Legal Update Archives - Page 3 of 35

Home

Expertise

Our Expertise

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.

Care Orders vs Supervision Orders for Children Placed at Home

Introduction   For the first time in many years, the Court of Appeal in 2023 looked at the type of order, if any, under which a child should be placed at home in JW (Child at Home under Care Order) [2023] EWCA Civ 944<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a>.   Case Law and Legal Principles   Until the Court of Appeal revisited this area in JW, the last time that the topic had been, albeit tangentially, considered by the Court was in Re DE (Child under Care Order: Injunction under Human Rights Act 1998) [2014] EWFC 6; [2018] 1 FLR 1001.   Baker J held that, unless the need to remove arises as an emergency, a local authority considering removal should give notice to the parents, who may then make an application to the court to hold the situation via either an application to discharge the care order or a HRA 1998 injunction, or both. The decision to remove a child should only be made after a ‘rigorous analysis of all of the realistic options’ (in a similar manner required by the Supreme Court in Re B [2013] UKSC 33 when adoption is being considered). Baker J set out guidance on the approach to be taken where a local authority is proposing to remove a child, who is the subject of a care order, from home at paragraph 49 of the judgment.   [28] of JW sets out a helpful summary of the statutory scheme and case law:   <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"> <li>making a care order with a subject child placed at home in the care of their parent(s) is plainly permissible within the statutory scheme and express provision is made for such circumstances in CA 1989, s 22C and in the placement regulations;</li>   <li>the early post-CA 1989 authorities established that a care plan for placement at home was an appropriate outcome where the facts justified it, without the need for exceptional circumstances;</li>   <li>the analysis of Hale J/LJ in Oxfordshire and in Re O laid particular weight upon the need for the authority to have power to remove the child instantly if circumstances required it, or to plan for the child to be placed outside the family;</li>   <li>since Oxfordshire and Re O, the High Court decision in Re DE, containing guidance endorsed by the President, has been widely accepted so that, in all but a true emergency, the local authority power to remove a child from their home under a care order should not be exercised without giving parents an opportunity to bring the issue before a court;</li>   <li>the difference concerning removal of a child from home either under a care order or where there is no care order is now largely procedural. In all but the most urgent cases, the decision on removal will ultimately be taken within the umbrella of court proceedings, rather than administratively within a local authority;</li>   <li>sharing of parental responsibility by the local authority with parents is an important element, but, as Hale J/LJ stressed, the fact that considerable help and advice may be needed over a prolonged period is not a reason, in itself for making a care order;</li>   <li>it is wrong to make a care order in order to impose duties on a local authority or use it to encourage them to perform the duties that they have to a child in need;</li>   <li>the protection of the child is the decisive factor, but proportionality is key when making the choice between a care and supervision order for a child who is placed at home;</li>   <li>supervision orders should be made to work, where that is the proportionate form of order to make.</li> </ol>   President’s Public Law Working Group Guidance   In March 2021<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a>, the report at paragraphs 158 – 162 dealt with the making of care orders where children are placed at home. Key parts of those paragraphs are:   <ul> <li>There is a risk that the making of a care order at home provides false assurances to partner agencies because the local authority is neither involved in, nor has a thorough oversight of, the child’s day-to-day care.</li>   <li>The making of a care order should not be used as a vehicle to achieve the provision of support and services after the conclusion of proceedings. Unless a final care order is necessary for the protection of a child, an alternative means/route should be made available to provide this support and these services without the need to make a care order.</li>   <li>Supervision Orders may be appropriate, but there are concerns of their use. They have a higher (20%) risk of breakdown and return to court for further care proceedings within 5 years.</li>   <li>A final care order should not be used as a method prematurely to end proceedings within 26 weeks artificially to alleviate concerns that the children will be at continuing risk of harm. The order should only be made whether the local authority can demonstrate that the assessment of any carer of a looked after child meets the criteria of the regulations.</li>   <li>A final care order has an intrusive effect of state intervention, not only for the parents but also for the child. It can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm to the child.</li> </ul>   Appendix F of the report sets out the best practice guidance (paragraphs 34 – 37) where a care order is sought but the child is to be placed at home:   <ul> <li>There should be exceptional reasons for the court to make such an order.</li>   <li>It should not be used as a vehicle for the provision or support or services.</li>   <li>The risks of significant harm to the child are either adjudged to be such that the child should be removed from the care of her parents/carers, or some lesser legal order and regime is required. Any placement with parents under an interim or final order should be evidenced to comply with the statutory regulations for placement at home.</li>   <li>It should be considered to be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to the child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but, nevertheless, the risks can be managed with a care order being made in favour of the local authority with the child remaining in the care of the parents/carers. A care order represents a serious intervention by the state in the life of the child and in the lives of the parents in terms of their respective ECHR, article 8 rights. This can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risks of harm of the child.</li> </ul>   The PLWG in their report and recommendations placed emphasis on the need for proportionality when considering the necessity for a child placed at home under a final care order. This in turn caused the Court of Appeal in JW to find that there needs to be ‘exceptional reasons’ to justify the making of a care order for a child who is to be placed at home as a long-term care plan.   Paragraph 37 of JW is key;   ‘It should be considered to be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to the child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but, nevertheless, the risks can be managed with a care order being made in favour of the local authority with the child remaining in the care of the parents/carers. A care order represents a serious intervention by the state in the life of the child and in the lives of the parents in terms of their respective ECHR, article 8 rights. This can only be justified if it is necessary and proportionate to the risks of harm of the child.'   In April 2023 a further report was published (Recommendations to achieve best practice in the child protection and family justice systems: Supervision Orders)<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a>. The key provision within this report is contained with Appendix C. The key change is the expectation that, in every case where a supervision order may be made, the local authority will prepare a clear and detailed Supervision Support Plan<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> which is tailored to the needs of the child. It also requires that the plan should be clear as to the provision of resources to underpin each element of the plan, and that the plan should be seen as a living instrument and be kept under formal ‘robust’ review during the life of the supervision order:   ‘In every case where a Supervision Order may be made, the local authority will prepare a clear and detailed Supervision Support Plan which is tailored to the needs of the child. The guidance also requires that the plan should be clear as to the provision of resources to underpin each element of the plan, and that the plan should be seen as a living instrument and be kept under formal ‘robust’ review during the life of the Supervision Order.’   Conclusion   Following the decision in JW, it is anticipated that the number of final care orders for children placed at home will drop significantly. As practitioners, it is important to analyse the facts of each case where such a care plan is proposed, to identify whether there are ‘truly exceptional’ circumstances that justify the same. Where a case is to be concluded by way of a supervision order, it is essential that the support plan is a comprehensive document that sets out exactly what the parents can expect the local authority to do to support the family in making the placement successful, and vice versa.   <hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>   <a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/JW-Children-judgment-040823.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/JW-Children-judgment-040823.pdf</a>   <a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/March-2021-report-final_clickable.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/March-2021-report-final_clickable.pdf</a>   <a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/April-2023-Report-Supervision-Orders-Final.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/April-2023-Report-Supervision-Orders-Final.pdf</a>   <a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Annex-A-Supervision-Order-Plan.pdf">https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Annex-A-Supervision-Order-Plan.pdf</a>

Case Law Update: Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-Examination: No QLR) [2024] EWFC 22

Introduction   Sir Andrew McFarlane (President of the Family division) has handed down a very helpful and hotly anticipated judgment regarding the approach the court should adopt when it has directed a QLR be appointed for a party but no QLR has been found. Sir Andrew McFarlane took the opportunity to provide this judgment following a substantive judgment given at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing.   This case law update is provided to assist practitioners with providing a summary of this case. However, I would greatly encourage all family law practitioners to read the judgment in full and ensure they have a copy to hand in cases where the appointment or discharging of a QLR is likely to be an issue.   Part 4B of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (MFPA) was inserted by s65 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and establishes the statutory scheme for the appointment of QLR’s in family proceedings that commenced after 21 July 2022. Sir Andrew McFarlane notes the supporting Statutory Guidance, Family Procedure Rules, and provides a link to the Government website regarding the QLR scheme. His judgment provides a helpful summary of the scheme and its aims at paragraphs 4-20.   Sir Andrew McFarlane goes on to explain the decision that he faced in the case, namely what to do when a QLR is required, but none is available. He notes that many judges and magistrates are facing this issue on a daily basis.   Options Before the Court Where No QLR is Available   Practitioners may recall that in a “View from the President’s Chambers” in June 2023, the President suggested that ‘if no QLR is found within 28 days, the court should list the case for directions and direct that some summary information is provided by HMCTS about the difficulties that have been encountered.’ The President mentions this guidance in his judgment at paragraph 22, and also notes that ‘Cases should not be permitted to drift whilst an open-ended search for a QLR is undertaken” [22].   The President notes that the principal options facing a court at the directions stage, following that 28 days period are likely to be (but not exhaustively):   a) A further adjournment in the hope that a QLR may be found;   b) An adjournment to allow one or both parties to engage their own advocate;   c) Reviewing the need for the vulnerable party to give oral evidence and be cross-examined. This will include reviewing the need for there to be a fact-finding hearing in the proceedings;   d) Considering any other alternative means of avoiding in person cross-examination between the relevant parties;   e) The court itself taking on the task of asking questions in place of the in person party [23].   Importantly, he notes that ‘It does not follow that, if no QLR is available, the court is automatically required to conduct the questioning itself. It is important that all possible alternative options are reviewed at that point in the proceedings’ [23].   The President continues by stating: “When considering the options, and whether the court should take on the questioning, the court will take account of PD3AB paragraph 5.3 which states that: 'a satisfactory alternative to cross-examination in person does not include the court itself conducting the cross-examination on behalf of a party'. The validity of that statement is unlikely to be controversial in the eyes of judges and magistrates. Indeed, the negative aspects of questioning by the court must have been prominent in the thinking in Parliament when the QLR process was brought into law by the 2021 Act” [24].   Interestingly, whilst Practice Direction 3AB paragraph 3.5 states that ‘a satisfactory alternative to cross-examination in person does not include the court itself conducting the cross-examination on behalf of a party’, this provision is not black-letter law. Therefore, the Practice Direction does not prevent the court undertaking the task of cross-examination if the court considers that, in the interests of justice, it must nevertheless do so.   As practitioners well know, the need for the court to deal 'justly' with cases is not confined simply to the need to act in the interests of justice when appointing a QLR; it is a requirement that pervades every step that the court may take throughout any proceedings in order to meet the 'overriding objective' of the FPR 2010.   Ultimately, if the court decides to abandon further attempts to appoint a QLR, the previous direction appointing one must be discharged. The President also notes that, as a matter of good practice, the reasons for the discharge should be very shortly recorded on the face of the order and/or in a short judgment.   Questioning by the Court   The President at paragraphs 28 to 40 goes on to outline the approach regarding questioning by the court, noting in particular his own experience with doing so in the case before him.   “It may, at least in one sense, be reassuring to those judges, magistrates and legal advisers who regularly have to do so, to record that, in the case before me, I found the task of asking the questions to be a particularly burdensome, unnatural and tricky one. As neither party was represented, as the judge I found myself first of all asking questions to tease out further details 'in chief', as it were, from the first of the parties to give evidence before then putting to them most of the questions that the other party wished to have put. The process was then reversed when the other party entered the witness box. Over the course of a full court day, I therefore ended up asking all of the questions.   I have used the word 'tricky' to describe the process as, when undertaking questioning, the court has to tread a narrow path between, on the one side, ensuring the witness' evidence is adequately tested by the points that the other party wishes to raise, but, on the other, ensuring that the judge does not enter the arena or be seen in any way to be promoting the case of one side or the other.” [28-29].   Helpfully, the President sets out in some detail the leading authorities on the questioning of witnesses by judges, including Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23 and the decision of Hayden J in PS v BP [2018] EWHC 1987 (Fam).  Practitioners and judges alike may find that particular section of the President’s judgment useful when preparing written and oral arguments or judgments on this issue.   The President’s Practical Points   The President concludes at paragraphs 41 to 42 by providing his own practical factors that he would encourage judges to consider.   “Finally, I would offer the following practical points for courts to consider either when appointing a QLR or when preparing to put questions itself:   a) Whilst there is value in the QLR attending court for the ground rules hearing so that they may meet the party on whose behalf they will be asking questions, where this is impractical, and where holding the hearing remotely means that a QLR who could not otherwise act can be appointed, it should be acceptable for the QLR to attend the ground rules hearing remotely;   b) The default position for the full hearing should be for the QLR to be in attendance at court, rather than joining remotely, as the overall effectiveness and fairness of the process is likely to be diminished if they are not in the courtroom;   c) In all cases (whether there is a QLR or not) at the ground rules hearing, or earlier, the court should direct that the prohibited party should submit a clear statement shortly stating the allegations, facts or findings that they seek to establish;   d) In all cases, the prohibited party should be required to file a written list of the questions that they wish to have asked prior to the main hearing. The list should go to the QLR, or to the court if there is no QLR, but not to the witness or other parties. This process should not prevent the prohibited party from identifying additional questions that may arise during the hearing;   In conclusion, whilst it is to be hoped that, in time, the continued training programme and the ability to claim travel expenses will increase the availability of QLRs, there will inevitably remain some cases where there is no alternative but for the court to ask the questions itself. Unsatisfactory though that process plainly is, in such cases it will be necessary in order to deliver a just, fair and timely conclusion to proceedings. Where that is the case, the advice in this judgment is intended to assist the court in navigating the tricky path between ensuring that the opposing case is put fully, fairly and properly, but doing so without entering the arena [41-42].   Conclusion   As the lack of QLR’s is unlikely to be resolved in the near future, this helpful judgment is likely to be of assistance to practitioners and judges alike for some time. Ultimately, on the ground one can see that the issue of proper renumeration for the role of QLR is likely to be one of the key factors that impacts the availability of advocates willing to fulfil that role.   To read the President’s judgment in full, please see the following link: <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2024/22.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2024/22.html</a>

Bathgate v Technip [2023] CSIH: Broadening the scope of Qualifying Settlement Agreements

As all employment lawyers know, in order to protect them from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous employers, employees cannot ordinarily contract out of their employment rights. There are only two exceptions.  They can do so in a contract of settlement made with the assistance of ACAS, known as a ‘COT3’, or they can do so in ‘qualifying settlement agreement’, but not otherwise.   I recently came across the notes for a talk I gave back in 2006 in which I confidently stated that one of the differences between a COT3 and a qualifying settlement agreement (or a compromise agreement as they were then called), was that a COT3 could compromise claims arising out of future conduct whereas a qualifying settlement agreement could not.  Following the recent Court of Session judgment in Bathgate v Technip [2023] CSIH 48, however, it appears that my confidence was misplaced.   Legal Background   Since at least the House of Lords decision in BCCI v Ali [2001] ICR 337,it has been clear that parties can use a COT3 to compromise claims that have not even come into existence, although as Lord Bingham put it ‘If the parties had sought to achieve so extravagant a result they should in my opinion have used language which left no room for doubt’. That is because there is nothing to stop parties at common law from contracting out of future rights; and in order to fall into the ‘COT3’ exception, the only stipulation is that the agreement is ‘made with the assistance of ACAS’. In other words, any otherwise contractually enforceable agreement made with the assistance of ACAS will work; a point well illustrated in the context of post-employment victimisation in Arvunescu v Quick Release [2022] EWCA Civ 1600.   It is slightly different with qualifying settlement agreements. To come within that exception there are a number of hoops that have to cleared, one of which is that the agreement must ‘relate to the particular complaint’. It might be thought that for an agreement to relate to ‘the particular complaint’ then the particular complaint must be capable of being in existence at the time the agreement is signed. That certainly was the view of the EAT in Lunt v Merseyside TEC Ltd [1999] ICR 17, when it said:   'A compromise agreement cannot, therefore, seek to exclude potential complaints that have not yet arisen on the off-chance that they might be raised; it cannot, in other words, be used to sign away all the employee's tribunal rights, as can be done in the case of a negotiated settlement drawn up with the assistance of a conciliation officer.'   That also seems to have been the intention behind the statutory provisions, given the comments of Viscount Ullswater when he introduced the relevant statutory provisions in the House of Lords:   'We are proposing that these procedures should only be available in the context of an agreement which settles a particular complaint that has already arisen between the parties to that complaint.'   That too was Lord Summers’s view when Bathgate was in the Scottish EAT. Drawing from the judgments of Mummery and Smith LJJ in University of East London v Hinton [2005] ICR 1260, that the broad purpose behind the legislation was to protect employees from relinquishing their rights; he concluded that the requirement that a settlement agreement ‘relates to the particular complaint’ could never be met in relation to a cause of action which had not emerged at the time of the agreement.   The Judgment of the Court of Session   Needless to say, the Court of Session came to the opposite conclusion. It reasoned that if Parliament had intended to lay down rules limiting parties’ freedom of contract, it would have expressed them in clear and unequivocal terms; and it had not done so. In its view, all that the words ‘relate to the particular complaint’ required was that the complaint being made was covered by the terms of the contract. It could see no justification for putting a temporal limit on what could be compromised by a settlement agreement, when none existed for a COT3. On a natural reading of the settlement agreement signed by Mr Bathgate, future claims for age discrimination were covered. Accordingly his age discrimination claim, which arose out of conduct which post-dated that agreement, had been validly compromised even before the discriminatory conduct had occurred.   Comment   With respect to the Court of Session, its reasons do not seem to me to be entirely convincing. Firstly, it is abundantly clear that Parliament was laying down rules to limit parties’ freedom to contract. It does that in terms at section 144(1) of the Equality Act 2010. The section the Court was interpreting is an exception to that general prohibition, it is not itself a limitation to the right to contract.   Secondly, on one reading of the Court of Session analysis, the statutory requirement for the agreement to ‘relate to the particular complaint’ is entirely superfluous. If the agreement does not ‘relate to the particular complaint’ in the sense used by the Court of Session, then as a matter of contract it will not compromise the complaint. Surely Parliament intended something more by those words than a bland restatement of the obvious. Indeed, I do wonder whether the ubiquitous list of UK employment rights (which Smith LJ had warned against in Hinton) is really quite what Parliament had in mind either.   Thirdly, and perhaps most compellingly, on the Court of Session analysis, the central purpose of the prohibition on contracting out would seem to be undermined. On its analysis, there is nothing to prevent an unscrupulous employer from asking an employee (after advice from an insured lawyer and presumably some form of payment) to sign away their employment rights pre-emptively during the course of their employment. Surely it is that evil that the ‘particular complaint’ requirement was designed to prevent. By definition, ACAS will not become involved until a dispute has arisen, so there is less need for a similar protection in respect of a COT3. But that is not the case with legal advisors. Without some sort of safeguard, they could be brought in to give advice on the waiver of employment rights, even as the ink is drying on the employment contract.   The Court of Session is not technically binding in England and Wales, but its decisions are highly persuasive; and unless and until the issue is revisited by the Court of Appeal, it is likely to be followed. In the meantime, and out of an abundance of caution, I will still be advising employers to utilise a COT3 if they wish to be confident of compromising any claims arising out of future conduct.   <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/dominic-bayne">Dominic Bayne</a> acted for Mr Bathgate before the EAT and at first instance. He is joint head of <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/expertise/employment">PLP’s employment team</a>, and is recognised by the directories as one of the leading employment barristers on the North Eastern Circuit.

TA v the Public Guardian and duties of a Certificate Provider

Introduction   The Judgment can be found here <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2023/63.html">TA v the Public Guardian [2023] EWCOP 63 (07 December 2023) (bailii.org)</a>.   The case involved an appeal to Mrs Justice Lieven by P’s potential attorney (‘the Appellant’) from a decision of HHJ McCabe sitting in the Court of Protection. The Judgement is short, and therefore probably worth reading, particularly if you want to be refreshed of all the relevant statutory provisions which I have not set out in this note.   Facts   In brief, The case arose from a challenge by the Office of the Public Guardian (‘OPG’) to the validity of Lasting Powers of Attorney instruments for both Property and Financial Affairs and Health and Welfare (‘the LPA’s’), on the basis that they did not comply with paragraph 2(1)(e) Schedule 1 of the Mental Capacity Act (‘the 2005 Act’).   The Application originally included non-compliance on two grounds. However, the only ground pursued at the first hearing was that the Certificate Provider (‘CP’) ‘failed to make the requisite checks of understanding with P prior to certification’.   In the 2005 Act, Schedule 1 2(1) provides that : - ‘The instrument must include –   (e) a certificate by a person of a prescribed description that, in his opinion, at the time when the donor executes the instrument –   <ul> <li>The donor understands the purpose of the instrument and the scope of the authority conferred under it,</li>   <li>No fraud or undue pressure is being used to induce the donor to create a lasting power of attorney, and</li>   <li>There is nothing else which would prevent a lasting power of attorney from being created by the instrument.’</li> </ul>   The PG asked the court at first instance to determine whether the CP had failed to fulfil the requisite checks of understanding (i.e. those set out in the previous paragraph) with the donor prior to the execution of the LPAs.    The attorney argued that there was no requirement for the CP to carry out various checks of the donors understanding, and that how the CP satisfied themselves of matters relating to the donor prior to signing the LPAs was a matter for them. Further, that neither the Lasting Powers of Attorney, Enduring Powers of Attorney and Public Guardian Regulations 2007 (‘ the 2007 Regulations’), or the 2005 Act, prescribed particular steps that the CP would have to take to ascertain the donors understanding.   HHJ McCabe disagreed and held that she was entitled to look for evidence from the CP that the requirements of Schedule 2 had been met. In this case, the CP had simply asked the donor whether she was happy about the LPAs, and the donor confirmed she was. The Judge held it was difficult to understand (from this information), how the CP had satisfied herself that the donor understood the scope of her authority; that there was no undue pressure or inducement; and there was nothing else to prevent the LPA being created. The LPAs were found to be invalid.   The Appeal   The appeal was on the basis that :-   The statutory scheme sets out in clear terms what is required in order for an LPA to be valid, and the only requirement in para 2(1)(e) was for the provision of a certificate. There was no requirement for the CP to take any particular steps prior to signing the certificate, or for the court to ensure that the requisite opinion is formed.   HHJ McCabe therefore wrongly concluded that “this opinion is one of the requirements of the creation of an LPA …” when it is wrong and there is no requirement for the opinion.   Finally, that the Judge wrongly introduced the concept that the opinion must be valid and imposed obligations on the CP.   It was argued by the Appellant that the Judge’s approach undermined the scheme of the MCA; that there was a presumption of capacity; and that the Judge’s approach was that even though the donor had capacity, the LPA was invalid because the certificate provider failed to undertake sufficient checks.   On behalf of the PG, I argued that it was clear that para 2(1) (e) required the CP to have formed the requisite opinion.  This opinion must be based on something which allowed the opinion to be properly formed. The provision of a certificate is fundamental to the formal validity of the LPA. It is not simply a signature verifying capacity, but it is a signature which also goes to issues such as understanding who the attorney is, and undue influence etc.   In order to establish the validity of what the signature is verifying, the court must be able to look behind the signature and the opinion which was formed prior to signing.   Whilst the Appellant appeared to be suggesting that as long as the signature was present, the formalities were met, I submitted that the appellants submission taken at face value could result in a situation where there was no enquiry as to the basis on which the CP had formed the requisite opinion. This could result in an LPA being taken as valid when the CP had not spoken to the donor, or ascertained anything about the wishes, intentions or understanding of the donor. Such a situation would be absurd and would undermine the protection intended in Schedule 1.   Mrs Justice Lieven considered the statutory language, the overall statutory scheme and the purpose at which it was aimed. She held that the court was entitled to check that the requisite opinion had been formed by the CP and that the Judges approach at first instance was correct. The appeal was dismissed.

Roundup of recently reported modest asset cases

As the end of the first week of the Financial Remedies Court (FRC) Reporting Pilot in Leeds draws to an end, what follows is an update of modest asset cases reported in the last six months:   VT v LT [2023] EWFC 256 (B)   <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2023/256.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2023/256.html</a>   DJ Hatvany sitting at the FRC in Bristol, 18 December 2023   Core facts:   W (lived in rented accommodation); H (continued to live in the FMH- in his sole name)   18-year relationship with three children (two of which still minor; shared care in place)   Assets:   FMH (four-bed) with net equity of £118,000 (used by H for his business)   Marital debt £33,777 in H’s name and £3,922 in W’s name (plus legal costs)   H’s business, value uncertain but income stream for H who was sole shareholder   Parties’ positions:   W sought a sale of the FMH and a lump sum of £80,000 to buy a shared ownership property, with H to retain all marital debt   H sought to retain the FMH and pay W a lump sum of £45,000 (£20,000 now and balance within 18 months)   Outcome:   <ul> <li>H to retain the FMH (the judge accepted that this functioned as an office for H as well as a home and he could not afford to relocate)</li>   <li>H to pay W a lump sum of £55,000 (£20,000 now and an additional £35,000 within 24 months), with an order for sale in default</li>   <li>H to service the marital debt in his name</li>   <li>Pension Sharing Order in W’s favour</li>   <li>Clean break</li> </ul>   Useful takeaways from this case:   This is a short, ex-tempore judgment similar to the ones we may encounter in our day-to-day practice. DJ Hatvany speaks for the entire profession when he says at paragraph 33: “There is no easy answer. The court can only look for the fairest solution in difficult circumstances having regard to the criteria set out in section 25 of the matrimonial causes act 1973.”   The parties both had responsibilities towards the children of the marriage, and equal housing needs. One of the difficulties was that W’s income was supplemented by Universal Credit and therefore any lump sum over and above £16,000 would have wiped out her entitlement to Universal Credit unless it was utilised to meet her housing needs (hence the shared ownership) within six months (or longer if a sale did not complete). For a detailed analysis of the interplay between financial remedy orders and welfare benefits, the following articles on the Financial Remedies Journal are a must-read: <a href="https://financialremediesjournal.com/content/an-overview-of-the-benefits-system.71b2fff3de2345a7b71ce6a73ed4d5a0.htm">https://financialremediesjournal.com/content/an-overview-of-the-benefits-system.71b2fff3de2345a7b71ce6a73ed4d5a0.htm</a> and <a href="https://financialremediesjournal.com/content/an-overview-of-the-benefits-system.71b2fff3de2345a7b71ce6a73ed4d5a0.htm)">https://financialremediesjournal.com/content/an-overview-of-the-benefits-system.71b2fff3de2345a7b71ce6a73ed4d5a0.htm)</a>.)  The judge opted for a ‘creative’ solution, i.e. a deferred lump sum which enabled H to retain the FMH (at least in the interim) and to allow W to part-fund a shared ownership property. This case also highlights the difficulties that both courts and practitioners face at present with competing evidence on the parties’ borrowing capacity.   AXA v BYB (QLR: Financial Remedies) [2023] EWFC 251 (B)   <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2023/251">https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2023/251</a>   Recorder Rhys Taylor sitting at the Central Family Court, 18 December 2023   Core facts:   W aged 36 (lived in rented accommodation); H aged 41 (continued to live in the FMH- in his sole name)   5-year relationship with a child aged 3   Assets:   FMH net equity £100,000   London flat in W’s sole name net equity of £50,000 (W found to hold 50% beneficial interest)   Proceeds of Iranian property owned by H but sold in 2022 (value unknown)   W’s debts totalling £122,674 and H’s debts totalling £101,600   H’s pensions £86,983 and W’s pensions £28,844   Parties’ positions:   <ul> <li>W sought an order for sale and 100% of net proceeds to be paid to her or a Mesher order until child attained majority. She also sought periodical payments and her jewellery to be returned.</li>   <li>H sought to retain 75% of the net proceeds of the FMH, his pensions and clean break.</li> </ul>   Outcome:   <ul> <li>FMH (and contents) to be transferred to W subject to mortgage</li>   <li>Spousal maintenance at £700 pcm until child’s 18th birthday or completion of secondary education (global figure including CMS £1,360 pcm)</li>   <li>Cost order made by way of a pension sharing order, based on the limited amount of capital available against which W could enforce a costs order. This was expressed as follows in the order: “There is no order as to costs save that the court made a 100% pension sharing order over H’s Vanguard pension and has required H to pay promptly any costs of implementation in order to satisfy the costs liability.” (it later became apparent that the Vanguard pension was not illiquid, and the costs order was therefore amended to provide for 75% of the pension fund to be paid to W within 21 days).</li> </ul>   Useful takeaways from this case:   This is the first reported case that deals with the involvement of a Qualified Legal Representative. Recorder Taylor acknowledged the difficulties that this role entails, not least the fact that a QLR is not entitled to see the bundle in advance and cannot therefore make a judgment as to whether the case is within their competence. It is an extremely well-structured judgment with hyperlinks which enable the reader to jump straight to the relevant issue. The court held that W was entitled to a significant departure from equality on the basis of her needs. He quoted the recent judgment of Moor J in Butler v Butler [2023] EWHC 2453 (Fam) where he had stated that in a needs case the court does not necessarily need to make an order that meets both parties’ needs. The Recorder was unimpressed with H’s evidence and his lack of disclosure. He concluded that H would have to rent somewhere and commented at paragraph 148: “if this feels like rough justice, H only has himself to blame. He has the beneficial ownership of an undisclosed sum of money somewhere”.   JN v GN [2023] EWFC 244   <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2023/244.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2023/244.html</a>   DJ Hatvany sitting at the FRC in Swindon, 21 November 2023   Core facts:   W aged 60 (continued to live in the FMH); H aged 62 (lived with partner in social housing with secured tenancy)   23-year marriage with one adult child   Assets:   FMH with equity of £224,500   H’s inheritance £468,000 + £30,000 for a painting (dissipated)   H was also alleged to have dissipated £28,000 endowment policy and £56,000 cashed-in pension   Modest pension provisions   Parties’ positions:   <ul> <li>W sought a transfer of the FMH into her name and H to clear the outstanding mortgage, as well as a cost order</li>   <li>H agreed that W should retain the FMH but did not agree to repay the mortgage</li> </ul>   Outcome:   <ul> <li>FMH transferred to W</li>   <li>W to retain responsibility to repay the mortgage</li>   <li>Departure from equality justified on the basis of H’s spending</li>   <li>Clean break</li>   <li>H to pay £10,000 towards W’s costs (£350 pcm due to lack of resources) due to litigation conduct</li> </ul>   Useful takeaways from this case:   District Judge Hatavny took a very pragmatic approach when confronted with a limited asset base and significant non-compliance as well as financial misconduct on H’s part. He ensured that W’s housing needs were met (taking into account her health issues) whilst acknowledging that it would be unfair to require H to repay the mortgage. The approach taken by the judge on costs is also worth of note and it is hoped that it can be replicated; in the vast majority of low-asset cases, there are usually no resources left to pay for a cost order (within 14 days or at all) and this appears to sometimes discourage courts from entertaining cost applications. However, a cost order in a low-value case can go a long way and this instalment-based approach is to be given serious consideration.   Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam)   <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2023/2303.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2023/2303.html</a>   Peel J on appeal from a decision of Mr Recorder Samuels KC, 20 September 2023   Core facts:   W aged 55, H aged 49   15-year marriage with two minor children aged 17 and 13   Assets:   Property 1 £110,000 net equity   Property 2 £110,000 net equity   Rent in bank account £41,000   Combined business interests about £270,000 net   H’s pension £43,000   W’s debts £40,000   H’s debts £85,000   Outcome of the appeal:   <ul> <li>The judge at first instance had operated a departure from equality, 62/38 in W’s favour and made findings against H in respect of deficient disclosure, manipulative approach to litigation and deliberate downplaying of resources;</li>   <li>The appeal was dismissed on all 6 grounds;</li>   <li>Two amendments were made to the substantive order, namely that a provision giving a specified timeframe for H to repay his sister a soft loan was deleted, and a s 28(1A) provision was added.</li> </ul>   Useful takeaways from this case:   This case highlights the difficulties that parties face when appealing findings of fact. The judge at first instance had been satisfied that, even if H’s share was less readily realisable, it was nonetheless sustainable, and he had only himself to blame for the judge’s adverse findings.   Of particular interest is Peel J’s rejection of H’s criticism of the first instance court’s treatment of the available resources with reference to the parties’ housing needs. Mr Recorder Samuels KC had found that H would need time to rebuild his resources so as to buy a property and, with his earning potential, he would be able to do so. Peel J commented at para 39: “although it is generally desirable in financial remedy cases for each party to be able to own a property, with the attendant benefits of security and potential investment upside, it is not an iron rule. It will all depend on the facts. In this case it is not possible to do so at this stage.”   Butler v Butler [2023] EWHC 2453 (Fam)   <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2023/2453.html">https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2023/2453.html</a>   Moor J on appeal from a decision of Recorder Anderson, 24 August 2023   Core facts:   W aged 53 (lived in rental accommodation), H aged 64 (lived in owned property)   Six-year relationship, one child aged 16   Assets:   Property purchased by H £410,000 equity   Land in Jamaica owned by W £16,000   H’s small pension in payment   Both parties had debts   Outcome of the appeal:   <ul> <li>Recorder Anderson had ordered H to pay a lump sum of £58,000 to W and a clean break.</li>   <li>The appeal was a dismissed on the basis that the Recorder was entitled to make the order that he did; the lump sum ordered would enable W to clear her debts and there were no circumstances in which W would be able to purchase her own property.</li> </ul>   Useful takeaways from this case:   The unusual feature of this case is that the parties’ marriage had been in name only from 2009, despite the divorce petition being dated March 2020. Therefore, the property where H was residing was non-matrimonial, having been acquired post-separation. The appeal court did not interfere with the decision of the Recorder, accepting that he was entitled to reject an outcome which would have rendered H homeless. Moor J’s comment at para 39 will no doubt feature in many position statements and skeleton arguments moving forward: “The fact that a judge rightly concludes that a case is a "needs" case does not mean that the judge must then make an order that satisfies both parties' needs. In one sense, this is obvious, because there may simply be insufficient assets to satisfy the needs of either party, let alone both.” Moor J goes on to say that “the court cannot simply apply needs as the only consideration”, and it must in fact consider all factors under s25 MCA. Moor J found that the Recorder was entitled to reject making an order that would make H homeless, particularly in light of the non-matrimonial nature of the main asset.   As a side note, Moor J’s initial comments on the litigation costs, congratulating the lawyers for “the sensible and economic way in which the matter has been litigated”, make a welcome change from the stark criticism made by the higher courts on the disproportionate nature of the litigation costs incurred.   Conclusion   It is hoped that the extension of the transparency pilot to financial remedy cases will lead to more widespread reporting of low-modest asset cases. These are certainly the cases that lead legal representatives to scratch their heads, not to mention the pressure on mounting legal costs when the parties can barely afford it.

Inquest Costs: Separately Recoverable under the Fixed Recoverable Costs Regime

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has responded to the July 2023 consultation confirming that the costs of inquest proceedings will be recoverable separately, and the change will be inserted at CPR 45.1 (9) and come into force on 6 April 2024.   In the consultation, which opened on 21 July 2023 and closed on 8 September, the MoJ had indicated a provisional view that the costs of inquests should be separately recoverable to the FRC, and subject to assessment, if these costs were reasonable and proportionate. And in making the rule change, the MoJ has confirmed that inquest costs should only be recoverable to the extent that they would be anyway, outside of FRC.   The consultation highlighted recognition by the MoJ that as part of any proper investigation process, an inquest will typically pre-date, and may (to an extent at least) enable the litigation.   In the multi-track, where FRC will not apply, the costs involved in an inquest can be recoverable.   The MoJ also acknowledged as part of the consultation that without the addition of a new rule in the CPR to provide for the separate recoverability of inquest costs in FRC cases, that the level of costs involved in the inquest would make the pursuit of any claim for compensation uneconomic.   There were 74 responses to the consultation, which included a joint response from the Bar Council and the Personal Injuries Bar Association (PIBA). With the addition of this new rule for inquest costs, there appears to be recognition by the MOJ of the position outlined in the joint response from the Bar Council and PIBA that:   <ul> <li>Inquests are an integral part of the process for investigating unnatural deaths and will inform and facilitate decisions taken about civil proceedings.</li>   <li>It would be wrong to be overly prescriptive in defining the cases when inquests costs ought to be recoverable. Those claims that may be made following an inquest are not limited to claims for dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. There will be claims on behalf of the estate under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934; and accidents involving fatalities which found claims for family and non-family members for psychiatric injury as primary and secondary victims. Claims involving the deaths of children and young adults can be complex, but the damages recoverable can be limited to the levels set out in the Fast and Intermediate tracks.</li>   <li>Many cases involving inquests will be complex. There will be some cases when the facts of an inquest greatly assist the determination of civil liability, and admissions may be made, and judgment entered. These cases may be suitable for the Intermediate Track as a result. It is important that the CPR allow for inquest costs to be recovered in these circumstances.</li> </ul>   The addition of the new rule to allow the costs of inquests proceedings to be recovered separately clearly addresses the wide concern shared by many, including the MoJ, that the FRC rules as previously drafted may have impeded solicitors’ ability to pursue claims, and therefore may have impacted on the future ability of bereaved families to obtain representation unless they were able to fund this, wholly or in part, themselves. The new rule will therefore be seen as a positive step for access to representation in the inquest process.   Leila Benyounes is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as a leading junior in Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Inquests and Inquiries. Leila’s full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes">here</a>

Nicola Twine reflects on securing a finding of Fundamental Dishonesty with Enforceable Costs

“ What appears at first blush to be a straightforward case often is not. Many personal injury claims arise from ‘rear end shunt no fault accidents’, and damages are often expected to be recovered where that accident was sufficient to cause injury. Withholding of information and misleading provision of information can have serious consequences. Last week, in a case instructed by <a href="https://dwfgroup.com/en/services/legal-services/insurance/motor">DWF</a> for <a href="https://www.aviva.co.uk/">Aviva</a>, I was successful in having a claim dismissed and securing a finding of ‘fundamental dishonesty’. The Claimant had been involved in two accidents in proximity and brought claims arising from both. DWF had obtained the medical reports in both cases and social media posts, which were able to be considered alongside her medical records.   The Claimant had been selective in what she had disclosed to medical experts, in relation to: each accident, her injuries, and her medical history. On the special damages claim there were suspicions of ‘claims layering’ - that the CBT and physiotherapy treatment had been added with the specific purpose of increasing the value of the claim and costs. As the Defendant did not call evidence the case was determined following robust cross examination and submissions on credibility. The Claimant's reasons for her apparent failures were many. She was a poor historian unable to explain the inconsistencies and oddities. What is outlined as expected of a genuine claimant in 'Molodi' was not present. The trial Judge did not make finding of 'claims layering' but expressed concern about the medical reports in the case. Whilst it appeared that the Claimant may have been caught up in a model operated by others the Judge found that the Claimant was dishonest. In this case there was more than exaggeration at play, although exaggeration alone can give rise to a finding of fundamental dishonesty. Fundamental dishonesty was found with enforceable costs and the Claimant was ordered to repay an interim payment. Thanks to <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAD7cNOYBLe-BDqnjeo_BlCJOGtKN6Re40to">Rohini Kapur</a> for her instructions and assistance. ”     Nicola Twine is a member of the specialist Personal Injury, Clinical Negligence, and Employment Teams at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as a Leading Junior by Chambers & Partners and The Legal 500 in Employment and by The Legal 500 in Clinical Negligence. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/nicola-twine">here</a>.

Inadequate Triage and Missed Opportunities for Assessment at Hospital: Woman’s death caused by severe pain hours after hospital discharge

<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/leila-benyounes/">Leila Benyounes</a> represented the family of a 63-year-old lady who suffered an acute cardiac arrhythmia due to severe pain hours after she had been discharged from hospital in May 2022.   The deceased, a former fitness instructor with a medical history of osteoarthritis to her right hip, had awoken with extreme pain to her right hip and required Entonox and intravenous morphine prior to transfer to hospital by ambulance.   It was held at the inquest that the triage within the emergency department was inadequate, did not include a pain score or pull through significant information onto the hospital records, including the opiate analgesia prescribed by the paramedics. It was also held that there was an under-triage of the deceased’s condition, and it was appropriate for the deceased to be admitted for a mobility assessment prior to discharge which did not occur.   It was found that the death was due to a cardiac arrhythmia caused by acute adrenaline excess, as a result of the severe pain the deceased was experiencing to her right hip.   A narrative conclusion was recorded at the inquest in which it was held that there was an inadequate triage and missed opportunities for assessment at hospital.   Leila was instructed by Victoria Wanless at <a href="https://www.beechampeacock.co.uk/">Beacham Peacock Solicitors</a>.   Leila Benyounes is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as Band 1 by Legal 500 for Inquests and Inquiries. Leila has been appointed to the Attorney General’s Treasury Counsel Panel A since 2010. Leila is appointed as Assistant Coroner for Gateshead and South Tyneside. Leila regularly represents interested persons in a wide range of inquests including Article 2 jury inquests and complex medical matters. Her full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes">here</a>.

Richard Copnall secures a conclusion of “unlawful killing” in the inquest of Ryan Vincent

Following a week-long inquest; <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/richard-copnall/">Richard Copnall</a> has secured a conclusion of “unlawful killing” for the family of Ryan Vincent. The coroner reached his conclusion on the basis of both “unlawful act” and “gross negligence” manslaughter.   Ryan and his family were guests at Haven’s Primrose Valley caravan park. The coroner found that a security guard effected an unlawful arrest, in which he pinned Ryan face down to the floor, for 16 minutes, despite Ryan’s repeated pleas that he could not breathe. Ryan suffered positional asphyxia, causing extensive brain damage and leading to his death. The family had waited nearly 7 years for this conclusion and now intend to invite the CPS to review its decision not to prosecute.   You can read the full findings on the BBC News website <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy6e90ynz93o">here</a> and in The Yorkshire Post <a href="https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/crime/ryan-vincent-unlawfully-killed-at-caravan-park-after-security-guard-sat-on-him-4494338">here</a>.

Emma Bennett appears in a 2-week jury inquest following a death in police custody

On 4 September 2021 a young man sadly died whilst being held in police custody after he swallowed a large plastic bag filled with cocaine and heroin.   Immediately prior to his death, the man, a drug dealer, had been searched and arrested on grounds of possession of a small quantity of drugs. However, whilst being held in the rear of a police van, CCTV footage showed him to produce from his trouser pocket a further undiscovered much larger quantity of drugs and which he placed in his mouth.   Upon the realisation by the police of that fact in the custody suite, the man inhaled the bag and died from obstruction of his airways despite the attempts of the public ambulance service and the private ambulance service, for whom Emma acted, to resuscitate him.   Potential criticisms at the 2- week jury inquest before Senior Coroner for East London Mr Graeme Irvine centred on failures by the police to identify the bag of drugs in the initial search and on the ambulance services for failing to resuscitate the man.    The jury heard extensive witness evidence over a number of days including from the Home Office pathologist and from a witness giving evidence from Thailand, in respect of which issues of the decision in <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/practice-direction-taking-evidence-from-overseas-in-cases-before-the-special-immigration-appeals-commission/">Agbakiaka</a> (evidence from abroad; Nare guidance) [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) were engaged.   Their findings were that the police’s conduct, by failing to perform a thorough search contributed to the man’s death as did his own conduct for swallowing the bag of drugs.   In respect of the ambulance services, the jury found that by the time of their arrival the man was not breathing, had no pulse and was in cardiac arrest. His chance of survival was accordingly very poor and there had been no contribution by the ambulance services to his death.   Whilst a sad case for all concerned, from a practitioner’s perspective the inquest is of interest because of issues raised by it as to medical causation and contribution to a death as well as the nature of both the search and resuscitation protocols to be followed by the emergency services.   Emma Bennett is an experienced advocate with a previous background of criminal trial advocacy in the most serious cases. She has appeared in a number of high profile and factually complex inquests over the last 12 months. Details of her recent work can be found in her chambers profile <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/emma-bennett/">here</a>.   Emma was instructed by Director, <a href="https://dwfgroup.com/en/people/r/rebecca-wyld">Rebecca Wyld</a> at DWF who is highly respected for her work in inquests and inquiries on behalf of public and private bodies in the healthcare sector.   The case has received attention in the press including by the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-68034516">BBC</a> the <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/police-watchdog-man-choked-drugs-death-met-police-custody-b1133620.html">Evening Standard</a>, on the <a href="https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/news/met-officer-failed-properly-search-or-monitor-man-who-died-custody-after-choking-drugs">police conduct website</a> and the <a href="https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/jury-find-police-failings-contributed-death-man-police-custody">website</a> of the lawyers who appeared for the family.

Latest News

News

16 May 2024

The Perils of Lists of Issues in the Employment Tribunal

Read time: 6 m

Video

15 May 2024

REPLAY: Clinical Negligence Case Law Update | 15 May 2024

Read time: < 1 m

News

14 May 2024

Isabella Brunton – My First Month Of Civil Law Pupillage at Parklane Plowden Chambers

Read time: 2 m

Legal Update

10 May 2024

Allegation of Fundamental Dishonesty? No Interim Payment Permitted.

Read time: 5 m

Cookie	Duration	Description
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional	11 months	The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
viewed_cookie_policy	11 months	The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.

Your Shortlist (0)