permanent placement absent direct evidence as to timescales to place M for adoption.  v) Fail to consider if a “robust and focused timescale” could have been imposed to lead to an expeditious resolution of proceedings following further assessment of the aunt and uncle.”  In submissions, Teertha Gupta KC, focused on the third and fifth grounds of appeal, having conceded there were clear uncertainties with the plan and that the assessment for 6-12 months was something the judge could have reasonably assessed.  Ground iii  With respect to ground iii, the Court stated at [53]  “That there was a real possibility that the assessment might fail was in my judgment an inevitable consequence of the uncertainty inherent in the whole complicated plan; for example, it may simply not have been viable because the funding was no longer available from the cash-poor local authority or the applications for visas may be refused. M may himself have found the introduction to his aunt and uncle with the language barrier just too difficult and, as had been identified by Ms Rafiq, there were issues with schools and the home conditions. These were all potential stumbling blocks. For my part I can see that there was also a significant risk that the demands on the aunt and uncle might be simply too great. Should the matter have been adjourned then, providing they managed to obtain visas, the family would have relocated to a strange country for an unspecified period of time for assessment and, if successful, the uncle would then return to Pakistan with the two older (but by no means grown up) children. Once home they would have to manage without their primary carer while their father worked punishingly long hours, potentially for many months, whilst court proceedings took their course in both the UK and Pakistan, proceedings which would be necessary in order to provide essential protection for M’s position in Pakistan.”  It was clear that the judge did consider the positives within the CFAB assessment, notably the cultural match and a family placement, however, drawing on Re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents Competing Claims) [2016] EWCA Civ 793, the Court reaffirmed at [55] that:  “As in any case where it is hoped that a family placement can be achieved it is important, as was perhaps not recognised until too late in this case, that there is no presumption or right for a child to be brought up by a member of his or her natural family.”  On ground iii, the court concluded at [56] that:  “Ultimately the judge concluded that M’s welfare demanded that he be placed for adoption and that when she performed a proportionality cross check she said she was “satisfied that, despite its draconian nature and lifelong consequences, adoption is a necessary and proportionate interference – in short, nothing else will do”.”  Ground v  As to ground v, it was submitted by Teertha Gupta KC, that, given the delay already in place, there was no requirement for the court to now “bring down the guillotine” and that an extension should be granted under s.32(5) Children Act 1989. The Court relied on Sir James Munby’s assessment in Re S (a child) (Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment) [2015] 1 WLR 925, where the then President held at [34] of that judgment that:  “I repeat, because the point is so important, that in no case can an extension beyond 26 weeks be authorised unless it is "necessary" to enable the court to resolve the proceedings "justly". Only the imperative demands of justice – fair process – or of the child's welfare will suffice…”  Further, the Court drew on the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ in Re S-L (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 1571, where the Court of Appeal in that case, at [12], decided that:  “In cases involving children, there can sometimes be good reasons for adjourning a final decision in order to obtain necessary information. The overriding obligation is to deal with the case justly, but there is a trade-off between the need for information and the presumptive prejudice to the child of delay […] public law proceedings are subject to a statutory timetabling imperative. Section 32(1)(a) provides that the court must draw up a timetable for disposing of the application without delay and in any event within 26 weeks; subsection 32(5) allows an extension only where the court considers it necessary to enable the proceedings to be resolved justly.”  The Court considered the crucial age at which M now was. M was entering critical phases for developing his attachments.  On ground v, the court concluded at [64] that:  “…the judge’s careful and sympathetic analysis of the application for an adjournment for further assessments of the aunt and uncle cannot be faulted and in my judgment she reached the right decision given the uncertainties inherent in the proposed plan for placement in Pakistan and the urgency of achieving permanency for M.”  Comment  Tt has been 12 years since the Supreme Court gave the landmark ruling in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, and the Court of Appeal gave guidance in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. It was hoped that the Court of Appeal may have taken this opportunity to provide further guidance on the concept of “nothing else will do” given this nebulous concept has caused much debate and concern for practitioners across the board.  The concept of “nothing else will do” creates a paradox when paired with a clear statutory time-limit of 26-weeks for resolving children proceedings. How can it be said, on the purely factual basis in this case, and countless others, that nothing else will do for this child. Whilst the judge was evidently right to conclude that the assessment and placement with the aunt and uncle was an uncertain placement, it is a comment which can be applied to every placement that results from care proceedings, whether adoption or otherwise.  What is clear, is that this child had a clear opportunity to be placed within his family unit. Notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal, and previous decisions, that there is no ‘right’ to such a family placement, it is incontestable that a family placement has inherent benefits and is the preferred outcome where that placement is safe (were this not the case, Local Authorities would have no duty to assess connected carers). So, whilst the assessment of the aunt and uncle was not clear, it was optimistic and was a viable way forward. As such, on a literal interpretation, it could not be said that “nothing else will do” but placing M for adoption.  It is clear that “nothing else will do” comes with several caveats such that the actual rule, or at least how it is applied in courts, appears to be more akin to “nothing else will reasonably or realistically do, given the welfare needs of the child”. As the Court of Appeal in Re M have made clear, delay, especially where 26-weeks has been surpassed, will clearly require that any alternative plan be more and more realistic and more and  more reasonable than it otherwise may have to be at the start of proceedings (this being encapsulated by the Local Authorities approach here).  What can be learned from this case, is the need for Local Authorities, and those representing parents, to be proactive in identifying and assessing potential kinship carers at the earliest possible stage of proceedings. ‘Front-loading’ these assessments can help avoid the late emergence of an overseas relative or other connected person, which often places the court in the difficult position of choosing between exploring a potentially appropriate kinship placement and meeting strict statutory deadlines. By initiating thorough kinship assessments at the outset, local authorities not only ensure transparency and fairness but also mitigate the risk of children lingering in uncertain temporary arrangements. From the parental perspective, practitioners should advise parents on the importance of promptly disclosing potential family carers and providing all necessary details as soon as possible, thus offering a more realistic chance of success for kinship placements if they are viable.  A clear problem in practice is the misunderstanding of twin tracking by a) the parents; and b) the prospective carers; it must be made abundantly clear to those involved in proceedings, that suggesting such connected carers in no way takes away from the assessment of parents or the court dealing with proceedings.  Local authorities and practitioners acting for parents must collaborate to address matters such as visa applications, relocation logistics, funding arrangements, and compliance with both UK and foreign legal systems at an early stage. Where an international assessment is a serious possibility, forward planning, including formal engagement with international bodies like CFAB and seeking specialist advice, should form part of the initial case strategy, ensuring clarity around timelines, financial support, and the child’s specific educational or medical needs if placed overseas. It appears that, in such cases, the recommendations made by the Public Law Working Group in respect of international adoption may offer valuable steering.  Deborah Shield, led by Teertha Gupta KC, acted for the aunt and uncle in the Court of Appeal.

Deborah Shield appears in Court of Appeal Case Deciding Against International Placement

Deborah Shield appeared in Re M (A Child) (Placement Order) [2025] EWCA Civ 214.  The case concerned the placement options for a young boy, M, where the court was asked to grapple with placing the child for adoption or delaying proceedings and determination to support a possible family placement abroad.  Deborah Shield, led by Teertha Gupta KC, acted for the aunt and uncle in the Court of Appeal.  For more on this matter, please read Deborah Shield and Avaia Williams' review of the case, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/when-enough-is-enough-court-of-appeal-decides-against-international-placement/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.

Latest News

Legal Update

9 May 2025

Coroners Statistics 2024: Key Trends

Read time: < 1 m

Legal Update

7 May 2025

Gonorrhoea and Presumed Sexual Abuse – Court of Appeal Clarifies Re A, B and C

Read time: 8 m

News

6 May 2025

Neglect Found to Have Contributed to Death Where There Was Post-Operative Bleeding

Read time: 2 m