Our Expertise

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.

Critical Failure to Report a Gastric Band Slip Found to be Neglect

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Sophie Watson represented the family of a 46-year-old woman who tragically died due to complications arising from a gastric band slip of which there was a missed opportunity for the hospital to identify and intervene.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In March 2024 the deceased attended the hospital after experiencing coffee ground vomit and significant abdominal pain. A CT scan and chest x-ray were both performed. The CT scan failed to identify the gastric band was in an abnormal lie despite it being visible on the imaging. The clinicians also did not identify the abnormal positioning upon reviewing the chest x-ray.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>After two days as an inpatient the deceased collapsed. Despite CPR, the deceased tragically died.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner found there was a critical failure to report that the deceased’s gastric band had slipped which contributed to the failure to refer the deceased to bariatric specialists. He found this failure represented neglect.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He found the failure to correctly report the gastric band slip on the CT scan caused or contributed to the deceased’s death.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner issued a future prevention of death report to NHS England and the Royal College of Radiology given his concerns about the lack of knowledge of gastric band positioning by radiologists nationally.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Sophie was instructed by <a href="https://www.ramsdens.co.uk/team/rachel-sharp" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Rachel Sharp</a> of Ramsdens Solicitors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Media coverage can be read online here:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvg45q8vpv8o" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvg45q8vpv8o</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/woman-gastric-band-went-huddersfield-040000465.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAC5SuZdm2em5klorACr9KvSZ7_d9ng3agpTO1l3glRqW1-fcpazKVyQgK3kVU2aFHZJhjqtpuGdghd_Ocj70GNgJGPN3xrxjbQSQn2a1gSkWvj1hqndPd-Uj4cnHBotRa73ksJl4-N3vubRJdEgB0mvpgUU4Q1RurL9kybM6B2bf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://uk.news.yahoo.com/woman-gastric-band-went-huddersfield-040000465.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAC5SuZdm2em5klorACr9KvSZ7_d9ng3agpTO1l3glRqW1-fcpazKVyQgK3kVU2aFHZJhjqtpuGdghd_Ocj70GNgJGPN3xrxjbQSQn2a1gSkWvj1hqndPd-Uj4cnHBotRa73ksJl4-N3vubRJdEgB0mvpgUU4Q1RurL9kybM6B2bf</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Sophie is a member of the Inquest and Inquiries team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and regularly acts on behalf of Interested Persons at Inquests. Sophie’s full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/sophie-watson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Sara Sharif Judges to be Named – Court of Appeal Delivers Stinging Judgment

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Tickle &amp; Anor v The BBC &amp; Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Avaia Williams, a first six pupil under the supervision of Sara Anning and Rebecca Musgrove, summarises the Court of Appeal judgment in Tickle &amp; Anor v The BBC &amp; Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42, the appeal concerning whether the historic judges involved in Sara Sharif’s family proceedings should be named.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The background to the matter concerns the tragic circumstances of the murder of Sara Sharif by her father and step-mother. Following her murder, several journalists sought information from the family proceedings and accordingly applied to the court for this disclosure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A vast amount of material was disclosed, however, in making this order, Mr Justice Williams unilaterally made an order that the judges who had previously been involved in proceedings must not be named. This focused mainly on the Article 8 rights of the judges.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The decision was quickly appealed, and the decision, the first of its kind, was considered by the Court of Appeal who, in delivering a stinging and critical judgment, found that:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“…the judge had no jurisdiction to anonymise the historic judges either on 9 December 2024 or thereafter. He was wrong to do so…”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Master of the Rolls further explained that:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“…He knew he had no evidence, and he could have realised that the judges would not wish to provide any evidence (as has happened). In short, the whole idea of anonymising the judges was, I have to say, misguided.”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judgment is a significant moment in reaffirming the principle of open justice, particularly within the context of the family courts, still known for their overarching secrecy. The Court of Appeal’s decision emphasises the constitutional importance of transparency and accountability in judicial proceedings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For the full summary and commentary, visit <a href="https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/judgments/tickle-anor-v-the-bbc-ors-2025-ewca-civ-42/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Family Law Week</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The full judgment is available on <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/42.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">BAILII</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Stuart Jamieson Helps Secure Settlement for Family of Man Who Died of Metastasised Colon Cancer

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>BST (deceased) v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Stuart Jamieson, instructed by <a href="https://www.switalskis.com/profile/claire-garrity" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Claire Garrity of Switalskis</a>, has helped secure a settlement for the Estate and dependants of a man that died from metastasised colon cancer. The six-figure settlement (subject to an anonymity order) was recently approved by HHJ Gargan, the Designated Civil Judge in Leeds. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The key disputes within the proceedings involved the failure to investigate the deceased upon GP referral by way of a colonoscopy to rule out a mucosal lesion, denied by the Defendant Trust as representing a breach of duty, and separately the effect of a failure to identify the Deceased’s colon cancer on a CT scan years later. The full causative effect of this later breach of duty was denied by the Trust. The Defendant denied that identification of the Deceased’s colon cancer at the time of the CT scan would have avoided the Deceased’s death, the disease subsequently metastasising to his liver and lungs. The Claimant’s case was that earlier identification from the CT scan would likely have avoided the Deceased’s death and his treatment requirements for a stoma, systemic chemotherapy and treatment for liver metastases. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The settlement on behalf of the Estate and dependants was approved in January 2025. The claim was contested over several years and with competing expert evidence in Oncology and Coloproctology. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Stuart Jamieson is a barrister specialising in Clinical Negligence and Personal Injury. Stuart is the Head of the Civil Team at Parklane Plowden</em>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Parklane Plowden Podcast – Getting the Best Out of Expert Evidence in Clinical Negligence Proceedings

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Listen to Parklane Plowden’s latest PLP Podcast – Getting the best out of expert evidence in clinical negligence litigation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Head of Parklane Plowden’s Civil team, personal injury and clinical negligence barrister <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/stuart-jamieson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Stuart Jamieson</a> and head of the Clinical Negligence team, barrister <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/anna-datta/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Anna Data</a> discuss expert evidence in clinical negligence.  </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Experts and their evidence are central to clinical negligence litigation, so it is essential to take steps to maximise their value to support cases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The two discuss strategies and principles and provide guidance on how legal practitioners can get the most out of experts throughout proceedings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This encompasses all stages from medical expert witness selection and what to look out for at preliminary conferences, through to trial including the use of literature, expert reports, joint statements and overall court presentation.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Throughout the podcast, Stuart and Anna refer to individual cases where expert evidence was a key factor in the proceedings and analyse key lessons.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Listen to the podcast below.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Helpful resources and further reading:</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Duties of an expert</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part35" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">CPR 35</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=CCC+v+Sheffield+Teaching+Hospitals+NHSFT+%5B2023%5D&amp;rlz=1C1GCEA_enGB1054GB1054&amp;oq=CCC+v+Sheffield+Teaching+Hospitals+NHSFT+%5B2023%5D&amp;gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQABgWGB4yCggCEAAYogQYiQUyBwgDEAAY7wUyBwgEEAAY7wUyBwgFEAAY7wUyBwgGEAAY7wXSAQczODdqMGo3qAIAsAIA&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">CCC v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHSFT [2023]</a> </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/649f20468fa1977797a22413" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Riley v Salford Royal NHS FT [2022]</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Approach taken by the expert</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/celine-martin-v-salford-royal-nhs-foundation-trust-the-question-of-double-recovery-in-care-claims-when-there-is-a-pre-existing-state-funded-care-package/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Celine Martin v Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/65720fb2cd29093de5347806#:~:text=Decision,were%20awarded%20to%20the%20Claimant." target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Parsons v Isle of Wight NHS Trust [2023]</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Use of literature</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/6494a422744f894966d01665" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Snow v Royal United Hospitals Bath NHS Trust [2023] EWHC (KB)</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The expert report</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/64c7fff1b4b0e776d726a73e" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Jayden Astley (by his father and litigation friend Craig Astley) v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHSFT [2023] EWHC 1921 (KB)</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The joint statement</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b2897ad2c94e06b9e1983fc" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Saunders v Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWHC 343</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/most-unsatisfactory-expert-evidence-under-fire-from-judge/5068984.article" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Mayr v CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.civillitigationbrief.com/2022/03/10/experts-going-wrong-again-this-time-it-has-cost-someone-225000-the-work-turns-into-dust/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Patricia Andrews &amp; Ors v Kronospan Limited [ 2022 ] EWHC 479 (QB)</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Trial</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/6576d91b52aae60ac079d19b" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Beatty v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust [2023]</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/64ee3c099887ba4f0b22f108" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Scarcliffe v Brampton Valley Group Ltd (2023)</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list -->

Interim Relief: How Employers Can Reclaim the Narrative

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/robert-allen/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Robert Allen</a></u>, employment and commercial barrister, considers the mechanism of interim relief, why dismissed employees should proceed with caution, and how employers can turn an application against them into a strategic asset.</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Interim relief (IR) gives the tribunal the power to compel the employer to reinstate, re-engage or continue to pay a dismissed employee pending the outcome of a final hearing. Given the current pressures within the tribunal system and growing backlog, this interlocutory remedy has the potential to become increasingly valuable to claimants.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The statutory test</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>IR is only available to employees in limited circumstances. The right to apply is provided for by section 128 Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>‘An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and –</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>That the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in –</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A or</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,…</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>May apply to the tribunal for interim relief.’</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For an employer, having (rightly or wrongly) decided to dismiss an employee, being required to maintain the terms of a contract for however long it takes for litigation to run its course<a id="_ftnref1" href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> is, on any measure, draconian.&nbsp;Consequently, the IR bar is set purposefully high. That is not altogether obvious, however.&nbsp;On the face of the wording of the statute, one may be deceived. Section 129 ERA 1996 provides:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>‘This section applies where, on hearing an employee’s application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is <u>likely</u> that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal to be one of those specified…’</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>(Emphasis added)</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>My<em> ‘likely’</em> is not necessarily as likely as yours.&nbsp;The statute offers little by way of assistance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Guidance from caselaw</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Caselaw has – to a degree – clarified matters.&nbsp;The word <em>‘likely’</em> is to be construed as meaning the employee has a <em>‘pretty good chance’</em> of success at the final hearing.<a id="_ftnref2" href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> But what does a <em>‘pretty good chance’</em> mean? According to Mr Justice Underhill, a <em>‘pretty good chance’</em> ostensibly means <em>‘a significantly higher degree of likelihood than just more likely than not.’</em><a id="_ftnref3" href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> The then President went on to state: <em>‘in this context ‘likely’ does not mean simply ‘more likely than not’ – that is at least 51% - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood.’&nbsp; </em>In short, it’s no easy task to prove.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Application</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By illustration, take one of the more common routes to IR: an automatic unfair dismissal by operation of section 103A ERA 1996. In such a case, IR can only be ordered where the tribunal is satisfied that it is likely on hearing the evidence at a final hearing that the reason (or principal reason) for the dismissal was that the employee made a protected disclosure. It falls to the applicant to establish the necessary level of likelihood in relation to each and every distinct element of the claim.<a id="_ftnref4" href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>So, to succeed, the applicant must establish that it is likely that the tribunal at a final hearing would find that:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>they made a disclosure;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>they believed that the disclosure tended to show one or more of the matters listed in section 43B(1) ERA 1996;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>that belief was reasonable;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the disclosure was made in the public interest;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the disclosure was the sole or principal cause of dismissal;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As for that final limb, in the absence of qualifying service on the part of the employee, it falls to them to prove the causative link to dismissal.<a id="_ftnref5" href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Only employees with two or more years of continuous service shift the burden to their employer to show they were not dismissed with the sole or principal reason being the disclosure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Procedure</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Pre-hearing</span></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>IR applications are exempt from the usual requirement<a id="_ftnref6" href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> to conciliate before passing go. Time limits are tight: claimants must apply within seven days of the date of dismissal and there is no latitude for an extension.<a id="_ftnref7" href="#_ftn7">[7]</a>&nbsp;A hearing will be listed promptly thereafter. The issue shall be determined <em>‘as soon as is practicable’</em>.<a id="_ftnref8" href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> Employers will have at least seven days’ notice of a hearing, but seldom more.<a id="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Though an IR hearing will be a matter of days away by the time an employer is put on notice, parties should nonetheless attempt to cooperate to agree bundle contents. The bundle should be restricted to what is necessary; less is more. A bundle running to hundreds of pages is rarely indicative of a successful IR application. Parties can, and should, make appropriate use of witness statements.&nbsp;And the value of a concise skeleton argument drawing it all together cannot be underestimated.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">At the hearing</span></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even when statements have been provided, expect the judge to hear submissions alone. Rule 94<a id="_ftnref10" href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> provides that the tribunal <em>‘must not hear oral evidence unless it directs otherwise’</em>. Any request to hear oral evidence would have to be founded on an exceptional reason. If you are seeking the tribunal to hear evidence, be ready to justify why this irregular step is necessary in the circumstances. Is there a point that can only be made orally?&nbsp; If so, why has it not been set out in a witness statement? If there is a point of challenge, why is it just to challenge it now? If you are resisting such a request made by the other side, emphasise that the task at an IR hearing is to take each party’s case at its evidential height. Moreover, point to the overriding objective<a id="_ftnref11" href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> in light of the risk that hearing evidence at an interlocutory stage may well prejudice evidence at a final hearing.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Tactical considerations</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Applying - eager enthusiasm may prove ephemeral</span></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>No claimant presents an ET1 without some initial level of confidence in the outcome. But when pursuing IR, such early confidence must be particularly well-placed. IR, for all it can subject the respondent to early pressure (and cost), has the potential to backfire.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>First, there is no disclosure process. Not only do employees have to prove each element of the legal test to the required standard; they must do so based upon the documentation they have available to them at the time of applying. Whereas many cases can evolve based upon disclosure identifying key evidential vulnerabilities, IR will turn simply upon what the employee is able to point to from their own records, combined with anything the employer elects to cite for themselves (and the latter is unlikely to be helpful). Even taking the very first stage of a section 103A ERA 1996 dismissal - the employee will need to be ready to point to clear evidence of the precise circumstances of the disclosure they purport to have made. This can be far from straightforward, even with disclosure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Second, whilst it may be tempting to put early pressure on the employer by making them face an IR application, it must be borne in mind that if IR is successfully resisted, it could be followed swiftly by an application on the employer’s part for costs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Responding – turning an obstacle into an asset</span></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whilst facing an application for interim relief can seem daunting, requiring prompt tribunal attendance and early incurrence of costs, it can also present an opportunity for the respondent to make early headway in turning the momentum of the litigation in their favour.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The key to defeating IR applications is to properly apply the test. Limb by limb, submissions can be raised to demonstrate why the applicant does not come up to proof. The bar is high, and each limb presents its own evidential obstacles. In approaching this exercise, the respondent has the tactical benefit of using contemporaneous documents which favour their position, without having to disclose that which could be more damaging.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Where an IR application is successfully opposed, various opportunities present themselves. Principally, the employer has shifted the momentum in their favour.&nbsp;The IR hearing provides an initial forum for submissions explaining why the claim is not as strong as was believed by the other side.&nbsp;If a judge agrees with those submissions, confidence in the prospects of the claim is inevitably diminished – providing scope for settlement or withdrawal.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Having seen off IR, an employer can, in certain cases, use the hearing to go further. For one, the decision to pursue IR at all may have been unreasonable in the circumstances, such that the door is open to pursue costs. If, for instance, an employer is able to justify why the application fails to come up to proof by some margin on each and every aspect, the tribunal may be minded to make a costs order – particularly so if it is persuaded the tribunal’s time has been wasted in the process. Equally, provided IR was sought within a claim that had been presented following conciliation<a id="_ftnref12" href="#_ftn12">[12]</a>, there would be nothing stopping the respondent from applying for a deposit order at the hearing if the evidence tended to suggest its prospects were sufficiently low.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Summary</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Dismissed employees should proceed with care when weighing up the benefits and risks of IR. After all, a prepared employer could utilise an application against them for their own benefit, demonstrating unforeseen weaknesses in the claim and pursuing costs for the tactical misstep. <em>‘As the ancient Romans said, festina lente.’</em><a id="_ftnref13" href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><u>Robert</u> was recently instructed to respond to an interim relief application. Having successfully resisted it; he went on to obtain a costs order in favour of his client.&nbsp;If you wish to instruct a member of our employment team to help navigate an interim relief application, please contact our clerking team.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:separator --> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/> <!-- /wp:separator --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> A period which is increasingly measured in years rather than months</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a><em> Taplin v. C Shippam</em> [1978] IRLR 450 EAT</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a><em> Ministry of Justice v. Sarfraz</em> [2011] IRLR 562 EAT</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a id="_ftn4" href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a><em> Hancock v. Ter-Berg</em> [2020] ICR 570</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> <em>Smith v. Hayle Town Council</em> [1978] ICR 996, CA</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> Under s.18A Employment Tribunals Act 1996</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> See s.128 (2) ERA 1996 and s.161 (2) Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULR(C)A) 1992</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a> S.128 (3) ERA 1996 and s.162 (1) TULR(C)A 1992</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref9" id="_ftn9">[9]</a> S.128 (4) and s.162 (2) ibid</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref10" id="_ftn10">[10]</a> Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, SI 2024/1155</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref11" id="_ftn11">[11]</a> Now found at Rule 3, ibid</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref12" id="_ftn12">[12]</a> This would be rare, given the narrow time limits and IR’s exemption from the early conciliation requirement</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref13" id="_ftn13">[13]</a> In the words of <em>Iolanthe</em>’s Lord Chancellor.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

International Adoption – PLWG Best Practice: A Guide

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Moving onto the fourth and penultimate article in my series covering the Public Law Working Group’s recommendations for best practice for adoption, we consider Chapter 4 of the PLWG report. This section addresses a more niche element of adoptions, those that are either international, or have an international element. As it stands, adoptions with an international element are extremely confusing, legislatively complex, and rife with delay. This chapter aims to provide background to the chaos involved in such adoptions and seeks to provide a comprehensive recommendation to move forward.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As with previous articles in the series, this follows the general chronology and sub-headings of the report to ensure consistency and to break the report down into a bite sized and user-friendly guide as to the recommendations.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The terms ‘country’ and ‘state’ are used interchangeably in this article to refer to the Central Authority within that country whose role it is to deal with international adoptions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Introduction</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Working Group’s remit was to consider not only reform to the procedure of international adoption, but any changes to the substantive law. As part of this, three key areas were identified:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Whether the statutory framework is sufficiently clear;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Whether there needs to be any changes to the statutory framework or procedure;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Whether good practice guidance would be of assistance.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>International Adoptions Generally</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Broadly speaking, the PLWG define international adoptions as any incoming or outgoing adoption involving another country. These include adoptions under the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“the Hague Convention” or “the 1993 Convention”); adoptions governed by s.66 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002; adoptions under s.57 of the Family Law Act 1986 and common law adoptions; and domestic adoptions concerning overseas resident children.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is not common in England and Wales for adoption orders to be made in favour of wider family, but where a placement is overseas, adoption may be necessary with respect to security of placement and immigration status. Similarly, there are children from outside the jurisdiction placed in the UK for adoption.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These cases are very complex and often lead to delay. The aim of the PLWG report in this area is to identify how improvements can be made to these harmful complexities.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Adoptions Pursuant to the 1993 Hague Convention</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The UK is a Contracting State to the 1993 Convention, incorporated domestically via the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 and the Adoptions with a Foreign Element Regulations 2005 (“the 2005 Regulations” or “the AFER 2005”). The 1993 Convention, at its core, is a partnership agreement between countries – the ‘origin’ country of the child is responsible for assessing the child, and the ‘receiving’ country is responsible for assessing the adopters. Neither state has a higher authority.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Convention requires the receiving state to confirm that, upon adoption, the child will receive an immigration status such that they can permanently remain within the jurisdiction. Upon both confirming the match and an order being made, ALL Convention states MUST give effect to the order. There is no need to seek further orders within those states.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whichever jurisdiction makes the adoption order (usually the ‘origin’ country, but there is nothing in law preventing the ‘receiving’ country making the order), must issue an Article 23 certificate confirming the Convention process has been followed (including dates of Article 17 agreements). This certificate (subject to the rare exception under Article 24 that the adoption is contrary to that state’s public policy) then binds every Convention state.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The 2005 Regulations are not a self-contained set of rules. They instead supplement the existing domestic framework contained within the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the Adoption Agency Regulations 2005. International adoptions are also dealt with by way of further legislation (Children and Adoption Act 2006; Local Authority (Adoptions) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2005). As such, those unfamiliar with the process, including professionals, can quickly become overwhelmed. The need to cross reference numerous regulations is complex, however, the legislative framework is very thorough and specialist lawyers are able to navigate this (though this requires Local Authorities to either have, or instruct, said specialist lawyers).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Outgoing Convention Adoptions</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Local Authorities and the courts must consider whether a child who cannot be cared for by their birth family can be cared for by their wider family. This duty exists even if the wider family live overseas (the rationale being that it is better for a child to maintain family ties abroad, than to sever those ties domestically).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The PLWG did not look at the conduct of assessments of overseas family members, however, the Working Group did note that some authorities were reluctant to engage with the overseas assessment process in a timely manner. The Working Group note that authorities can seek support from Children and Families Across Borders and the Outbound Permanence Service (via Coram BAAF).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Many overseas placements do not involve adoption (these can often be affected under other orders such as Special Guardianship Orders), but some placements necessitate this, such necessity often coming from immigration status or SGO’s not being an order in the receiving state.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Convention framework does not sit well with the typical adoption process in England and Wales, where children are removed due to abuse or neglect, or where there is nobody to exercise Parental Responsibility. Article 4 of the Convention specifically sets the groundwork that a Local Authority must obtain a placement order, Article 17 further set out requirements that the Central Authorities have agreed the adoption.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Children habitually resident in England and Wales are very rarely placed abroad for adoption unless it is to be with family members due to parental abuse or neglect. These children should be placed as soon as possible, but the Convention requirements, domestic legislation, and immigration laws make this very difficult, in some cases impossible.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The domestic legislation sets up somewhat of a paradox. Section 85 ACA 2002 makes it an offence to remove a child from the UK for the purposes of adoption, unless the prospective adopters have been granted parental responsibility via section 84. The issue, however, is that an application under section 84 cannot be made unless the court is satisfied that the child and the prospective adopter have had sufficient opportunities to be seen together – both countries additionally still need to comply with Articles 15, 16, and 17 of the Convention.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is therefore in the child’s interests to obtain a Convention adoption order in the domestic courts. <em>Re M (A Child) (Adoption: Placement Outside Jurisdiction)</em> [2011] 2 WLR 1264 held that an offence would not be committed under s.85 in those circumstances as, any ‘visit’ the child made to the prospective adopters would not be for the purpose of adoption in that state, but to further a domestic Convention adoption.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Incoming Convention Adoptions</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Incoming adoptions are not a frequent occurrence and, when these do happen, the burden on the domestic authorities is lesser given the assessment of the children is for the state of ordinary residence. The PLWG do however note that, adoption agencies do not always appreciate the complexities of Convention adoptions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is recommended that there is an open access hotline for social workers to obtain advice and information on any adoption with an international element, this is especially vital where the prospective adopters do not, or cannot, instruct lawyers. Procedural difficulties are often not noticed until several steps into proceedings, leading to significant delay and harm to the child and families.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Non-Convention Adoptions (Outgoing)</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Children can only be taken out of the UK for adoption purposes via a section 84 order. This requires compliance with the 2005 Regulations. Section 84 is not available to those normally resident in the UK, it is designed solely for foreign nationals to assist in foreign adoption.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A s.84 order removes parental responsibility from all other people and grants this to the prospective adopters. It also authorises the removal of the child from the jurisdiction for the purposes of adoption. An order under s.84 is not, however, guaranteed to be recognised in the foreign court.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the adoption is agency, the child must be placed with the prospective adopters for at least 10-weeks before an application under section 84 is issued.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the child is looked after by a Local Authority, permission to remove from the jurisdiction can be sought under Schedule 2 of the Children Act 1989 prior to the granting of a placement order. Where a Local Authority is permitted to place a child for adoption, removal from the jurisdiction is then governed by section 28 ACA 2002. The position is not clear on whether s.28 can be used to allow the child to remain outside the jurisdiction, or to be placed for adoption whilst they remain outside the jurisdiction (there are no reported cases on this matter).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the child is not looked after, it is difficult for the prospective adopters to comply with section 84, and s.42 where it is a non-agency adoption (this requires the child to be seen by the Local Authority). One possible way around this is that the Local Authority make a temporary home for the prospective adopters within the jurisdiction, for 10-weeks. It is clear this is not a viable position. It is therefore more straightforward for public law orders to be made and for a mirroring order to be obtained in the non-Convention state.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is not always the right path for a child, and it may not overcome immigration issues in some states. But if it is, the proposed adopters may then seek to adopt at a later stage (having then complied with the s.84 requirements by virtue of an alternative order), this is uncontroversial if the state is a party to the Hague Convention Parental Responsibility and Protection of Children 1996 (not to be confused with the 1993 Convention which has been the subject of this Chapter) this is simple. If the state is not a party, it is liable to be extremely complicated. Though the cases where these issues transpire are very small.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Non-Convention Adoptions (Incoming)</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Unlike outgoing non-Convention adoptions, there are a significant number of inbound adoptions under section 57 of the Family Law Act 1986. These cases are dealt with under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction but can be heard by a High Court Judge sitting in the Family Court.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the adoption is an overseas adoption pursuant to s.87 ACA 2002 (under the law of a country listed in the Adoption (Recognition of Overseas Adoptions) Order 2013), it will automatically be recognised in England and Wales and there is no need for proceedings to recognise the child’s status under English law (but this process does not confer British citizenship).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If an adoption order is made outside the jurisdiction and neither the Convention nor s.87 apply, the adoption may be recognised according to common law. Re Valentine’s Settlement [1965] Ch 831 set out four principles:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The adoptive parents have been domiciled in the foreign country at the time of the adoption;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The child was legally adopted according to the law of that jurisdiction;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The adoption has the same substantive characteristics and concept as an English adoption;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>There must be no public policy reason refusing the recognition.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Where these criteria are met, a person may apply under s.57 Family Law Act 1986 for recognition of the common law adoption.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Where the criteria in Re Valentine’s Settlement are not met, the courts may still recognise an adoption where to not do so would be a breach of the Article 8 rights of the children and prospective adopters (such cases being extremely rare, and extremely complex).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Dual applications for common law recognition and declarations of status requires the court to deal with different principles to each application and their domicile. Recognition will rely on the applicant’s domicile at the date of application, but a s.57 declaration will rely on the applicant’s domicile at or prior to the application.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Section 83 ACA 2002 makes it an offence to bring a child resident outside the UK into the UK for the purpose of adoption (a reverse of s.85) unless the Convention has been complied with. Whilst such adoptions are factually complex, the courts apply domestic law and assessment takes place within the jurisdiction. Where a person breaches s.83, the courts do not automatically refuse to make an adoption order.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Most applications to adopt from overseas are compliant with the 2005 Regulations, the prospective adopters will be registered and approved by the Department of Education. Upon returning to the UK with the child, there is further assessment and, following the child having lived with the prospective adopters, a further report to the court.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The biggest issue with such adoptions, despite a rigorous and complex process, including government departments, is that there is no recognition of the process at the visa stage when the child is finally ready to join their intended family. As noted by the Working Group:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“The apparent systemic failure to process visa applications promptly…to enable the child to enter the UK and begin their lives with their newly adopted parents…is lamentable.”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In some cases, years off delay can ensue, causing unnecessary emotional and financial hardship. The Working Group recommend that policy is amended to allows such children a special status with the Home Office at the visa stage. Whilst the usual checks should continue to apply, these should be fast-tracked, the delay otherwise being harmful to the welfare of the child.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Where adopters are domiciled in the UK but are habitually resident elsewhere, section 83 does not apply. If an adoption is made in a country not on the list in the 2013 Order, then it will not be recognised. A visa can be applied for on the basis of a period of care abroad, this may allow the child to settle in the&nbsp; UK, but it does not alter the family law status – these parents may apply for a domestic adoption despite being habitually resident elsewhere.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In these cases, the child must have lived with the prospective adopters for at least three-years (unless this time is abridged by the court). At the point of being able to make the application, three years having passed often means there are difficulties tracing parents to obtain consent. The PLWG suggest considering whether allowing an application after 6 to 12 months would be more appropriate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>PLWG Conclusion</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“The current system is just about working but the sheer complexity of it is illustrated by the number of statutes and statutory instruments which govern the process in England…”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With a possible combination of up to 18 pieces of legislation dealing with adoption (not including the international law), the complexity cannot be understated. Delays, misunderstanding, and mistakes are too common in adoptions with an international element.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The overarching recommendation of the Working Group is to review the legislative framework for international adoptions, such that this is contained within a single Act of Parliament, with regulations where necessary. Where regulations are required, these should be dealt with in a way to not require cross-referencing so as to leave the process more accessible to all involved.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The PLWG recognise that this is a major statutory task, and, outside of such reform (hopefully in the interim at most), recommend the following:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The Central Authority’s should update and expand the written guidance for intercountry adoptions to draw together the legislation into one place.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Consideration should be given to setting up a specialist referral unit.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The Central Authority’s should work closely with the Home Office where applications are relevant to immigration status decisions.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Section 84 ACA 2002 should be amended to make explicit that prospective adopters may be assessed overseas without committing an offence under s.85.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The regulations should be reviewed for inconsistencies (such as the paradox created by regulation 46, requiring a placement order and parental consent)</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Regulation 47(1)(d) of the 2005 regulations should be amended to make clear this relates to the receiving state.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Practice Directions should be drafted to govern applications under Schedule 2 to the Children Act 1989 or applications under s.28 ACA 2002.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Cafcass Legal must be given sufficient resources to allow them to advise in such complex cases, often being the only lawyers involved.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The Home Office should create a fast-track process for visa approval where the applicant has fully complied with the regulations.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Section 42 should be amended to allow applications where adopters are habitually resident outside the UK to be made after six months.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Consideration should be given to amending the Children and Adoption Act 2006 to require mandatory review of countries on the banned list every three years.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The PLWG's recommendations on international adoptions highlight the significant complexities and challenges within the current system. By addressing gaps in legislative clarity, procedural inefficiencies, and the burdens placed on families and professionals, these proposals aim to simplify the framework while safeguarding the welfare of children involved in cross-border adoptions. The overarching call for consolidating legislation into a single statutory framework is a bold but necessary step towards reducing delays and ensuring that all parties can navigate the process with greater ease and confidence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The proposed amendments to legislation and practice have the potential to transform the landscape of international adoptions. Streamlining the statutory framework into one cohesive Act would resolve much of the confusion caused by the current patchwork of regulations. This would not only benefit legal professionals and social workers but also provide prospective adopters with a clearer understanding of their obligations and rights. Such simplification is particularly critical for cases involving vulnerable children, where unnecessary delays can have a profound and lasting impact on their stability and well-being.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The emphasis on inter-agency collaboration, particularly with the Home Office on immigration matters, is another pivotal recommendation. By fast-tracking visa applications for children who have complied with all adoption regulations, the welfare of these children can be prioritised, reducing emotional and financial strain on families. Furthermore, enabling overseas assessments under section 84 without triggering offences under section 85 would mitigate procedural roadblocks and allow children to transition into stable placements more swiftly.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whilst the PLWG report does not consider this position within Chapter 4, the Working Group’s vision for "open" adoptions domestically, as advocated for in Chapter 1 of the report, introduces an interesting parallel for international adoptions. If adopted children can maintain ties to their birth families without severing connections entirely, the rationale for prioritising family placements abroad – despite logistical challenges – may shift. Courts might feel more confident in pursuing domestic solutions or alternative orders when open adoptions ensure that biological ties remain intact and meaningful. This evolution could reduce reliance on complex international placements, particularly in cases where immigration or procedural barriers make overseas placements less practical, but, at least currently, mandatory to pursue.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The PLWG's recommendations for international adoptions reflect a nuanced understanding of the countless challenges faced by children, families, and professionals. By fostering legislative coherence, enhancing inter-agency cooperation, and promoting a child-centred approach, these proposals have the potential to transform the adoption system. Ultimately, the recommendations align with the broader goal of creating a framework that balances the need for permanency and security with the preservation of identity and familial connections, ensuring the best outcomes for children involved in international adoptions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Neglect Found to have Contributed to Death from a Failure to Diagnose Pulmonary Thromboembolism

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila Benyounes represented the family of a lady who died at home from an undiagnosed pulmonary thromboembolism 10 days after presenting at her GP with sudden shortness of breath on exertion. Her death occurred seven days after she was discharged from hospital, after being referred there by her GP, due to a misdiagnosis of heart failure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>At the inquest, it was held that the lady developed a thromboembolism prior to her attendance at hospital, and in accordance with NICE guidance the presence of a pulmonary thromboembolism should have been suspected as a possible diagnosis. It was held that further investigations should have been arranged, which would have confirmed the diagnosis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It was further held that high dose anti-coagulant medication should have been administered, thereby reducing the existing pulmonary thromboembolism, and preventing others from forming, which would have prevented the lady’s death.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner found that there were gross failures to provide basic medical care to the lady, which would on the balance of probabilities, have prevented her death.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A formal finding of ‘neglect’ was made by the coroner who concluded that the lady’s death was aggravated by lack of care and recorded that the death was due to natural causes contributed to by neglect.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila was instructed by <a href="https://www.fletcherssolicitors.co.uk/team/jerard-knott/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Jerard Knott</a> and Laura Forsyth of Fletchers Solicitors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Leila Benyounes is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as Band 1 by Legal 500 for Inquests and Inquiries. Leila has been appointed to the Attorney General’s Treasury Counsel Panel A since 2010. Leila is appointed as an Assistant Coroner in two coronial areas. Leila regularly represents interested persons in a wide range of inquests including Article 2 jury inquests and complex medical matters. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a></em>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->