AMA, Author at Parklane Plowden

Arya Vindlacheruvu looks at lost years damages for child claimants

An overview of CCC (by her mother and Litigation Friend MMM) (Appellant) v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Respondent) [2026] UKSC 5.  The Supreme Court confirmed that child claimants could be awarded lost years damages in personal injury claims.   Accordingly, the appeal succeeded and the case was remitted to the trial judge to assess damages for the Claimant’s lost years.  “Lost years damages”  “Lost years” refers to the time between a claimant’s reduced life expectancy, as a consequence of their injury, and their life expectancy pre-injury.   The damages which may be awarded to compensate for those lost years is the sum of the claimant’s loss of earnings and loss of pension, minus their living expenses, over the course of those years.   Background  Liability was admitted. The Defendant failed to prevent the Claimant from suffering a hypoxic brain injury at birth, which resulted in her suffering from cerebral palsy.   The parties agreed that the Claimant’s injuries would reduce her life expectancy to age 29.   The parties also agreed that the Judge was barred from making an award for lost years damages because it was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Croke v Wiseman [1982] 1 WLR 71.   The Judge declined to assess damages for lost years but granted a certificate for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court to review the correctness of Croke v Wiseman.   The basis of the appeal to the Supreme Court  Whether the bar on lost years claims for children (as per Croke v Wiseman) was inconsistent with the earlier House of Lords’ authorities of Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] AC 136 and Gammell v Wilson [1982] AC 27.  Judgment  In CCC v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, the majority found that Croke v Wiseman was inconsistent with Pickett and Gammell.   Previous authorities   Pickett and Gammell recognised the evidential difficulties of proving and assessing lost years damages for child claimants.   Pickett rejected the proposition that lost years damages were confined to claimants with dependants and Gammell attached no significance to the presence of dependants for the purpose of awarding lost years damages.  In conflict with those decisions, the court in Croke v Wiseman barred child claimants from being awarded lost years damages because of the absence of dependants who would benefit from the damages.   Assessing loss  In the present case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty in assessing lost years damages for a child claimant compared to an adult claimant. However, it was held that the difficult nature of the assessment would not act as a bar to recovery.   Loss of earnings  When calculating a child claimant’s loss of earnings, the majority in the Supreme Court found that judges would be assisted by evidence in relation to a child claimant’s particular situation, including; the child’s educational achievements, the occupation and attitude of the claimant’s parents and siblings, and evidence concerning the average earnings of a suitably tailored category of individuals.   Reliance on such evidence, which can be unrelated to the characteristics of the individual claimant, was a key criticism of Lady Rose’s dissenting judgment.   Living expenses  When calculating the deduction for living expenses for adult claimants, a conventional percentage is generally applied to the net earnings on a rough and ready basis. The majority held that a similar approach could be applied to child claimants[62].  Where the multiplier approach is used to calculate lost years damages, Lord Burrows anticipated that a high deduction from lost earnings for living expenses would be applied in child claimant cases to reflect the high degree of uncertainty involved [141-142].   Calculating lost years damages  The multiplier approach is the usual method for calculating lost years damages for adult claimants. Lord Burrows anticipated that this approach would usually be adopted in child claimant cases [150].   “To calculate damages for the lost years, it is usual to apply a multiplier derived from actuarial tables known as the Ogden Tables, reflecting the number of lost years (ie the difference between the claimant’s actual life expectancy and the life expectancy which the claimant would have enjoyed but for the injury), but discounted so as to allow for the fact that a lump sum is being given now instead of periodical payments over those years (and also to allow for any contingencies not already taken into account), to a multiplicand reflecting the net annual loss during that period (ie the loss of annual income net of tax, and after deduction of the claimant’s probable living expenses).” [7(4)]  Comment   This decision appears to reflect the purpose of compensation: to restore a claimant to their pre-injury position.   Unsurprisingly, there will be less direct evidence of the earning capabilities of a child claimant. Conversely, the older the claimant, the more established they will be in their career, and the more likely they will be able to adduce evidence to assist in quantifying their lost years damages.   The difficulty in assessing lost years damages for child claimants is mitigated by evidence of the claimant’s family’s circumstances and attitudes. This will provide courts with a helpful starting point.  Attempts to distinguish between the damages recoverable by adult and child claimants would arguably be artificial and risk undercompensating a child claimant.   Key Takeaways  Child claimants can claim for lost years damages.   The absence of dependants is not fatal to such a claim.  Evidence of a child claimant’s family’s earnings potential and attitude will inform the court’s assessment of such damages, especially where there is no direct evidence as to the claimant’s individual earning potential.  The Judgment is available <a href="https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2023_0111_judgment_bcc0527041.pdf">here</a>.

When The Scan Is Normal And The School Reports Are Positive: Rethinking Paediatric Brain Injury Evidence

In paediatric brain injury litigation, the cases that appear straightforward at first glance are often the ones that demand the greatest caution.  These themes were explored in a recent webinar delivered in collaboration with <a href="https://www.inneg.co.uk/?utm_source=parklane-plowden&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=parklane-plowden-article&utm_id=webinar-parklane-plowden-article">INNEG,</a> featuring Consultant Clinical Paediatric Neuropsychologist Dr Nigel Colbert and barrister Hylton Armstrong, examining the evidential challenges that arise when early presentation appears reassuring.  A child presents following a traumatic event. Acute imaging does not demonstrate significant structural abnormality. There is no dramatic neurological collapse. By the time proceedings are underway, primary school reports describe steady progress. Teachers are encouraging. The child is described as “coping.”  In adult litigation, such a profile might significantly narrow the issues. In children, it should prompt closer examination.  Development Is Not a Static Baseline  One of the central difficulties in paediatric cases is that there is rarely a settled pre-injury baseline. In adults, the task is commonly retrospective: what has been lost? In children, the question is prospective: what would have developed?  The legal exercise is therefore not simply to measure deficit, but to analyse altered trajectory. That shift carries implications for quantum, causation and the timing of expert evidence. A nine-year-old who appears broadly functional today may not yet have encountered the developmental demands that would expose vulnerability.  The absence of obvious deficit at an early stage cannot safely be treated as determinative.  The Masking Effect of Structure  Primary education is highly structured. Planning is scaffolded. Movement is supervised. Expectations around independent organisation are comparatively modest. Within that environment, subtle inefficiencies can be concealed.  A child may follow peers rather than process instructions independently. They may complete tasks more slowly but remain within acceptable classroom tolerance. Written reports may reflect effort and attitude rather than underlying executive performance.  Difficulties often become clearer when structure falls away.  Secondary school introduces complexity: multiple teachers, timetables, independent navigation, competing academic pressures. Executive functioning becomes not advantageous but essential. Where maturation of frontal systems has been disrupted, the strain of these demands can reveal difficulties that were previously masked.  From an evidential perspective, the timing of assessment therefore becomes more than procedural - it becomes substantive.  The Limits of Structural Imaging  Conventional imaging retains obvious importance in acute management. However, structurally normal scans do not answer functional questions. Network integrity, processing efficiency and executive regulation are not directly visualised on routine CT or MRI.  An absence of visible lesion does not equate to intact cognitive performance. Nor does the presence of a focal abnormality automatically dictate outcome. Contemporary neuropsychological understanding emphasises complexity and interaction rather than simplistic localisation.  For advocates, overreliance on radiological reassurance risks oversimplification.  Causation in a Developing System  Paediatric brains are dynamic. They mature across stages. Early disruption may have consequences that only manifest when specific networks are called upon.  Complicating matters further, many children present with pre-existing traits or vulnerabilities. Overlapping features between acquired injury and conditions such as attentional or autistic spectrum profiles make binary reasoning unattractive. The question is rarely whether injury is the sole cause, but how it has interacted with existing characteristics.  Arguments framed in absolutes tend not to survive careful scrutiny. Contribution, amplification and reduced compensatory capacity are often more accurate descriptors than exclusivity.  Expert Evidence: Beyond the Numbers  Psychometric testing remains central to forensic neuropsychology, but figures divorced from context are incomplete. How the child approached tasks, regulated frustration, deployed strategy or fatigued over time may be as probative as any composite score.  Equally, the completeness of contextual enquiry - school liaison, developmental history, family functioning - frequently determines how persuasive an opinion will be at trial. A report constructed solely from clinic-based testing, without integration of environmental reality, is inherently more vulnerable.  Judges are not assisted by raw data. They are assisted by coherent explanation.  A Case for Evidential Patience  There is an understandable pressure within litigation to crystallise prognosis. Yet in paediatric claims, time itself may be evidential. Executive capacity, emotional regulation and independence cannot be fully evaluated before they are meaningfully tested.  Where proceedings conclude before those developmental milestones are reached, there is a real risk that valuation will rest on partial information.  This is not an argument for delay in every case. It is an argument for alignment between developmental stage and evidential certainty.  Keeping Development Central  Ultimately, paediatric brain injury litigation is concerned with futures, not merely past events. The legal task is to construct a reliable picture of how an injury has altered a life still unfolding.  That requires caution where early recovery appears reassuring. It requires restraint where experts are tempted toward reductionism. And it requires recognition that development is neither linear nor uniform.  In this area of practice, the most persuasive cases are often those that acknowledge complexity rather than resist it.  The full webinar discussion can be accessed <a href="https://www.inneg.co.uk/resource-centre/webinars/neuropsychological-evidence-in-paediatric-brain-injury-dr-nigel-colbert-hylton-armstrong?utm_source=parklane-plowden&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=parklane-plowden-article&utm_id=webinar-parklane-plowden-article">here ></a>

Leila Benyounes and Georgia Banks acting on the Nottingham Inquiry

The Public Inquiry into the tragic Nottingham attacks moves into a crucial new phase as formal hearings begin today, Monday, 23rd February.  Parklane Plowden Chambers is pleased to share an update following yesterday’s announcement. We can confirm that Georgia Banks has now been instructed as the second junior on this matter, joining the team already in place, which includes Leila Benyounes.  Georgia’s appointment further strengthens the team and reflects the continued confidence placed in Chambers to provide coordinated, high‑quality representation. With counsel now confirmed, Chambers looks forward to supporting our instructing solicitors with a well‑resourced and experienced team  This marks an important moment for the Bereaved families, Survivors, and wider community who have waited a long time for answers.  The Inquiry will examine the circumstances surrounding the events of 13 June 2023, in which three people were killed and three others seriously injured.  It will scrutinise the actions of public bodies, the adequacy of systems in place, and the opportunities—missed or otherwise—to prevent such a devastating outcome.  Leila Benyounes, of Parklane Plowden Chambers, continues to act on behalf of the Surviving Victims, who have life changing injuries. She is instructed by Greg Almond, Partner at Rothera Bray LLP, who has been steadfast in his support of those most deeply affected.  This next stage of the Inquiry represents a significant opportunity for transparency, accountability, and meaningful learning. The Survivors' determination to understand what went wrong—and how future tragedies can be prevented—remains at the heart of these proceedings.  As the hearing commences, our thoughts remain with all the victims, their families, and all those whose lives were irrevocably changed. Their courage in seeking answers continues to drive this process forward.

26th February 2026 | Family Finance & Private Children: A Private Client Wine‑Tasting Evening

Join Parklane Plowden Chambers’ Family Finance and Private Children Team for a relaxed and insightful Private Client Wine‑Tasting Evening in the heart of Harrogate.  Date: Thursday, 26 February 2026 Venue: Williams & Victoria, 6 Cold Bath Road, Harrogate, HG2 0NA  This exclusive event brings together professionals working across family finance and private law children matters for an evening of informal networking, conversation, and expertly guided wine tasting.  Programme  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>6:00pm – Arrival</li>  <li>7:00pm – Wine Tasting</li>  <li>8:30pm – Close</li> </ul>  Canapes will be served throughout the evening.  We look forward to welcoming you for an enjoyable and informative event.  For queries, please contact: <a href="mailto:events@parklaneplowden.co.uk">events@parklaneplowden.co.uk</a>

Avaia Williams Secures Findings of Fabricated Rape and Sexual Coercion Allegations

Avaia Williams successfully represented the respondent father in the recent fact-finding hearing in <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/22">M v F (Fact Finding Hearing) [2026] EWFC 22 (B)</a>, a contested Children Act case concerning allegations of the utmost severity.  The hearing, which took place over four days, involved allegations of rape, sexual coercion, physical abuse toward both the mother and child, and controlling and coercive behaviour. After a detailed review of the evidence and hearing from the father, mother, and her four witness, the court found that, not only were none of the mother’s allegations made out, but that the allegations of rape, sexual coercion and physical abuse were actively fabricated and false.   In rejecting the evidence relied upon by the mother, the judge drew attention to significant issues with the production and reliability of key witness statements, drawn out in cross examination, including a witness statement produced by AI and another substantively edited by the solicitor without the witness fully understanding it.   In addition, a key witness for the mother was deemed by the Court to be entirely unreliable, with the Judge placing noweight on her following the witness being faced with incontrovertible evidence that she had lied in her statement and in court, her reasoning boiling down to “supporting the girls club”.  As a result of the findings, a non-molestation order, prohibited steps order, and specific issues order which had plagued the father for almost a year were discharged with immediate effect and interim contact (which had earlier been secured against Cafcass recommendation) was drastically increased with all conditions removed; the court finding that there was no safeguarding basis to prevent this.  Avaia, instructed by MSD Solicitors, has acted for the father at every hearing since the proceedings were issued, including an interim appeal and an application for a stay of interim contact by the mother, both of which were successfully challenged.

Getting the balance right – the importance of a thorough evaluation of competing options following Re S (Foster Care or Placement for Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 47

The recent decision in Re S provides a helpful illustration of the careful balancing exercise which must be undertaken when comparing options of adoption and fostering.  Background  Proceedings concerned S, aged 4 years and 8 months. Concerns arose about the mother’s parenting when S was about 2 years old, prompting Local Authority involvement. After the identification of bruising on S’s inner arm which was believed to be non-accidental, public law proceedings were brought. However, the Local Authority did not pursue findings about the origin of the bruising.   In the sixteen month period between commencement of proceedings and the final hearing, S only spent four months in her mother’s care, with close supervision in a residential assessment. The residential placement ended following negative reports about the mother’s ability to care for S, and S moved to live with a maternal aunt and uncle. Unfortunately, they could not offer the care S required.   In early May 2025, S was placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of the proceedings. The mother, at the time of the final hearing, had been seeing S twice per-week with foster carers supervising one of those visits. By the time of the final hearing in late September 2025, S was observed to be well-settled and emotionally secure with her foster carers. The Local Authority applied for a placement order two working days before the final hearing. At the commencement of the hearing, the Local Authority sought a closed adoptive placement, although this position was revised to open adoption with annual face-to-face contact following the social worker’s oral evidence on the first day. The Local Authority’s final care plan proposed to search for an adoptive home for six to nine months, following which they would place S in long-term foster care and explore the possibility of S being placed in long-term foster care  At the final hearing HHJ Tolson KC made a care order but refused to make a placement order, preferring long-term fostering for S with contact with her mother at once per fortnight. The Local Authority sought to appeal the refusal of the placement order. Permission was granted on 1 December 2025 by Peter Jackson LJ.   Grounds of Appeal  Ground 1: failure to undertake an adequate, comparative analysis of long-term foster care or adoption – the ‘balance sheet’ approach  The Court of Appeal recognised that the applications presented to the court “offered a stark choice – either the Judge approved the application for a placement order for adoption on the basis of the local authority care plan, or he refused it on the basis that S’s future would be better served by foster care.” ([54]). It is integral therefore, the Court made clear, that when reaching any such decision the tribunal undertakes a consideration of competing factors relevant to each option.  HHJ Tolson KC, however, failed to undertake such a “side-by-side comparative analysis” ([55]). Nevertheless, it was not fatal to the judge’s decision. It was still possible to identify the competing factors which the Judge had weighed in coming to his decision. In particular, the Judge highlighted the ‘box analysis’ undertaken by the social worker and evaluated the Guardian’s analysis of the pros and cons of the available options. Indeed, the Judge had reproduced substantial elements of this within the judgment itself. Although not in tabular form, the Judge’s reasoning was evident in the analysis he had undertaken. Thus, Cobb LJ made clear “a failure to set out the options in a side-by-side balance sheet analysis … will not pave the route towards certain success on appeal.” ([42]) What matters is “whether a judge actually failed to balance the factors in such a way as to lead them into error” (ibid).   Ground 2 – consideration of availability of current foster placement as a long-term placement  The appellants contended that the Judge was not entitled to reach the conclusion “that the carers have expressed a settled desire to care for [S] during her minority” (original judgment [38i]). It was argued that the Judge’s view was formed on the assumption that the current foster carers would be highly likely to continue meeting S’s needs throughout her remaining minority and into adulthood. The foster carers had however only been approved as short-term carers.  Whilst the Court determined that the Judge had “expressed a higher degree of confidence in the long-term potential for the current placement than the evidence at the hearing, taken as a whole, truly permitted” [69], following Peter Jackson LJ’s direction the foster carers had expressed a willingness to provide long-term care for S. This therefore in effect neutralised the second ground of appeal.  Ground 3 – insufficient consideration of advantages of open adoption  As set out above, the Local Authority changed their position as to one in favour of open adoption following the first day of the final hearing. S and her mother, at the time of the final hearing, were seeing one another twice per week. The Judge acknowledged that the mother had been managing the contacts well, with professionals praising the relationship between them. The Judge had recognised that the loss of S’s relationship with her mother would be “highly likely to be detrimental”, considering “that the loss may be irreplaceable” (judgment [38a]).  The Judge set out a template for ‘optimal contact’, with fortnightly contact being deemed the appropriate level.However, the Judge directly grappled with the practical reality that even in a “modern world” of increasing post-adoption contact following Re S (Placement Order; Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823, that level of contact may very well be too substantial an inhibition on the potential to find an adoptive home ([71]). The Judge was accordingly justified in reaching his view.   Ground 4 (a) – the negative assessment of the Local Authority’s ability to find a placement for S  The Local Authority argued that the Judge was unduly pessimistic in relation to this ground. The Guardian’s evidence set out that contact at six times per year would be appropriate, but that it would be “highly unlikely” that purported adopters would be agreeable to that level of contact (judgment [33]). That frequency, it should be noted, was substantially less than that proposed by the Judge.  Reinforcing the Judge’s pessimism was the statistical evidence of the Team Manager of the regional adoption agency. As a result, the Judge made it clear that he “accept[ed] that the (un)likelihood of a placement is not a bar to a placement order, but it must be a relevant factor, especially in a child who, it is common ground, needs to settle (or rather remain settled) now” (judgment [40d]). The Judgewas, again, therefore entitled to reach the view he did.  Ground 4 (b) – the negative assessment of the Local Authority’s commitment to finding an open adoptive placement  The Court of Appeal set out three material facts at which substantiated, and indeed justified, the Judge’s view. They are reproduced in full ([75]):  i) The authority’s plan prior to the start of the hearing had been to find a closed adoption placement for S under the placement order; only on the second day of  thehearing did it change its tune – prompting the Judge’s remark “it has the feel of forensic necessity about it” (judgment [14]);    ii) The final evidence of the Local Authority showed that it had “… not seriously considered the option of long-term fostering” for S (judgment [14]); and    iii) The Local Authority had known nothing of the circumstances in which the  current foster carers had adopted their children; this showed that “careful thinking on the relative merits of adoption against long-term foster care has been lacking” (judgment [18]).  Ground 5 – failure to give adequate reasons for departing from professional recommendations  Cobb LJ set out that, in coming to his decision, the Judge appropriately addressed the breadth of professional views which he was presented with. He did so by:  • Quoting extensively from the evidence of the Guardian and the social worker’s final evidence.  • Considering the depth, or lack thereof, of the Local Authority’s research into the position of the current foster carers  • Underlining the unbalanced review of the Local Authority in failing to consider long-term fostering either adequately or at all  The Court highlighted that the Local Authority’s change of position during the course of the hearing “redeemed its professional stance to some degree” ([76]), but the Judge was fair in his treatment of the matter as a finely balanced one. Indeed, the Court highlighted that the matter was so finely balanced that by the time of the appeal the Guardian’s position had “tilted onto the other side” (ibid).  Conclusion  What matters in each individual case is the clarity with which the reasoning underpinning any decision is set out, paired with a balanced evaluation both by the relevant professionals and the tribunal as to the available options. In this respect, it is worth setting out in full - as Cobb LJ did - the words of Peter Jackson LJ in Re D-S (A Child: Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 948; [2025] 1 FLR  815:  “[14] In many cases about children there are a number ofpossible plans. One judge might choose one, another judge might choose another. So long as the judge takes the correct legal approach, explains his or her thinking, and makes a decision that will work for the child, that is fine. We will not allow an appeal just because we might think that another possible plan would have been better. We can only step in if we have been shown that the judge did not approach the decision correctly or explain it properly, or if the judge’s chosen plan will not work”.    Practical Takeaways  When considering the viability of foster care or adoption:  • Do not simply compare the options in principle  • Adopt a balance sheet approach to provide a structured and detailed analysis of available options as a helpful aide memoire   • Despite the advances towards increased post-adoption contact, any welfare assessment must be underpinned by the evidence particular to the relevant child  • Fully explore the views of current foster carers and the availability for potential provision of long-term care

Parklane Plowden Podcast – Mediating probate and wills disputes

Listen to Parklane Plowden’s latest podcast: Mediating probate and wills disputes.  Chancery barrister Cait Sweeney is joined by barristers Marisa Lloyd and Sarah Harrison, both of whom are specialists in mediations and probate and wills work, to discuss the challenges to overcome during potential disputes.     Marisa and Sarah give their top tips on ensuring how the most can be made of a session, how to be fully prepared for a mediation and keeping a client engaged throughout the process.   Listen to the podcast below:

Six-Figure Indemnity Secured for Novel Appeal on Interpretation of Consumer Insurance Act

In an Appeal thought to be the first to consider the burden of proof applicable to Schedule 1 of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, HH Judge Mark Gargan has handed down judgment confirming that it is incumbent upon insurers seeking to avoid policies to prove, in the event a consumer has made a “qualifying misrepresentation”, that they would not have insured that consumer on any terms.  The Defendant, having led no evidence on the point in the court below, was denied its request for the matter to be remitted.  Adam Gould, instructed by Watson Woodhouse Solicitors, acted for the Claimant throughout.  A copy of the Judgment is available <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2022/09/22.06.01.kramarzyk.appeal.judgment.handed-down.pdf">here</a>.

PLP Clinical Negligence Case Law Update

<iframe width="1120" height="730" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/YQdWjZnbQQk" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>

‘A New Deal for Working People?’: Employment Status, Qualifying Periods, and Labour’s Proposal

<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/robert-dunn">Robert Dunn</a> is an <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/expertise/employment">Employment</a> specialist. To view Robert's original comments, click <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/news/robert-dunn-quoted-by-hr-grapevine-on-labour-pledge-to-grant-the-same-rights-to-all-workers-from-their-first-day">here</a>.The Current PositionAs it stands, everyone in England & Wales whom works, broadly fits into 1 of 3 groups. They could be an ‘employee’, a ‘worker’ or ‘self-employed’. These categories are far from clear cut, and are subject to a minefield of case law. Neither is it helpful that these categories can be defined differently, in different statutes.(Very) broadly speaking though, they are: <ul> <li> Employees - s.230(1) ERA 1996: These persons have a contract of service, express or implied. They are subject to control, mutuality of obligation, and must provide personal service;</li> <li> Workers - s.230(3)(b) ERA 1996: These persons have a contract for services, express or implied. They are should provide personal service, but may not have mutuality of obligation. These persons are categorised by their relationship of subordination to an employer, irrespective of what is on the face of their contract;</li> <li> Self-Employed: These persons are not subject to the subordination of a worker. They conduct business genuinely in their own right.</li> </ul> Different persons receive different employment rights, depending on which category they fall into. Crucially, rights also depend on one’s continuity of service. For example, employees require 2 years to claim unfair dismissal, or 26 weeks to complain that they have been subjected to a detriment for requesting training, pursuant to s.63(6)(d)(a) ERA 1996. Such qualifying periods are rife through employment law as we know it. Labour’s New DealOn 26th July 2021, Labour announced their ‘New Deal’, should they be elected in 2024. Essentially, they announced that they would: <ul> <li>Create a ‘unified worker status’. This would include employees, S.230(3)(b) ERA 1996 workers, and ‘those in bogus self-employment’;</li> <li>Remove qualifying periods for employment rights, and give all such ‘unified workers’ ‘full employment rights from Day One’;</li> </ul> Proposals have clearly not crystalised yet, and the devil will of course be in the detail. However, this article seeks to explore some of the potential questions which arise, and the possible effects of such a proposal. DiscussionFrom the perspective of those in work, this appears at first sight to be a positive proposal. Whilst employees already have access to ‘full employment rights’, the qualifying periods will be removed. Rights, such as the right to claim for unfair dismissal or claim paternity pay, would be available from the outset. No longer could a less-than-thorough disciplinary or redundancy procedure be applied just before an employee’s 2 years are up.For many workers, the benefits are clear too. The weightier ‘employee’ rights would become open to them, and all without any qualifying periods. Labour have also announced that the requirement to earn £120 per week to access Statutory Sick Pay would also be removed, it being a quasi-qualifying period. The TUC estimate this would bring over 6 million additional workers within the sick pay regime. The Key QuestionsAs ever with employment law though (and particularly employment status), the proposal also creates as many questions, as it does gives answers.Firstly, the proposal fails to comment on other definitions of ‘worker’. For example, S.43K ERA 1996 gives an extended ‘worker’ definition, for those not falling within S.230(3)(b). This gives S.43K workers the right to claim for detriments arising from whistleblowing, and does not even require a direct contract with their ‘employer’; per HHJ Eady QC in Keppel Seghers UK Ltd v Hinds [UK EAT/0019/14/JOJ]. On the face of the proposal, S.43K workers are excluded. If so, what is the logical basis for there being no widening of their rights at all, but other workers receiving ‘full’ employment rights?Secondly, there is the concept of the ‘bogus self-employed’. The inclusion of this concept, in addition to S.230(3)(b) workers, suggests it adds something more. However, it is entirely undefined. Moreover, key recent UK Supreme Court cases such as Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41 and Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, are aimed at focusing on the ‘reality’ of a relationship to determine whether individuals have been genuinely self-employed or not. Given the Uber decision, it is questionable whether this concept of the ‘bogus self-employed’ really widens the scope of protection at all. If it does, it would almost certainly lead to a further raft of extensive satellite litigation to determine where the new boundary would fall. If it does not, why has it been included in addition to ‘workers’?Thirdly, that said, there may be concern for those whom are self-employed. These persons may well not want to be sucked into this ‘unified worker’ definition, given the control and potential tax implications it may have. As an example, many barristers work solely under a particular Chambers, whom provide them work, deal with any complaints against them, deal with their fees, and deduct payments for clerking and expenses. The relationship has features of subordination, yet most barristers would surely be loathed to fall under the definition of ‘bogus self-employed’.Fourthly, there may be concern for workers. Some workers can pay tax as a self-employed person, and this could be threatened. Moreover, many workers enjoy the flexibility that a lack of mutuality of obligation, and perhaps control, brings. If employers are forced to give such individuals ‘full employment rights’, the additional cost may well discourage their employment in the first place. Is it worth employing a casual zero-hours worker on a temporary basis, if they can immediately resign and take you to the Tribunal for unfair dismissal? Further, if employers are forced to give such workers typical ‘employee rights’, there appears no reason not to then subject them to the additional obligations of an employee, and exert a greater level of control, subordination and mutuality of obligation on them. This will be unwanted by many current ‘workers’.Fifthly, the proposal poses questions for other categories of persons. What about apprentices or probationary employees, for example? Such individuals having protection against unfair dismissal, or the right to claim sick pay or maternity pay, ‘from Day One’ may well impact the willingness of employers to take such persons on. And what about Agency workers? Whilst they may still not be the ‘worker’ of the end-user (unless S.43K workers are included), they would almost certainly have ‘full employment rights’ against the agency. That would have profound implications for recruitment agencies, and their profitability.Sixthly, there is the impact upon Tribunals. It is difficult to see how providing millions more individuals with greater employment rights will not lead to more claims. No longer will a Tribunal have a lack of jurisdiction to consider an unfair dismissal complaint because a person is a worker, or does not have continuity of service. What is now the near instant rejection of an ET1 on those bases, would instead become a Preliminary Hearing followed by a 2-day Unfair Dismissal claim. There have also been soundings of the time limit for bringing most Tribunal claims, perhaps being extended to 6 months. Unless such proposals are accompanied by substantial investment in the Tribunal Service, it is difficult to see how this would not further worsen the case backlog.Lastly, the impact upon employer HR teams seems mixed. There must be a practical ease, in understanding all those whom work for you are a ‘unified worker’ with all rights from the outset. Distinguishing between such persons and calculating continuity of service would fall away. That may though be outweighed by the impact of any increase in Tribunal claims. ConclusionThe devil will of course be in the detail. 2024 is a long way away, and Labour still appear to have a long way to go in the polls to win in any event.Either way though, the proposals are interesting and worthy of discussion. They challenge the current orthodoxy, and some may argue simply continue the movement towards greater protection for those in unstable work, that is evident behind cases such as Uber BV v Aslam. As highlighted however, they require substantial clarification and pose risks for the Tribunal system, employers, and those workers whom want to retain the flexibility and freedom that their current role brings.

Cookie	Duration	Description
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional	11 months	The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
viewed_cookie_policy	11 months	The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.

Your Shortlist (0)

Arya Vindlacheruvu looks at lost years damages for child claimants

When The Scan Is Normal And The School Reports Are Positive: Rethinking Paediatric Brain Injury Evidence

Leila Benyounes and Georgia Banks acting on the Nottingham Inquiry

26th February 2026 | Family Finance & Private Children: A Private Client Wine‑Tasting Evening

Avaia Williams Secures Findings of Fabricated Rape and Sexual Coercion Allegations

Getting the balance right – the importance of a thorough evaluation of competing options following Re S (Foster Care or Placement for Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 47

Parklane Plowden Podcast – Mediating probate and wills disputes

Six-Figure Indemnity Secured for Novel Appeal on Interpretation of Consumer Insurance Act

PLP Clinical Negligence Case Law Update

‘A New Deal for Working People?’: Employment Status, Qualifying Periods, and Labour’s Proposal

14th May 2026 | ‘We Set the Bar’ Professor Jo Delahunty KC

Plead It or Lose It: EAT Reaffirms Limits on Tribunal Intervention in Whitaker v WRAT & LEG

Hylton Armstrong helps secure settlement of £4.6m in liability disputed clinical negligence birth injury claim

Adequacy of Reasons: Tim Wilkinson appears in the EAT

Your Shortlist (0)

Our Expertise

Arya Vindlacheruvu looks at lost years damages for child claimants

When The Scan Is Normal And The School Reports Are Positive: Rethinking Paediatric Brain Injury Evidence

Leila Benyounes and Georgia Banks acting on the Nottingham Inquiry

26th February 2026 | Family Finance &amp; Private Children: A Private Client Wine‑Tasting Evening

Avaia Williams Secures Findings of Fabricated Rape and Sexual Coercion Allegations

Getting the balance right – the importance of a thorough evaluation of competing options following Re S (Foster Care or Placement for Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 47

Parklane Plowden Podcast – Mediating probate and wills disputes

Six-Figure Indemnity Secured for Novel Appeal on Interpretation of Consumer Insurance Act

PLP Clinical Negligence Case Law Update

‘A New Deal for Working People?’: Employment Status, Qualifying Periods, and Labour’s Proposal

Latest News

14th May 2026 | ‘We Set the Bar’ Professor Jo Delahunty KC

Plead It or Lose It: EAT Reaffirms Limits on Tribunal Intervention in Whitaker v WRAT & LEG

Hylton Armstrong helps secure settlement of £4.6m in liability disputed clinical negligence birth injury claim

Adequacy of Reasons: Tim Wilkinson appears in the EAT

26th February 2026 | Family Finance & Private Children: A Private Client Wine‑Tasting Evening