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Care Orders vs Supervision Orders for Children Placed at Home

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Introduction</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For the first time in many years, the Court of Appeal in 2023 looked at the type of order, if any, under which a child should be placed at home in <em>JW (Child at Home under Care Order)</em> [2023] EWCA Civ 944<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Case Law and Legal Principles</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Until the Court of Appeal revisited this area in <em>JW</em>, the last time that the topic had been, albeit tangentially, considered by the Court was in<em> Re DE (Child under Care Order: Injunction under Human Rights Act 1998)</em> [2014] EWFC 6; [2018] 1 FLR 1001.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Baker J held that, unless the need to remove arises as an emergency, a local authority considering removal should give notice to the parents, who may then make an application to the court to hold the situation via either an application to discharge the care order or a HRA 1998 injunction, or both. The decision to remove a child should only be made after a ‘<em>rigorous analysis of all of the realistic options</em>’ (in a similar manner required by the Supreme Court in <em>Re B </em>[2013] UKSC 33 when adoption is being considered). Baker J set out guidance on the approach to be taken where a local authority is proposing to remove a child, who is the subject of a care order, from home at paragraph 49 of the judgment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>[28] of <em>JW</em> sets out a helpful summary of the statutory scheme and case law:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"type":"lower-alpha"} --> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>making a care order with a subject child placed at home in the care of their parent(s) is plainly permissible within the statutory scheme and express provision is made for such circumstances in CA 1989, s 22C and in the placement regulations;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the early post-CA 1989 authorities established that a care plan for placement at home was an appropriate outcome where the facts justified it, without the need for exceptional circumstances;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the analysis of Hale J/LJ in Oxfordshire and in Re O laid particular weight upon the need for the authority to have power to remove the child instantly if circumstances required it, or to plan for the child to be placed outside the family;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>since <em>Oxfordshire </em>and <em>Re O</em>, the High Court decision in <em>Re DE</em>, containing guidance endorsed by the President, has been widely accepted so that, in all but a true emergency, the local authority power to remove a child from their home under a care order should not be exercised without giving parents an opportunity to bring the issue before a court;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the difference concerning removal of a child from home either under a care order or where there is no care order is now largely procedural. In all but the most urgent cases, the decision on removal will ultimately be taken within the umbrella of court proceedings, rather than administratively within a local authority;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>sharing of parental responsibility by the local authority with parents is an important element, but, as Hale J/LJ stressed, the fact that considerable help and advice may be needed over a prolonged period is not a reason, in itself for making a care order;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>it is wrong to make a care order in order to impose duties on a local authority or use it to encourage them to perform the duties that they have to a child in need;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the protection of the child is the decisive factor, but proportionality is key when making the choice between a care and supervision order for a child who is placed at home;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>supervision orders should be made to work, where that is the proportionate form of order to make.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>President’s Public Law Working Group Guidance</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In March 2021<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a>, the report at paragraphs 158 – 162 dealt with the making of care orders where children are placed at home. Key parts of those paragraphs are:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>There is a risk that the making of a care order at home provides false assurances to partner agencies because the local authority is neither involved in, nor has a thorough oversight of, the child’s day-to-day care.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The making of a care order should not be used as a vehicle to achieve the provision of support and services after the conclusion of proceedings. Unless a final care order is necessary for the protection of a child, an alternative means/route should be made available to provide this support and these services without the need to make a care order.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Supervision Orders may be appropriate, but there are concerns of their use. They have a higher (20%) risk of breakdown and return to court for further care proceedings within 5 years.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>A final care order should not be used as a method prematurely to end proceedings within 26 weeks artificially to alleviate concerns that the children will be at continuing risk of harm. The order should only be made whether the local authority can demonstrate that the assessment of any carer of a looked after child meets the criteria of the regulations.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>A final care order has an intrusive effect of state intervention, not only for the parents but also for the child. It can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm to the child.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Appendix F of the report sets out the best practice guidance (paragraphs 34 – 37) where a care order is sought but the child is to be placed at home:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>There should be exceptional reasons for the court to make such an order.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>It should not be used as a vehicle for the provision or support or services.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The risks of significant harm to the child are either adjudged to be such that the child should be removed from the care of her parents/carers, or some lesser legal order and regime is required. Any placement with parents under an interim or final order should be evidenced to comply with the statutory regulations for placement at home.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>It should be considered to be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to the child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but, nevertheless, the risks can be managed with a care order being made in favour of the local authority with the child remaining in the care of the parents/carers. A care order represents a serious intervention by the state in the life of the child and in the lives of the parents in terms of their respective ECHR, article 8 rights. This can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risks of harm of the child.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The PLWG in their report and recommendations placed emphasis on the need for proportionality when considering the necessity for a child placed at home under a final care order. This in turn caused the Court of Appeal in <em>JW</em> to find that there needs to be ‘<em>exceptional reasons’</em> to justify the making of a care order for a child who is to be placed at home as a long-term care plan.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Paragraph 37 of <em>JW</em> is key;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>‘It should be considered to be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to the child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but, nevertheless, the risks can be managed with a care order being made in favour of the local authority with the child remaining in the care of the parents/carers. A care order represents a serious intervention by the state in the life of the child and in the lives of the parents in terms of their respective ECHR, article 8 rights. This can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risks of harm of the child.'</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In April 2023 a further report was published (<em>Recommendations to achieve best practice in the child protection and family justice systems: Supervision Orders</em>)<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a>. The key provision within this report is contained with Appendix C. The key change is the expectation that, in every case where a supervision order may be made, the local authority will prepare a clear and detailed Supervision Support Plan<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> which is tailored to the needs of the child. It also requires that the plan should be clear as to the provision of resources to underpin each element of the plan, and that the plan should be seen as a living instrument and be kept under formal ‘robust’ review during the life of the supervision order:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>‘<em>In every case where a Supervision Order may be made, the local authority will prepare a clear and detailed Supervision Support Plan which is tailored to the needs of the child. The guidance also requires that the plan should be clear as to the provision of resources to underpin <u>each element of the plan</u>, and that the plan should be seen as a living instrument and be kept under formal ‘robust’ review during the life of the Supervision Order.’</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Following the decision in JW, it is anticipated that the number of final care orders for children placed at home will drop significantly. As practitioners, it is important to analyse the facts of each case where such a care plan is proposed, to identify whether there are ‘truly exceptional’ circumstances that justify the same. Where a case is to be concluded by way of a supervision order, it is essential that the support plan is a comprehensive document that sets out exactly what the parents can expect the local authority to do to support the family in making the placement successful, and vice versa.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:separator --> <hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/> <!-- /wp:separator --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/JW-Children-judgment-040823.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/JW-Children-judgment-040823.pdf</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/March-2021-report-final_clickable.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/March-2021-report-final_clickable.pdf</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/April-2023-Report-Supervision-Orders-Final.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/April-2023-Report-Supervision-Orders-Final.pdf</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Annex-A-Supervision-Order-Plan.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Annex-A-Supervision-Order-Plan.pdf</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

New Family Clerking Appointments at Parklane Plowden Chambers

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>PLP has a number of exciting announcements to make as it expands and develops its clerking services. <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/clerks/stephen-render/">Stephen Render</a> has been appointed Senior Practice Director of the Family, Chancery and Commercial Teams. He is a highly experienced Clerk with many years of experience in all areas of work covered by those teams, in particular dealing with complex and high value work.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>New hire <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/clerks/callum-bryne/">Callum Byrne</a> has been appointed as an additional Family Team Practice Manager. His wealth of experience in clerking a variety of teams will complement our existing Family Team Practice Manager <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/clerks/hannah-townsend/">Hannah Townsend</a> and Family Clerk <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/clerks/claire-wright-nee-shephard/">Claire Wright</a> who pride themselves on their accommodating and highly responsive manner.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/clerks/millie-eccles/">Millie Eccles</a> has also been appointed to act as Family Junior Clerk and is a very welcome addition to the clerking team. After successfully completing her apprenticeship with PLP and showing a passion for clerking, she looks forward to starting her career with the family team.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Head of the Family Team <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/julia-nelson/">Julia Nelson</a> commented “<em>We are extremely pleased with all of our new appointments which can only strengthen the position of what is a thriving and successful family team. We look forward to continuing to provide a comprehensive and responsive clerking service to all of our clients</em>.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Case Law Update: Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-Examination: No QLR) [2024] EWFC 22

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Introduction</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Sir Andrew McFarlane (President of the Family division) has handed down a very helpful and hotly anticipated judgment regarding the approach the court should adopt when it has directed a QLR be appointed for a party but no QLR has been found. Sir Andrew McFarlane took the opportunity to provide this judgment following a substantive judgment given at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This case law update is provided to assist practitioners with providing a summary of this case. However, I would greatly encourage all family law practitioners to read the judgment in full and ensure they have a copy to hand in cases where the appointment or discharging of a QLR is likely to be an issue.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Part 4B of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (MFPA) was inserted by s65 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and establishes the statutory scheme for the appointment of QLR’s in family proceedings that commenced after 21 July 2022. Sir Andrew McFarlane notes the supporting Statutory Guidance, Family Procedure Rules, and provides a link to the Government website regarding the QLR scheme. His judgment provides a helpful summary of the scheme and its aims at paragraphs 4-20.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Sir Andrew McFarlane goes on to explain the decision that he faced in the case, namely what to do when a QLR is required, but none is available. He notes that many judges and magistrates are facing this issue on a daily basis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Options Before the Court Where No QLR is Available</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Practitioners may recall that in a “View from the President’s Chambers” in June 2023, the President suggested that ‘if no QLR is found within 28 days, the court should list the case for directions and direct that some summary information is provided by HMCTS about the difficulties that have been encountered.’ The President mentions this guidance in his judgment at paragraph 22, and also notes that ‘Cases should not be permitted to drift whilst an open-ended search for a QLR is undertaken” [22].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The President notes that the principal options facing a court at the directions stage, following that 28 days period are likely to be (but not exhaustively):</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>a) A further adjournment in the hope that a QLR may be found;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>b) An adjournment to allow one or both parties to engage their own advocate;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>c) Reviewing the need for the vulnerable party to give oral evidence and be cross-examined. This will include reviewing the need for there to be a fact-finding hearing in the proceedings;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>d) Considering any other alternative means of avoiding in person cross-examination between the relevant parties;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>e) The court itself taking on the task of asking questions in place of the in person party [23].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Importantly, he notes that ‘It does not follow that, if no QLR is available, the court is automatically required to conduct the questioning itself. It is important that all possible alternative options are reviewed at that point in the proceedings’ [23].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The President continues by stating: “When considering the options, and whether the court should take on the questioning, the court will take account of PD3AB paragraph 5.3 which states that: 'a satisfactory alternative to cross-examination in person does not include the court itself conducting the cross-examination on behalf of a party'. The validity of that statement is unlikely to be controversial in the eyes of judges and magistrates. Indeed, the negative aspects of questioning by the court must have been prominent in the thinking in Parliament when the QLR process was brought into law by the 2021 Act” [24].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Interestingly, whilst Practice Direction 3AB paragraph 3.5 states that ‘a satisfactory alternative to cross-examination in person does not include the court itself conducting the cross-examination on behalf of a party’, this provision is not black-letter law. Therefore, the Practice Direction does not prevent the court undertaking the task of cross-examination if the court considers that, in the interests of justice, it must nevertheless do so.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As practitioners well know, the need for the court to deal 'justly' with cases is not confined simply to the need to act in the interests of justice when appointing a QLR; it is a requirement that pervades every step that the court may take throughout any proceedings in order to meet the 'overriding objective' of the FPR 2010.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Ultimately, if the court decides to abandon further attempts to appoint a QLR, the previous direction appointing one must be discharged. The President also notes that, as a matter of good practice, the reasons for the discharge should be very shortly recorded on the face of the order and/or in a short judgment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Questioning by the Court</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The President at paragraphs 28 to 40 goes on to outline the approach regarding questioning by the court, noting in particular his own experience with doing so in the case before him.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“It may, at least in one sense, be reassuring to those judges, magistrates and legal advisers who regularly have to do so, to record that, in the case before me, I found the task of asking the questions to be a particularly burdensome, unnatural and tricky one. As neither party was represented, as the judge I found myself first of all asking questions to tease out further details 'in chief', as it were, from the first of the parties to give evidence before then putting to them most of the questions that the other party wished to have put. The process was then reversed when the other party entered the witness box. Over the course of a full court day, I therefore ended up asking all of the questions.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>I have used the word 'tricky' to describe the process as, when undertaking questioning, the court has to tread a narrow path between, on the one side, ensuring the witness' evidence is adequately tested by the points that the other party wishes to raise, but, on the other, ensuring that the judge does not enter the arena or be seen in any way to be promoting the case of one side or the other.”</em> [28-29].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Helpfully, the President sets out in some detail the leading authorities on the questioning of witnesses by judges, including <strong><em>Serafin v Malkiewicz</em> [2020] UKSC 23</strong> and the decision of Hayden J in <strong><em>PS v BP </em>[2018] EWHC 1987 (Fam). </strong>&nbsp;Practitioners and judges alike may find that particular section of the President’s judgment useful when preparing written and oral arguments or judgments on this issue.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The President’s Practical Points</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The President concludes at paragraphs 41 to 42 by providing his own practical factors that he would encourage judges to consider.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“Finally, I would offer the following practical points for courts to consider either when appointing a QLR or when preparing to put questions itself:</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>a) Whilst there is value in the QLR attending court for the ground rules hearing so that they may meet the party on whose behalf they will be asking questions, where this is impractical, and where holding the hearing remotely means that a QLR who could not otherwise act can be appointed, it should be acceptable for the QLR to attend the ground rules hearing remotely;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>b) The default position for the full hearing should be for the QLR to be in attendance at court, rather than joining remotely, as the overall effectiveness and fairness of the process is likely to be diminished if they are not in the courtroom;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>c) In all cases (whether there is a QLR or not) at the ground rules hearing, or earlier, the court should direct that the prohibited party should submit a clear statement shortly stating the allegations, facts or findings that they seek to establish;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>d) In all cases, the prohibited party should be required to file a written list of the questions that they wish to have asked prior to the main hearing. The list should go to the QLR, or to the court if there is no QLR, but not to the witness or other parties. This process should not prevent the prohibited party from identifying additional questions that may arise during the hearing;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>In conclusion, whilst it is to be hoped that, in time, the continued training programme and the ability to claim travel expenses will increase the availability of QLRs, there will inevitably remain some cases where there is no alternative but for the court to ask the questions itself. Unsatisfactory though that process plainly is, in such cases it will be necessary in order to deliver a just, fair and timely conclusion to proceedings. Where that is the case, the advice in this judgment is intended to assist the court in navigating the tricky path between ensuring that the opposing case is put fully, fairly and properly, but doing so without entering the arena </em>[41-42].</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As the lack of QLR’s is unlikely to be resolved in the near future, this helpful judgment is likely to be of assistance to practitioners and judges alike for some time. Ultimately, on the ground one can see that the issue of proper renumeration for the role of QLR is likely to be one of the key factors that impacts the availability of advocates willing to fulfil that role.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>To read the President’s judgment in full, please see the following link: <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2024/22.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2024/22.html</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

20 March 2024 | Employment Grandstand Seminar, Newcastle

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Successful Litigation for Employment Practitioners: Practical Guidance and Useful Tips</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers would be delighted if you would join our employment team specialists on the 20th March 2024 for an afternoon of talks giving practical guidance and useful tips on running a successful employment tribunal litigation. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Location: </strong><a href="https://www.bing.com/maps?mepi=101%7EDirections%7EUnknown%7EDirection_Button&amp;ty=0&amp;rtp=pos.54.97492980957031_-1.6094900369644165__Laing+Art+Gallery__e_%7E&amp;mode=d&amp;v=2&amp;sV=1&amp;cp=54.974913%7E-1.609465&amp;lvl=14.5">Laing Art Gallery</a><br>New Bridge Street<br>Newcastle Upon Tyne<br>NE1 8AG</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Time:</strong> 12:00 - 16:30</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>We are offering an early bird price of <strong>£50pp</strong> when registering to this event until the <strong>26 February 2024</strong>. Tickets will be <strong>£75pp</strong> after this date. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Programme</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>12:00 - 12:55 | Lunch and Refreshments</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>12:55 - 13:00 | Welcome</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>13:00 - 13:30 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/andrew-sugarman/">Andrew Sugarman</a> - How to win in the Employment Tribunal: top 10 tips</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>13:30 - 14:00 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/claire-millns/">Claire Millns</a> - Mastering the virtual maze: a guide to efficiently handling employment tribunal claims via the online portal</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>14:00 - 14:30 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/robert-dunn/">Robert Dunn </a>&amp; <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/robert-allen-pupil/">Robert Allen</a> - Case choreography and preliminary pizzazz: tips on navigating a CMPH</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>14:30 - 14:45 | Break</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>14:45 - 15:15 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bryony-clayton/">Bryony Clayton</a> - The limits of open justice: anonymity and privacy issues in the tribunal</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>15:15 - 15:45 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/nicola-twine/">Nicola Twine</a> - Striking the balance: when to apply (and when not to), strike out and deposit orders</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>15:45 - 16:15 | <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bethan-davies/">Bethan Davies</a> - It’s all in the words: maximising your witness statements</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>16:15 - 16:30 | Questions and closing remarks</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Lunch and refreshments will be served from 12pm with speakers starting at 13:00 until 16:30. Guests will then be welcome to join us in Chambers at Portland House for drinks.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If you are interested in attending please <a href="https://lexlinks.parklaneplowden.co.uk/doForm.aspx?a=0xF15D4A97E0E04123&amp;d=0x49EB4C9596DBE1A5^0xBDC0B87423493533|0x40F3E49C83A12815^0xAF1BA1DD83354AE1|0xF1B146662D144B75^0x8A1CDD2DB76555E3|0x9CB58EF48012E032^0x75E2A344A6368118|0xA14B30AADF25AF0D^0x4538EA01547C6D9520542FC6B6F63C93|0x43D48F22BB6859DF^0x75E2A344A6368118|0xD52134AC788FF0FE^0xAF1BA1DD83354AE1|">sign up here</a>. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Bathgate v Technip [2023] CSIH: Broadening the scope of Qualifying Settlement Agreements

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As all employment lawyers know, in order to protect them from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous employers, employees cannot ordinarily contract out of their employment rights.&nbsp;There are only two exceptions.&nbsp; They can do so in a contract of settlement made with the assistance of ACAS, known as a ‘COT3’, or they can do so in ‘qualifying settlement agreement’, but not otherwise.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>I recently came across the notes for a talk I gave back in 2006 in which I confidently stated that one of the differences between a COT3 and a qualifying settlement agreement (or a compromise agreement as they were then called), was that a COT3 could compromise claims arising out of future conduct whereas a qualifying settlement agreement could not.&nbsp; Following the recent Court of Session judgment in <strong><em>Bathgate v Technip </em></strong>[2023] CSIH 48, however, it appears that my confidence was misplaced.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Legal Background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Since at least the House of Lords decision in <strong><em>BCCI v Ali </em></strong>[2001] ICR 337,it has been clear that parties can use a COT3 to compromise claims that have not even come into existence, although as Lord Bingham put it ‘If the parties had sought to achieve so extravagant a result they should in my opinion have used language which left no room for doubt’.&nbsp;That is because there is nothing to stop parties at common law from contracting out of future rights; and in order to fall into the ‘COT3’ exception, the only stipulation is that the agreement is ‘made with the assistance of ACAS’.&nbsp;In other words, any otherwise contractually enforceable agreement made with the assistance of ACAS will work; a point well illustrated in the context of post-employment victimisation in <strong><em>Arvunescu v Quick Release </em></strong>[2022] EWCA Civ 1600.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is slightly different with qualifying settlement agreements.&nbsp;To come within that exception there are a number of hoops that have to cleared, one of which is that the agreement must ‘relate to the particular complaint’.&nbsp;It might be thought that for an agreement to relate to ‘the particular complaint’ then the particular complaint must be capable of being in existence at the time the agreement is signed.&nbsp;That certainly was the view of the EAT in <strong><em>Lunt v Merseyside TEC Ltd</em></strong> [1999] ICR 17, when it said:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>'A compromise agreement cannot, therefore, seek to exclude potential complaints that have not yet arisen on the off-chance that they might be raised; it cannot, in other words, be used to sign away all the employee's tribunal rights, as can be done in the case of a negotiated settlement drawn up with the assistance of a conciliation officer.'</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That also seems to have been the intention behind the statutory provisions, given the comments of Viscount Ullswater when he introduced the relevant statutory provisions in the House of Lords:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>'We are proposing that these procedures should only be available in the context of an agreement which settles a particular complaint that has already arisen between the parties to that complaint.'</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That too was Lord Summers’s view when <strong><em>Bathgate</em></strong> was in the Scottish EAT.&nbsp;Drawing from the judgments of Mummery and Smith LJJ in <strong><em>University of East London v Hinton </em></strong>[2005] ICR 1260, that the broad purpose behind the legislation was to protect employees from relinquishing their rights; he concluded that the requirement that a settlement agreement ‘relates to the particular complaint’ could never be met in relation to a cause of action which had not emerged at the time of the agreement.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Judgment of the Court of Session</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Needless to say, the Court of Session came to the opposite conclusion. It reasoned that if Parliament had intended to lay down rules limiting parties’ freedom of contract, it would have expressed them in clear and unequivocal terms; and it had not done so. In its view, all that the words ‘relate to the particular complaint’ required was that the complaint being made was covered by the terms of the contract. It could see no justification for putting a temporal limit on what could be compromised by a settlement agreement, when none existed for a COT3. On a natural reading of the settlement agreement signed by Mr Bathgate, future claims for age discrimination were covered. Accordingly his age discrimination claim, which arose out of conduct which post-dated that agreement, had been validly compromised even before the discriminatory conduct had occurred.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Comment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With respect to the Court of Session, its reasons do not seem to me to be entirely convincing. Firstly, it is abundantly clear that Parliament <em>was</em> laying down rules to limit parties’ freedom to contract. It does that in terms at section 144(1) of the Equality Act 2010. The section the Court was interpreting is an exception to that general prohibition, it is not itself a limitation to the right to contract.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Secondly, on one reading of the Court of Session analysis, the statutory requirement for the agreement to ‘relate to the particular complaint’ is entirely superfluous. If the agreement does not ‘relate to the particular complaint’ in the sense used by the Court of Session, then as a matter of contract it will not compromise the complaint. Surely Parliament intended something more by those words than a bland restatement of the obvious. Indeed, I do wonder whether the ubiquitous list of UK employment rights (which Smith LJ had warned against in <strong><em>Hinton</em></strong>) is really quite what Parliament had in mind either. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Thirdly, and perhaps most compellingly, on the Court of Session analysis, the central purpose of the prohibition on contracting out would seem to be undermined. On its analysis, there is nothing to prevent an unscrupulous employer from asking an employee (after advice from an insured lawyer and presumably some form of payment) to sign away their employment rights pre-emptively during the course of their employment. Surely it is that evil that the ‘particular complaint’ requirement was designed to prevent. By definition, ACAS will not become involved until a dispute has arisen, so there is less need for a similar protection in respect of a COT3. But that is not the case with legal advisors. Without some sort of safeguard, they could be brought in to give advice on the waiver of employment rights, even as the ink is drying on the employment contract. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Session is not technically binding in England and Wales, but its decisions are highly persuasive; and unless and until the issue is revisited by the Court of Appeal, it is likely to be followed. In the meantime, and out of an abundance of caution, I will still be advising employers to utilise a COT3 if they wish to be confident of compromising any claims arising out of future conduct.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/dominic-bayne"><em>Dominic Bayne</em></a><em>&nbsp;acted for Mr Bathgate before the EAT and at first instance.&nbsp;He is joint head of&nbsp;</em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/expertise/employment"><em>PLP’s employment team</em></a><em>, and is recognised by the directories as one of the leading employment barristers on the North Eastern Circuit.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->