This year the <a href="https://www.law.ac.uk/landing/pupillage-fair/">ULaw Pupillage Fair</a> will be a virtual event, held on Saturday 14th November from 12pm - 3:00pm. Meet a wide range of chambers and help improve your chances of securing <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/recruitment/pupillages">pupillage</a>, there is also the opportunity to take part in a wide range of talks and employability workshops. <div id="heading-accordionItem_15120_2" class="accordion__header"> <h4 data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#accordionItem_15120_2">The agenda</h4> </div> <div id="accordionItem_15120_2" class="collapse show" data-parent="#accordion_15118"> <div class="accordion__body"> Our Pupillage Fair will take place virtually on the University of Law's online events platform, Hopin. <strong>Start time:</strong>&nbsp;12.00pm <strong>End time:</strong>&nbsp;3.00pm Throughout the event you'll get the opportunity to 'visit' interactive stands where you can talk to the exhibitors and ask any questions you may have. We'll also be running regular talks and panel sessions throughout the event, including: <ul> <li>12.15pm - Our Bar Practice Course (BPC)</li> <li>1.30pm - Pupillage Interviews Panel</li> <li>2.30pm - Applications and Gaining Experience During COVID</li> </ul> &nbsp; Book your place <a href="https://www.law.ac.uk/events/event-booking/?id=8D5CE24A-32EC-EA11-A815-0022480076D0">here</a>. </div> </div>

An analysis of the recent case of <em>FRB v DCA</em> [No. 2] [2020] EWHC 754 (Fam) in light of the applicable law and authorities on conduct.&nbsp; Cohen J found that the wife’s actions in deceiving the husband about whether the child was in effect his biological child would amount to conduct ‘so egregious that it would be inequitable to disregard’, but refused to reduce the wife’s award in light of the husband’s seriously deficient disclosure.&nbsp; The husband’s litigation conduct and the wife’s reprehensible personal conduct therefore cancelled each other out. This begs the question of whether, had the husband fully complied with his disclosure obligations, her award would have been effectively reduced as a result of her deception.&nbsp; The case itself featured numerous complexities and was heard over the course of 15 days (the husband having instructed 2 QCs). Cohen J described the dispute as a ‘gladiatorial combat’ and observed ‘I know of no other case where the breakdown of a marriage has engendered litigation on the scale witnessed in this case’.&nbsp; Facts in brief: both parties came from extremely wealthy Indian families, spending approximately £10m per year and flying around the world in private jets. At the time of the financial remedy proceedings, it was known that the child thought to be the child of the marriage was in fact another man’s child. The parties had married in 2003 and the child had been born in 2011. After the marriage broke down, the husband heard a rumour that the wife had had an affair. A paternity test was conducted in 2018 and confirmed that the husband was not the child’s biological father. The wife admitted to the liaison, but claimed that she had no suspicions that the child was anything other than the husband’s biological father.&nbsp; The husband pleaded that the wife’s deception amounted to conduct that would be inequitable to disregard under section 25(2)(g) MCA 1973. The husband argued that the wife’s share to the matrimonial assets should be reduced by 50%, given that the child had been conceived mid-way through the marriage and, had he known at the time, he would have terminated the relationship.&nbsp; Section 25(2)(g) MCA 1973 requires the court to consider the conduct of each party, if the conduct is such that it would be inequitable to disregard it. This section was introduced by reason of MFPA 1984.&nbsp; Prior to this, the court was required to exercise its powers to grant financial remedies&nbsp; 'as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other'. The guidance in<em> Wachtel v Wachtel</em> [1973] 1 All ER 829 provided that, short of the conduct being 'both obvious and gross', the court should not decline to award any financial support or to reduce its order for financial provision merely because of what was formerly regarded as guilt or blame.&nbsp; In <em>Miller / McFarlane</em> [2006] UKHL 24, Lady Hale endorsed the Wachtel guidelines and stated that this approach is ‘not only just, it is also the only practicable one. It is simply not possible for any outsider to pick over the events of a marriage and decide who was the more to blame for what went wrong, save in the most obvious and gross cases.’&nbsp; What, then, are the most ‘obvious and gross cases’? Since the introduction of section 25(2)(g), the courts heard a flurry of cases which have ranged from the ‘standard’ bitter divorce to the utterly unbelievable. Some examples include: attempted murder resulting in 12 years’ imprisonment (<em>H v H (financial relief: attempted murder as conduct) </em>[2005] EWHC 2911 (Fam)), a knife attack disabling the wife from working (<em>Jones v Jones</em> [1976] Fam 8), GBH and attempted rape (<em>H v H (financial provision: conduct)</em> [1994] 2 FLR 801), ‘grave marital misconduct’ which included keeping an elderly husband in a smaller part of the house whilst cohabiting with her lover, coercing the husband into transferring significant sums of money, coupled with the refusal to accept a generous open proposal (<em>Clark v Clark</em> [1999] 2 FLR 498).&nbsp; The expression ‘gasp factor’ derives from the case of <em>S v S (non-matrimonial property: conduct)</em> [2007] 1 FLR 1496, where the court heard about a number of significant incidents of domestic violence. In one of these incidents, the husband had chased the wife up to bathroom, where she had fallen against the shower rail, cutting her head; moments earlier she had smashed his grandfather clock (who has not come across a dispute about the grandfather clock?). The judge concluded that the sad history of the marriage may leave him with what might be called a 'gulp gasp? factor' arising out of what each of the parties did to each other, verbally and physically. He was not, however, left with the ‘gasp factor’ as eloquently argued by Mr Mostyn QC (as he then was).&nbsp; Against the backdrop of the above extreme examples on conduct, it is surprising that Cohen J would have been prepared to accept the husband’s argument, were it not for the fact that the husband himself had engaged in litigation misconduct. Cohen J had accepted that the wife did not know she had carried another man’s child, but found it impossible to believe that the thought had never crossed her mind. His Lordship accepted that the wife ‘was very anxious to believe that the husband was the father and as time went on put the alternative to the back of her mind’. Cohen J concluded that the consequences of her deception on the husband had been ‘devastating’, but did not reduce her award because to do so would have been a ‘double jeopardy’ in light of the husband’s conduct.&nbsp; Courts have historically discouraged parties from relying on conduct, only accepting the argument in the most extreme cases. It is hard to reconcile this approach with Cohen J’s analysis, especially because the wife’s reprehensible personal conduct did not have any significant financial consequences on the husband. &nbsp; &nbsp;

We are delighted that our Personal Injury and Clinical Negligence team has been shortlisted as Finalists for ‘Barristers’ Chambers of the Year’ at the 2020 Personal Injury Awards. The winners will be announced during an online award ceremony on 1^st December 2020, for further details and to register for the ceremony, please visit: <a href="https://www.claimsmag.co.uk/register-to-stream-pi">https://www.claimsmag.co.uk/register-to-stream-pi</a>&nbsp; Chambers has also been shortlisted in this category at the forthcoming British Claims Awards. For further details visit <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/news/personal-injury-and-clinical-negligence-team-shortlisted-at-the-british-claims-awards-2020">https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/news/personal-injury-and-clinical-negligence-team-shortlisted-at-the-british-claims-awards-2020</a> Don’t forget to engage with us on twitter using #PIAwards @ParklanePlowden

The landscape of informed consent in the doctor-patient relationship was fundamentally re-developed in 2015 when the Supreme Court drove a bulldozer through the Bolam principle replacing it with a new patient focused view designed on “materiality“ <em>in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [ 2015 ] UKSC 11</em>. The General Medical Council acted as an intervener in Montgomery case. Some 5 years after the ground breaking decision in Montgomery, and the plethora of cases that have followed, highlighting patient autonomy over “the doctor knows best“ paternalism approach, the GMC has issued new guidance entitled ‘<strong>Decision Making and Consent’ </strong>updating its earlier guidance on consent issued in 2008. <strong>The new guidance was published on 30^th September 2020, and comes into effect on 9^th November 2020</strong> and is contained in a comprehensive 44 page document. The guidance focuses on “<em>the importance of meaningful dialogue, personalised communication about potential benefits and harms, and how doctors can support patients to make decisions with them about treatment and care“</em>. The guidance is relevant to every health and care decision made with each patient and is to cover <em>“decisions about treatments, procedures, interventions, investigations, screenings, examinations and referrals“.</em> It highlights the need to take a proportionate approach having regard to the specific circumstances of each decision. In this context, the guidance recognises that obtaining a patient’s consent <em>“needn’t always be&nbsp; a formal time-consuming process “</em>and that <em>“while some interventions require a patient’s signature on a form, for most healthcare decisions you can rely on a patient’s verbal consent, as long as they’ve had the opportunity to consider any relevant information and decided to go ahead“.</em> The key is in determining the proportionality boundary. At the core of the updated guidance are the “seven principles of decision making and consent“, and Lawrencian in their perceived wisdom, namely:&nbsp; <ol> <li>All patients have the right to be involved in decisions about their treatment and care and be supported to make decisions if able;</li> <li>Decision making is an ongoing process focused on meaningful dialogue, the exchange of relevant information specific to the individual patient;</li> <li>All patients have the right to be listed to, and given the information they need to make a decision and the time and support that they need to understand it ;</li> <li>Doctors must try and find out what matters to patients so they can share relevant information about the benefits and harms of proposed options and reasonable alternatives, including the option to take no action;</li> <li>Doctors must start from the presumption that all adult patients have the capacity to make decisions about their treatment and care;</li> <li>The choice of treatment or care for patients who lack capacity must be of overall benefit to them, and decisions should be made in consultation with those who are close to them or advocating for them; and</li> <li>Patients whose right to consent is affected by law should be supported to be involved in the decision-making process, and to exercise choice if possible.</li> </ol> The genesis of the guidance finds its roots in the Montgomery decision. At the heart is the concept of meaningful dialogue. A recent study conducted at Queen Mary University of London “<em>The effect of the Montgomery Judgment on settled claims against the NHS due to failure to inform before giving consent to treatment“ by DS Wald, JP Bestwick and P Kelly, Quarterly Journal of Medicine 2020 Oct 1 ; 113 ( 10 ) 721-725, &nbsp;</em>found that “<em>one of the problems for the NHS is the subjectivity of determining exactly what constitutes a material risk to a patient . This may differ considerably between patients undergoing the same procedure, based on lifestyles and hobbies, which may not always be disclosed to doctors in the discussion before consent“.</em> It now remains to be seen whether the updated guidance highlighting the need for meaningful dialogue, and specific to the individual patient, may see a move to alleviating the obstacle highlighted in the study. Paragraphs 16 to 20 of the guidance highlight the need to find out what matters to individual patients, and is part of a whole section entitled “the dialogue leading to a decision“ , which specifies guidance to enable doctors to discover what matters to patients in order to allow them to provide the relevant and necessary information to allow them to choose between reasonable options. From a practical perspective, the guidance at Paragraphs 37 and 38 provides for the need to make a summary of the discussion about their future care and any decisions made, including as much detail as practical about the patient’s wishes and fears, their preferences about future options for care, and their values and priorities that influence their decision making. The discussion should be flagged and made available to the patient and others involved in their clear so that all parties are clear about what has been agreed. In doing so, the guidance provides at Paragraph 50 &nbsp;for the need to document in the medical notes details of the consenting process, thereby removing the lacuna of the sparseness of consenting information, which often provides the battleground of any informed consent case. It remains to be seen if it will be implemented by doctors at the coalface. The guidance makes the very specific point that whilst consent forms can be a helpful prompt to share key information , as well as a standard way to record a decision, the filling in of a consent form is not a substitute for meaningful dialogue tailored to the individual patients’ needs. The updated GMC Guidance therefore recognises the changes to medical practice, the change in the law of consent and the consequent change in the doctor-patient relationship that has occurred since the last guidance on consent in 2008. The main protagonist in this, of course , has been the decision in Montgomery. The guidance makes clear what is required by Montgomery. There is no room to hide .The new landscape has been set out in comprehensive detail by the GMC, it is now for doctors to recognise and reflect on that view, if they have not already done so, following on from the Montgomery decision. &nbsp; <span style="color: #3366ff"><em><strong><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/jonathan-godfrey"><span style="color: #3366ff">Jonathan Godfrey</span></a> was Called to the Bar in 1990 and specialises in personal injury and clinical negligence.</strong></em></span>

We are delighted to share that the charity webinar, '<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/news/honour-based-violence-webinar">Honour Based Violence</a>', hosted as part of the Family Team #WineAndWebinar series has raised an impressive £700 for&nbsp;the '<a href="https://uk.virginmoneygiving.com/charity-web/charity/finalCharityHomepage.action?charityId=1012961">Halo Project Charity</a>'. We would like to thanks&nbsp;Caroline Goode, retired Detective Superintendent for discussing 'Honour' based violence, risk assessments and sharing her role in the Banaz Mahmod investigation, and to those who attended and donated. If you would like to make a donation to the charity, you can do so by following this <a href="https://uk.virginmoneygiving.com/charity-web/charity/finalCharityHomepage.action?charityId=1012961">link</a>. Further webinars in the 'Wine &amp; Webinar' series will be announced soon via our website and social media channels. &nbsp;<img src="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2021/09/Halo-Logo-1-1.png" alt="" width="300" height="128"> #BreaktheSilence

<strong>Date:</strong> 6^th October 2020 <strong>Time:</strong> 6pm&nbsp; The webinar is aimed at aspiring lawyers who are still deciding between the&nbsp;barrister or solicitor route in their careers. <strong>Speakers:</strong> - Professor Suzanne Rab, Barrister at Serle Court Chambers. - Chris Daw, QC at Millennium Chambers. - <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/marisa-lloyd">Marisa Lloyd</a>, Chancery Barrister at Parkane Plowden Chambers. - Chris Lee, Associate at Osborne Clarke. - Donya Fredj, Head of Corporate at Clara Partners Limited.&nbsp; <strong>Topics include:</strong> - Dreams vs. Reality of the job? - Explain the similarities and differences between barristers and solicitors. - What tips would you give to students who want to stand out? The webinar will be hosted by Matthew Berrick , Future Trainee Solicitor at Pinsent Masons, and on the panel, Suzanne Rab will be joined by Chris Daw QC, Marisa Lloyd, Chris Lee and Donya Fredj. The webinar is free to attend, please click <a href="mailto:https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/routes-into-law-solicitor-vs-barrister-tickets-122950527337">here</a> if you would like to attend.

The recent case of Hinson v Hare [2020] EWHC 2386 QB provides further clarification on the circumstances in which a court may allow one party permission to rely on a further expert report, when the conclusions reached by the single joint expert are not to their liking. Whilst the specific claim was for noise induced hearing loss (NIHL) the principles expounded can be applied generally.&nbsp;&nbsp; Elizabeth has recently acted for the Defendant at two applications on the same issue in which the Claimant’s applications were dismissed. The Claimants are currently appealing both decisions. An update will be provided following the appeals.&nbsp; <strong>The case</strong><strong>&nbsp;</strong> The Claimant was employed by the Defendant in 1976-1986. It was the Claimant’s case that: she had been exposed to high levels of noise and had been provided no hearing protection, inadequate hearing protection, and/or no training in respect of the risk. The claim for pain suffering and loss of amenity was limited to £5,000. Consequently, on 23/11/18 the court allocated the claim to the fast track and gave permission for engineering evidence to be in the format of a joint report (being standard directions for a NIHL case with a value of less than £5,000).&nbsp; The parties agreed to instruct Ms Laura Martin of Strange, Strange and Gardner to produce a joint engineering report. The conclusion reached in the report meant the Defendant was not in breach of their duty of care to the Claimant and the Claimant’s case would fail. The Claimant sent Part 35 questions to Ms Martin and was permitted by the court to raise further Part 35 questions after discussing similar issues, on a different case, with Mr Adrian Watson. Following the replies, the Claimant produced a report from Mr Adrian Watson which supported the Claimant’s case. This report was received by the Claimant’s solicitor 3 days before the trial. It is important to note this was the third date the matter had been listed for trial due to the case being vacated twice previously.&nbsp;&nbsp; At the trial the Claimant applied to: <ol> <li>Vacate the trial.</li> <li>Re-allocate to the multi-track and list for two days (originally it was listed for 1 day).</li> <li>Be given permission to rely on Mr Watson’s report and for the joint expert, Ms Martin, to continue as the Defendant’s expert.&nbsp;</li> </ol> In summary Miss Recorder McNeill QC dismissed the Claimant’s application taking into account the following:&nbsp; <ol> <li>The engineering evidence was central to the case and technical.</li> <li>The Claimant had agreed the instruction of Ms Martin.</li> <li>The Claimant had lost confidence in the report of Ms Martin for a good reason.</li> <li>The single joint experts’ opinion was not obviously lacking in cogency and did not display a clear lack of analysis or even partiality. In the Judge’s opinion “<em>On the face of the two reports, it is perfectly possible that the judge at trial would prefer the evidence of Ms Martin, I cannot say”. </em></li> <li>The trial had been vacated on two previous occasions.</li> <li>The case was of a low value, considerable cost had already been incurred if the matter was adjourned there would be further considerable costs.</li> <li>The low value of the claim was relevant but not conclusive.&nbsp;</li> </ol> <strong>The Appeal</strong>&nbsp; The core argument for the Claimant on Appeal was if the report is technical and determines the crucial issue in the case, with the effect that the Claimant loses his claim in the event permission is not given, the application should succeed. The Claimant argued the value of the claim should not be determinative and pursuant to the ECHR the Claimant had a right to a fair trial.&nbsp; The Defendant submitted the Claimant had a “<em>significant hurdle”</em> to overcome at the appeal, the Claimant had to show the Judge had exercised her discretion wrongly. It was suggested if the Claimant’s submissions on appeal were accepted there would be no scope for the application of the “balance of grievance test” or the overriding objective.&nbsp;&nbsp; <strong>Judgement on the Appeal</strong>&nbsp; The Judge cited the paragraph in <em>Daniels v Walker</em> <em>[2000] 1 WLR 1382</em>, often quoted as the test to be applied when seeking to depart from a joint report, in which Lord Woolf MR makes reference to a joint report being the first step when a case is “<em>substantial</em>”. Following this if one party “<em>for reasons which are not fanciful</em>” want to consider whether to challenge the joint report then “<em>subject to the discretion of the court</em>” they should be permitted to so. Mr Justice Spencer (the Judge in the present case) interpreted this to suggest the Court of Appeal “<em>did not intend to apply any straightjackets to the court</em>”.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Judge further agreed with the approach taken in <em>Bulic: v Harwood and Others [2012] EWHC 3657 QB</em>&nbsp; “<em>Eady J also referred to the decision of HHJ MacDuff QC (as he then was) in Kay v West Midlands Strategic Health Authority which had been relied upon by Judge Simpkiss at first instance in Bulic’s case, where Judge Mac Duff stated:</em><em>&nbsp;</em> <p style="padding-left: 30px"><em>“Where a party requests a departure from the norm and makes what one can term a Daniels v Walker application, all relevant circumstances are to be taken into account but principally the court must have its eye on the overall justice to the parties. This includes what I have called the <strong>balance of grievance test</strong>. The application will only succeed in circumstances which are seen to <strong>be exceptional</strong> and to justify such a <strong>departure from the norm</strong>.”</em>&nbsp;</p> Mr Justice Spencer upheld the decision of the Recorder below:&nbsp; <p style="padding-left: 60px"><em>“In my judgment, in the present case, the learned Recorder was faced with the clear task of balancing the interests of the parties, taking into account not only the overriding objective but also the interests of justice generally in seeing that cases are decided expeditiously, at proportionate cost and without undue inconvenience to other parties.</em>”&nbsp;</p> The Judge found the Recorder had considered all the relevant matters and balanced them accordingly. It is clear from the quote above applying the overriding objective is of paramount importance. In making reference to “justice generally” Mr Justice Spencer highlights the principal considerations from the overriding objective, proportionality, undue inconvenience of the parties and dealing with cases quickly.&nbsp; <strong>Comment</strong>&nbsp; When considering such applications, it is important to remember they are fact sensitive, different considerations will need to be factored into the “balance of grievance test”.&nbsp; The case must fall outside the normal ‘run of the mill case’ and the circumstances be considered to be “exceptional” for the party to have any prospect of obtaining permission. What is a court likely to consider to be an “exceptional” circumstance? What is clear from this judgement is Courts (in claims of modest value) are reluctant to give a party permission for further expert evidence even if they can find an expert to provide a different opinion.&nbsp; It must follow that an expert providing an alternative opinion does not automatically make the opinion of the Joint expert wrong or unreliable. Justice cannot come at any price, even in cases such as the present, where the opinion of the single joint expert is crucial for the Claimant to succeed.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is interesting to note the quote used in the judgement from <em>Daniels v Walker </em>refers to <strong>obtaining</strong> the expert evidence and not permission to rely on such evidence; such a distinction does not appear to have been made in the current case. Furthermore, reference is not made to paragraph 29 of the judgement in Daniels v Walker where Lord Woolf refers to claims of “modest value” where different considerations apply:&nbsp; <p style="padding-left: 30px"><em>“You cannot make generalisations, but in a case where there is a modest sum involved a court may take a more rigorous approach.&nbsp; It may be said in a case where there is a modest amount involved that it would be disproportionate to obtain a second report in any circumstances.&nbsp; At most what should be allowed is merely to put a question to the expert who has already prepared the report”.</em></p> The lateness of the application and need to have the trial vacated played some part in the Claimant’s application being refused. Delay would no doubt be a factor in any application of this nature as the experts would have to prepare joint statements and attend the trial. One factor the court did not take into account is the effect of QOCS. In NIHL cases it is very rare for QOCS to be set aside. If the Claimant had been given permission to rely on Mr Watson the costs of defending the case would have escalated substantially.&nbsp; Had the Defendant been aware of this at allocation the Defendant may have run the case differently, including choosing a different expert engineer. The conduct of the Claimant may be considered by some to be a partial ambush. <em>&nbsp;</em> <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/elizabeth-jones"><strong><em>Elizabeth Jones</em></strong></a> <strong><em>Parklane Plowden Chambers</em></strong>

Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/tim-wilkinson/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tim Wilkinson</a> In <strong><em>Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service v Susan Ann Veevers [2020] EWHC 2550</em></strong>, HHJ Pearce upheld a decision, of DDJ Harris, that the costs of an inquest were recoverable.  This was despite the GMFRS having stated, in pre-inquest correspondence, that <em>“any claims that will be pursued by you on behalf of their deceased family members will be met in full”</em>.  The judgment contains a review of the relevant authorities and a helpful summary of the main principles. Prior to the inquest, the parties engaged in what was described by DDJ Harris as <em>“a costs game”</em>.  GMFRS’ solicitors’ letter, from which the above quote is extracted, also stated that their clients were willing to compensate the estate and the dependents <em>‘for any loss which they may prove to be attributable to the incident”</em>.  However, the letter earlier stated that their <em>“clients have made no assessment of the potential for liability to the estate and dependants of Stephen Hunt but they have instructed us to set out their position in relation to any potential claim which may be brought for the family of the deceased”</em>.  The Claimant responded making clear their position; that the intention to compensate could be withdrawn at any time and so they would continue to prepare for the inquest until liability was admitted.  GMFRS’ response was to say that there was no need for a letter of claim and to reiterate that the claims would be met <em>“without reduction”</em>.  The Claimant responded with <em>“I am happy not to send a letter of claim based on your offer to deal with any claim for compensation without reduction for contributory negligence”</em>. The costs of the inquest were claimed in the sum of £141,000.  GMFRS’ contention was that it had clearly and unequivocally accepted that it would meet the claims, regardless of what any investigations may throw up.  The Claimant maintained that no admission had been made and that such equivocation meant it was necessary for the legal team to attend the inquest. HHJ Pearce reviewed the main authorities, including <em>Ross v The Owners of the Ship ‘Bowbelle’ [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 196</em> and <em>Roach v Home Office [2010] QB 256</em>.  He derived a number of principles, summarised as follows: 1)      Reasonable and proportionate inquest costs may be recoverable, so long as they can properly be said to be incidental to the civil claim; 2)      Such costs are not recoverable if liability is no longer in issue; 3)      When examining whether liability is in issue, all circumstances must be considered.  The central plank is likely to be whether liability has been admitted; 4)      A court is entitled to look with care at anything less than an unqualified admission to see whether the defendant may resile or if matters are left in issue; 5)      The fact that it is not an unequivocal admission, where one could have been made, may entitle the court to justify a conclusion that the defendant might exercise its right to resile; 6)      If costs are justified on the above principles, the fact that there may be other reasons for legal representation (e.g. equality of arms) does not negate those costs being recoverable: <em>“It is enough that the attendance to secure relevant evidence in relation to matters in issue was a material purpose for the attendance”</em>. Ultimately, HHJ Pearce concluded that GMFRS’ letters did not amount to, and could not be equated with, an admission of liability.  DDJ Harris rightly did not treat the letters as decisive and properly concluded that the Claimant was entitled to treat the open statements as capable of withdrawal (despite pleading reliance upon them in the Particulars of Claim).  This was sufficient to distinguish <em>Bowbelle</em>, above, in which the court treated the correspondence as an admission (referring to negligence having been admitted).  The costs were recoverable as being ‘of and incidental’ to the claim. This is a useful review of the relevant authorities and a salutary lesson to defendants who are seeking to avoid paying the costs of an inquest.  Anything less than an unequivocal admission will be scrutinised with care and, in the end, may well leave the defendant in the position of having openly stated they will meet the claim, without the benefit of minimising costs.  There is, too, a cautionary note for claimants.  In paragraph 62, HHJ Pearce referred to the Claimant accepting, or acquiescing, when agreeing not to send a letter of claim (see above quote): <em>“In an appropriate case, a paying party who could show that it had acted to its detriment in reliance upon such a statement might persuade the court……it was not reasonable for it to meet costs that would have been avoided had the receiving party raised at the time the issue it now takes”</em>.  An example may be where a defendant shows that, had proper concerns been raised, it would have admitted liability.  Whilst this may seem unlikely, claimants ought to give serious thought to any ‘acquiescence’ of an equivocal statement. Photo by <strong><a href="https://www.pexels.com/@phantomant?utm_content=attributionCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=pexels">Tim Eiden</a></strong> from <strong><a href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/fireman-holding-fire-hose-2030190/?utm_content=attributionCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=pexels">Pexels</a></strong>

<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/claire-millns">Claire Millns</a>, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/gemma-lieberman">Gemma Lieberman</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/elizabeth-hodgson">Elizabeth Hodgson</a> donned their trainers, neon clothes and fairy lights over the weekend, and joined thousands of other walkers taking part in the 'Shine Night Walk' in Newcastle, as part of a national event to raise money for <a href="https://www.cancerresearchuk.org/get-involved/find-an-event/charity-walks/shine-night-walk">Cancer Research UK</a>. They had a fantastic evening for a cause very close to their hearts, and raised an impressive £1600 between them. Claire Millns said, <em>"The atmosphere was electric and we were cheered on by all we passed as we made our way through the city including passing over the river Tyne(four times!). The final stop was a welcome curry. We want to thank all those who supported us."&nbsp;</em> <p style="text-align: center"><img src="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2021/09/Collage.png" alt="" width="300" height="306"></p> &nbsp;

<strong>The finance team at Parklane Plowden Chambers has been shortlisted for ‘In-House Finance Team of the Year’ at the 2019 Yorkshire Accountancy Awards. The team, led by accountant Jenny Hatfield, was established in 2015 as part of a revolutionary restructure to modernise how a barrister’s chambers operates. &nbsp;</strong> Their impact on the way chambers functions has far outreached the expectations of the board that appointed them; influencing everything from recruitment strategy to debtmanagement. This has all been achieved against the backdrop of working in a sector that is heavily regulated, highly traditional and complex in its service delivery. During the past four years the chambers finance function has been revolutionised. The team have delivered a variety of improvements to streamline financial processes, use financial data to drive business decisions and add value to chambers. Financial Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) have been established to enable the Board to monitor the performance of Barristers as individuals and across their markets. This is used to determine the strategy for growth and quickly identify any performance concerns.&nbsp; This system prompted a significant recruitment drive and investment into Junior barristers. The winners will be announced at an awards dinner on 8^th May at New Dock Hall in Leeds. &nbsp;