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Neglect Found to have Contributed to Death from a Failure to Diagnose Pulmonary Thromboembolism

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila Benyounes represented the family of a lady who died at home from an undiagnosed pulmonary thromboembolism 10 days after presenting at her GP with sudden shortness of breath on exertion. Her death occurred seven days after she was discharged from hospital, after being referred there by her GP, due to a misdiagnosis of heart failure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>At the inquest, it was held that the lady developed a thromboembolism prior to her attendance at hospital, and in accordance with NICE guidance the presence of a pulmonary thromboembolism should have been suspected as a possible diagnosis. It was held that further investigations should have been arranged, which would have confirmed the diagnosis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It was further held that high dose anti-coagulant medication should have been administered, thereby reducing the existing pulmonary thromboembolism, and preventing others from forming, which would have prevented the lady’s death.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner found that there were gross failures to provide basic medical care to the lady, which would on the balance of probabilities, have prevented her death.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A formal finding of ‘neglect’ was made by the coroner who concluded that the lady’s death was aggravated by lack of care and recorded that the death was due to natural causes contributed to by neglect.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila was instructed by <a href="https://www.fletcherssolicitors.co.uk/team/jerard-knott/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Jerard Knott</a> and Laura Forsyth of Fletchers Solicitors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Leila Benyounes is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as Band 1 by Legal 500 for Inquests and Inquiries. Leila has been appointed to the Attorney General’s Treasury Counsel Panel A since 2010. Leila is appointed as an Assistant Coroner in two coronial areas. Leila regularly represents interested persons in a wide range of inquests including Article 2 jury inquests and complex medical matters. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a></em>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

22nd January 2025 | Parklane Plowden Pupillage Evening

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>We are pleased to be hosting a pupillage open evening on Wednesday 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2025 in our Newcastle Chambers starting at 6pm.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is an informal event providing a chance to meet some of our current pupils and members, have a look around the building and listen to a few short presentations about the pupillages we have on offer, our different practice areas, as well as our selection process and how best to approach it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If you would like to attend, please RSVP to <a href="mailto:events@parklaneplowden.co.uk" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">events@parklaneplowden.co.uk</a> by 21<sup>st</sup> January 2025.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For more information about pupillages within Chambers, see our Pupillage Guide available <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2024/11/Pupillage-Guide-2024.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a> and our Pupillage Training Programme, available <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2024/11/Pupillage-Training-Programme-Nov-24.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>. You can also visit our <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/pupillages/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Pupillage Page</a> on the website.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Letters of Wishes

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Nature of a letter of wishes</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A “<em>letter of wishes</em>” has been described as being <em>“a mechanism for the communication by a settlor to trustees of the settlement of non binding requests by him to take stated matters into account when exercising their discretionary powers"</em> (see<em> Breakspear v Ackland</em> [2008] EWHC 220).  Such a letter may be produced in relation to an inter vivos settlement or a testamentary trust. It will usually state that the wishes expressed in it are non binding.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Letters of wishes are most commonly produced in relation to the issue of how a settlor or testator would like the income and capital of a discretionary trust fund to be applied. However, they might also usefully be produced in relation to the exercise of an overriding power of appointment in relation to a flexible interest in possession trust or the exercise of an administrative power such as a power of investment or a power to add beneficiaries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>One reason that a testator might decide to create a discretionary trust of residue is because there are fraught family relationships and the testator wants to leave it to trustees to make decisions as to how the family are to benefit. They may wish to express sentiments to the trustees about family members which they would not want widely known. In such a case, the production of a detailed letter of wishes is crucial. However, even in less controversial circumstances, a letter of wishes should be produced so that there is no doubt as to what the relevant wishes of the settlor or testator were.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Although a letter of wishes is in essence a non binding document, it is important because it is a relevant consideration to be taken into account by trustees in relation to the exercise of their discretions. It was confirmed in<em> Pitt v Holt </em>[2013] UKSC 26 that “<em>the settlor’s wishes are always a material consideration in the exercise of fiduciary discretions</em>.” The better view is that the trustees must take the contents of a letter of wishes into account although they are not bound to follow it. That process will involve a consideration as to whether it is proper to follow such wishes in the interests of one or more of the beneficiaries of the trust. The trustees must still form their own view and they must not unthinkingly follow the wishes of the settlor or testator.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whilst a letter of wishes is only one factor for trustees to take into account when considering the exercise of a discretion, in practice, most trustees will endeavour to follow those wishes if they possibly can. As is stated in <em>Lewin on Trusts </em>“<em>trustees therefore rightly give great weight to the settlor’s wishes, either expressed from time to time during his lifetime or recorded, usually in documentary form, before his death</em>.” However, that does involve interpreting those wishes accurately (see <em>Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr </em>[2003] Ch 409). Trustees should also take into account any orally expressed wishes of the settlor or testator but it may be more difficult to establish what they were, if not formally recorded.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A settlor or testator can and should update a letter of wishes from time to time. Earlier letters of wishes may be superceded by later ones as a matter of construction or they may all remain of relevance if they deal with different issues. The first letter of wishes is likely to remain of relevance in any event in determining what a settlor’s purpose was in conferring a particular power on the trustees (see <em>Wong v Grand View Private Trust Co Ltd </em>[2022] UKPC 47).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A letter of wishes is likely to be of diminishing importance where it was made many years previously, particularly if there has been a material change of circumstances such as a beneficiary suffering serious health or financial problems.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>When might it be legitimate for trustees to decide not to follow the letter of wishes? It must be remembered that the trustees are subject to an overarching duty to administer the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Therefore, one circumstance would be where those wishes are unreasonable. For example, A created a discretionary trust of residue worth £10m but indicated that he did not want any of his family to ever have access to income or capital as of right. That view was not based on anything in the beneficiaries’ circumstances which made such a view appropriate but simply A’s desire to control his family from the grave. The consequence of following his wishes would be that no use could be made of the spouse exemption and anniversary charges would be incurred, diminishing the trust fund. Another example might be if the settlor or testator wanted the trust fund to be invested in a manner which the trustees considered would prejudice the beneficiaries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Disclosure</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A beneficiary may ask the trustees to provide a copy of the letter of wishes. Trustees must proceed cautiously in that regard. The exercise of discretionary dispositive powers by trustees has traditionally been regarded as an inherently confidential process as it is in the interests of the beneficiaries of family discretionary trusts and advantageous to the due administration of such trusts that the exercise by the trustees of their powers be treated from start to finish as confidential (see <em>Breakspear</em> endorsing the approach in<em> Re Londonderry’s Settlement</em> [1965] Ch 918).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This means that trustees are usually well advised not to give voluntary disclosure of a letter of wishes. If the trustees do not disclose the letter of wishes, it is obviously far less likely that a beneficiary will seek to challenge the validity of any decision they make by reference to that letter. The trustees should also not give reasons for any decision to refuse to disclose the letter of wishes. It was confirmed in <em>Breakspear</em> that they are not obliged to give reasons in that regard, but, that if they give any reasons, then the Court could review the decision.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Despite this, the trustees can still choose to disclose the letter of wishes to a beneficiary if they consider disclosure to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries and the due administration of the trust. In that regard, they are not bound to follow a direction from the settlor or testator that the letter should not be disclosed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Court application</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the trustees do not voluntarily disclose the letter of wishes, would the Court order disclosure? The traditional view was that a beneficiary had the right to call for accurate information as to the state of the trust and that the trustee had to be ready with their accounts. The beneficiary was also considered to have the right to inspect trust documents at all reasonable times and to take copies at their own expense. However, circumstances might warrant the withholding of disclosure, such as where it related to the exercise of trustees’ dispositive powers.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In <em>Schmidt v Rosewood </em>[2003] UKPC 26 the Privy Council held that a beneficiary did not have an automatic right to the production of trust documents but they could apply to the Court to seek disclosure of them. Whether disclosure would in fact be ordered was in the discretion of the Court. This was an aspect of the Court’s jurisdiction to supervise trusts and to intervene in their administration and it extended to discretionary beneficiaries. However, the Court still recognised that the need to protect confidentiality was one of the most important limitations to the disclosure of trust documents.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Although a letter of wishes is an important part of the trustees’ decision making process and it can be argued that disclosure would enable beneficiaries to ascertain whether trustees are acting properly, the Court will usually not order disclosure of it. In <em>Breakspear </em>it was stated that “<em>it is therefore brought into existence for the sole purpose of serving and facilitating an inherently confidential purpose. It seems to me axiomatic that a document brought into existence for the sole or predominant purpose of being used in furtherance of an inherently confidential purpose is itself properly to be regarded as confidential</em>.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>There can be exceptions to this. In<em> Breakspear</em> itself disclosure was ordered of the letter of wishes on the basis that it would have to be disclosed in relation to the trustees’ intended application for Court approval of the exercise of their dispositive discretions and disclosure now was likely to avoid delay and cost.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Another exception would be in relation to litigation between the trustees and beneficiaries, such as a challenge to the exercise of powers by the trustees. There the beneficiaries’ entitlement to disclosure is based on their status as litigants and not beneficiaries. In that context, relevance and necessity are the governing criteria and confidentiality is a subordinate consideration. However, the Court warned in <em>Breakspear </em>that the Court would adopt a robust approach to spurious litigation brought by beneficiaries as a fishing expedition simply to secure disclosure of the letter of wishes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Hussain. Again. Taxi Credit Hire in 2024.

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>I recently represented the Defendant in <em><u>Mazahar Hussain v EUI Limited</u></em>[2024] EWCC 16. A copy of the judgment handed down by HHJ Malek in Bradford is available here:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/Misc/2024/CC16.html&amp;query=(Hussain)+AND+(EUI)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/Misc/2024/CC16.html&amp;query=(Hussain)+AND+(EUI)</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judgment provides a thorough guide to the application of the principles set out in <em><u>Hussain v EUI</u></em> [2019] EWHC 2647 (QB).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant, a self-employed taxi driver, sought damages for various heads of loss. The claims for the pre-accident value of his vehicle and PSLA were unremarkable. The judge dismissed a claim for storage and recovery in its entirety.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The main head of loss related to a claim for credit hire charges for a plated vehicle in the sum of £33,140.52. The Claimant hired for a period of 162 days at at a daily rate of £203.46 including CDW and VAT. The Claimant had actually replaced the damaged vehicle within about five weeks of the date of the accident but continued to hire due to difficulties in getting the new vehicle plated by the local authority.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant did not assert impecuniosity and provided no financial disclosure. He asserted that he required a vehicle to continue with his employment and for social use.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant asserted that he fell into the first of the <em><u>Hussain</u></em> exceptions in that he risked losing future business if he did not continue to work. In support of that assertion, he relied upon a letter from his taxi base which suggested that he would permanently lose his place on the base if he was absent for more than seven days.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Defendant argued that the Claimant should be restricted to loss of profit (zero, in the absence of financial disclosure) and BHR for a non-plated vehicle for the period until the Claimant’s own vehicle was replaced. The Defendant argued that the Claimant did not fall into any of the <em><u>Hussain</u></em> exceptions such that he was entitled to recover the cost of hiring a taxi.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In relation to the risk of losing future business, the judge held:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>11. In my judgment there are a number of steps that need to be taken. The starting point requires an understanding of the Claimant’s profitability prior to the accident. That enables a calculation to be made of the pro-rata loss of profit over the relevant period. The next step in the calculation is to estimate the hypothetical loss of profit that might arise from the fact that by not providing his services a professional driver risks the permanent impairment of his trade.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>12. In the case of a self-employed professional private hire taxi driver plying his trade, whether by using the services of one or more taxi “bases” or not, requires the consideration of two things. The first, and easiest to work out, is the profitability of his or her trade. The next is the likelihood that his business (of being a self-employed private hire taxi driver) will be permanently impaired. This involves not only a consideration of whether or not he may be “dropped” by one “base”, but also whether or not he is able to move to another “base” or take advantage of an online platform such as Uber.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>13. Another, and perhaps better, way of looking at the same thing is to ask how long is it reasonable for a business to continue to operate at a loss (by for example hiring a vehicle) in order to ensure that future business is not permanently impaired? The answer to the question will depend on (a) how profitable the business is, (b) the size of the loss, and of course (c) the likelihood that the business would be permanently impaired absent the mitigation. Clearly, the less profitable the business and/or the greater the loss (i.e. greater the cost of hire) the less likely it is to be a reasonable course of action. Likewise, if there is little likelihood that the business will be permanently impaired then the less reasonable it will be to spend significant sums in mitigation.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>14. It might, fairly, be said that the approach I have set out above is overly technical and no professional driver would address his mind to these matters in the way that I have set out. Whilst I accept that the way I have set out the considerations might be seen as overly theoretical I think it does a disservice to professional drivers to suggest that they are not able to address their minds to these issues. Any businessman who is faced with the dilemma of having to operate at a loss in order to ensure that his business is not permanently affected will give careful consideration to the profitability of the business, the size and duration of the loss and the likelihood that, absent running at a loss for a period of time, the business will be permanently impaired. Whilst s/he may not give express voice or set out each separate consideration in the way that I have I am sure that no rational or reasonable decision can be made absent such considerations. Allied to that I also accept that claimants who find themselves the victims of acts of negligence are not expected to weigh matters to “a nicety” when attempting to mitigate their losses. However, they will, as a matter of logic if nothing else, have had, at the very least, to have given some thought to all of these matters before s/he can be heard to say that s/he acted in mitigation.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>15. Neither will a bare assertion that the claimant has thought about mitigation suffice. The court will need to understand whether the proposed course of action taken by a claimant is an act of reasonable mitigation bearing in mind the individual circumstances. The profitability and likelihood of permanent impairment of the business are key to making such an assessment and, accordingly, a claimant should come to court fully prepared to evidence these matters.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>16. In this case the Claimant provides absolutely no financial information or evidence of his profit (or hypothetical loss of profit in the event his trade was compromised) or even hint at having given this any thought before opting to hire a vehicle which would cost him £203.46 per day. Accordingly, he cannot hope to persuade a court that the first exception in Hussain applies to him.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With regard to the letter from the taxi company:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>17. Even if I am wrong about the above and the Claimant need not evidence his profitability as a self-employed driver, the evidence that he does provide, which appears to be aimed at demonstrating that his future trading would be compromised, is woefully inadequate. All that the Claimant is able to muster by way of evidence is a letter from “Barkerend Taxis” addressed to him in which it is said:</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“We put you on notice that you are required to work with a licensed vehicle that is in a suitable condition with the relevant licensing documentation within the next 7 days. If you do not return to work within the prescribed 7 days you will be disconnected from our dispatch system. A driver who has been disconnected, cannot rejoin on a later date”.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>18. As a starting point, it seems to me to be inherently unlikely that Barkerend Taxis would seek to end its relationship (and permanently so) with a driver (who on the evidence had been with them for some 8-9 years) because he was unable to provide his services as a taxi-driver for more than 7 days. Not only would this mean that the Claimant could not be on holiday, for example, for more than 7 days without losing his position (again inherently unlikely), but Barkerend Taxi’s position (as set out in the letter appended to the Claimant’s witness statement) is implausible to say the least. Barkerend Taxis, on the evidence, appear to work as a conventional taxi “base” operating a “dispatch system”. Such businesses, of which fact I am able to take judicial notice, apply a charge or license fee to each taxi driver working with them with such fees being colloquially referred to as a “radio fee” and charged, typically, on weekly or monthly basis. The income of these businesses is derived directly from the “radio fees” that they charge and telling a driver that s/he cannot return if s/he is absent for more than 7 days would, on the face of it, be an act of self- harm resulting, as it would, in the loss of revenue. There may, of course, be good reasons as to why a taxi base business may wish to end a relationship with a taxi-driver even if it results in a loss of revenue. In this case it is said by Mr. Hussain (and notably not Barkerend Taxis) that the reason why Barkerend Taxis would not want to continue their business relationship with the Claimant if he was not available to drive for more than 7 days is because they “needed to have sufficient number of drivers available to maintain their contracts and service levels...”. The difficulty with this is that this is, again, inherently implausible. If Barkerend Taxis were so busy, as seems to be the implication, that the unavailability of even one driver for more than 7 days, would jeopardise their “contracts” and service levels then what could they hope to gain by permanently excluding an otherwise good driver? This would clearly just make matters worse for them.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>19. Given what I say above I treat the letter from Barkerend Taxis to the Claimant with some caution. In addition, the letter relied upon by the Claimant appears to be from “Barkerend Taxis” (it being unclear whether this is a company, sole trader or partnership business), signed by a “A M khan” who is otherwise unidentified (either by reference to his full name, address, or relationship with Barkerend Taxis) and is undated.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>20. Further, the letter was received (on the Claimant’s own evidence) by him 2-3 days after he had his accident. It was the Claimant’s evidence that he had, previous to the receipt of the letter in question, been unaware that he was at risk of losing his position with Barkerend Taxis if he was unavailable to work for more than 7 days and had not previously ever received such a “notice”. If the letter was received 3 days after the accident then the Claimant had already entered into a hire agreement by this stage. If it was received on the second day then it was received on the day that he entered into hire, and in all likelihood, after he had made the decision to go into hire having, more than likely, already set the mechanics of the hire up. On the balance of probabilities the letter from Barkerend Taxis is unlikely to have been the operative cause of the Claimant entering into a credit hire agreement.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>21. More fundamentally, I agree with Mr. Richmond that the letter seems to be an attempted unenforceable unilateral variation of the contract (whatever the exact terms of the latter may have been) between the Claimant and Barkerend Taxis. However, this is not the same as an argument on the enforceability of a hire agreement, but rather the court needs to ask itself whether or not the Claimant acted reasonably in relying upon the letter that he received, irrespective of the legal merits of it. I accept that the Claimant may not have appreciated the legal nuances of the position that he found himself in. However, it seems to me perfectly reasonable to expect him to have taken legal advice or at the very least queried the contents of the letter with the author – after all a valuable future relationship (apparently worth preserving even at the expenditure of thousands of pounds on credit hire) was at stake. On his own evidence the Claimant did neither. Had the Claimant taken legal advice it is likely that such advice would have been to the effect that the threatened unilateral change to his contract with Barkerend Taxis was unenforceable.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Accordingly, the Claimant did not fall into the first <em><u>Hussain</u></em> exception. He could not recover the cost of hiring a plated vehicle and was only entitled to the non-plated BHR for whatever might be the appropriate period.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judge accepted that any delays in relation to licensing the Claimant’s new vehicle were irrelevant. The Claimant had a new vehicle which he could use for social purposes by five weeks post-accident. It was appropriate to restrict any hire charges to that period.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judge awarded £2,162.75 for hire. Overall, the Claimant failed to beat a Part 36 offer made some time earlier by the Defendant and costs consequences followed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The decision is not binding but is sufficiently thorough to provide sensible guidance in cases where similar facts arise.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Many thanks to Jess Wong at Horwich Farrelly for her instructions and for her sensible approach throughout.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If you would like to discuss the case or similar cases, then please feel free to contact me in chambers on 0113 228 5000. If you would like to instruct someone from the PLP credit hire team generally then please get in touch with the clerks on 0330 390 4301.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Justice Is Seen to be Done &#8211; High Court Considers Fairness of Counsel&#8217;s Interactions with Opposition

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>F v M &amp; Z [2024] EWHC 3190 (Fam)</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Avaia Williams, a first six pupil under the supervision of Sara Anning and Rebecca Musgrove, summarises the recent High Court case of F v M &amp; Z [2024] EWHC 3190 (Fam).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The High Court tackled a critical issue of procedural fairness, examining whether a barrister’s prior interactions with the opposing party compromised the perception of justice in family law proceedings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case involved a father’s appeal against a Child Arrangements Order allowing the mother to relocate with their child to Hungary. The father argued that his previous interactions with the mother’s counsel, including sharing case materials and discussions about instruction, created a conflict of interest and undermined the fairness of the proceedings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mr Justice Hayden ruled that the professional engagement, even if limited, posed a sufficient risk of perceived unfairness, stating:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“The weight of the professional obligation is to avoid the appearance or risk of unfairness and, in the time-honoured phrase, for justice not only to be done but to be seen to be done.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This judgment highlights the significance of maintaining procedural fairness and the ethical responsibilities of legal professionals. It serves as a reminder that even the perception of unfairness can undermine judicial integrity, necessitating rigorous adherence to ethical and procedural safeguards in family law.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For the full summary and commentary, visit <a href="https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/judgments/f-v-m-z-2024-ewhc-3190-fam/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Family Law Week</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The full judgment is available on <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2024/3190.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">BAILII</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Harrogate &amp; District Law Society Family Finance Talk

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Join three members of Parklane Plowden Chambers as they share their knowledge on Family Finance Law.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Harrogate &amp; District Law Society is holding a talk at the Cedar Court Hotel, where <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/naomi-hartridge/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Naomi Hartridge</a> will be speaking on Conduct in Financial Remedy Proceedings, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/paul-edwards/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Paul Edwards</a> on Pre and Post Nuptual Agreements, and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/giorgia-sessi/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Giorgia Sessi</a> on Enforcement of Financial Remedy Orders.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Come along and expand your knowledge in a friendly and welcoming environment. Don't miss out on this opportunity to engage with like-minded individuals and gain valuable insights.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Date:</strong> Tuesday, January 21, 2025</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Time:</strong> 3 - 5pm</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Location: </strong><a href="https://cedarcourthotels.co.uk/hotels/harrogate/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Cedar Court Hotel</a>, Park Parade, Harrogate, HG1 5AH</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Cost: </strong>£10.00 and £20.00 for non-members</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>How to book your place: </strong>Please book using the Eventbrite link below:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/harrogate-district-law-society-family-finance-talk-tickets-1110364613449?aff=oddtdtcreator" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Harrogate &amp; District Law Society Family Finance Talk</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->