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The Ockenden Inquiry into the failures in maternity care at the Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust: where do we go from here?

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/anna-datta/">Anna Datta</a></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The final report of the independent review of maternity services at the Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust, led by Donna Ockenden, was published on 30 March 2022.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The independent review commenced in the summer of 2017 with the remit to examine 23 cases of concern. The review was however expanded and considered the maternity care of 1,486 families, the majority of which were patients at the Trust between the years 2000 and 2019.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The report investigated all aspects of obstetric care, including cases involving maternal deaths, stillbirths, neonatal death, hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy, maternal morbidity and cerebral palsy.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The report</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The findings of the report were best summarised by Chair of the review, Donna Ockenden, who stated that <em>‘the reasons for these failures are clear. There were not enough staff, there was a lack of ongoing training, there was a lack of effective investigation and governance at the Trust and a culture of not listening to the families involved.’.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Notable findings were:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>There was a ‘<em>concerning and repeated culture’ </em>at the Trust of not declaring adverse outcomes. It was notable that when reviewing stillbirth and neonatal deaths between 2011 and 2019, 40% of still births and 43% of neonatal deaths which considered by the review team did not have a Trust investigation. Indeed, the review team identified cases where similar and continuing errors in practice had occurred over a prolonged period. A central criticism of the report is that the failure to investigate led to missed opportunities to learn, improve and prevent future incidents.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>When investigations were undertaken by the Trust, they were of poor quality and the subsequent complaint responses lacked <em>‘transparency and honesty’</em>, especially with regards to clinical care.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>There was a constant change over the period to the Trust’s executive team and board. This led to a failure in oversight and an inability to deliver service change and improvement.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>As recent as March 2022, staff reported to the investigating team that they felt unsupported and were encouragement not to escalate any concerns with regard to patient safety.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>There was poor provision of medical staffing which contributed to delays and led to poor maternity outcomes. It was noted that there was a high reliance on the locum medical workforce without documented appropriate supervision.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The recommendations</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The report makes 15 recommendations for immediate action to drive forward improvements in maternity services. The focus of these recommendations is on:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>Staffing levels and in particular the need for Trusts to invest in recruitment and retention to alleviate pressures on an already depleted workforce.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>A well-trained workforce and the need for protected time to allocated to staff training.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>Robust investigation into incidents and the lessons learnt to be the basis of a multidisciplinary training plan. Any change from clinical practice identified from an incident investigation must be evidenced by six months after an incident has occurred.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Importantly, the report also reinforces the need for clinicians and Trusts to listen to patients with regard to their care.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Comment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The report is a damming and distressing read. It is hoped that the outcome of the report has provided the families with a voice and some resolution that they have now been listened to. Ms Ockenden is clear that the Trust’s maternity services <em>‘failed both families across Shropshire and sometimes their own staff over a prolonged period of time’</em>. Sadly, the findings raised by the report may not be unique to Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The 15 recommendations for immediate action are intended to have implications for maternity services across the NHS. The report comes at a time when the NHS is already under immense pressure and both resources and staff are depleted due to covid-19. The concern will therefore be as to whether the recommendations, particularly in relation to staffing issues, can realistically be implemented. &nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A key area of the recommendations is the importance of robust and transparent internal investigations. This is a reminder of what should be considered best practice in any event and in accords with the duty of candour.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>From a clinical negligence perspective, a robust internal investigation may be useful in clarifying failures of care. It is therefore essential for both Claimant and Defendant lawyers that an investigation is obtained at an early stage in proceedings and is shared with the medical experts. Furthermore, a thorough investigation and open approach at an early stage may lead to better communication with the patient and a timely resolution of failures in care.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Author</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/anna-datta/">Anna Datta</a> is a specialist Clinical Negligence barrister. She has a special interest in claims arising out of obstetric and gynaecology care and is able to be understanding with clients &nbsp;on sensitive issues which arise in these types of cases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<em>Crompton v Meadowcroft </em>[2021] EW Misc 20

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Bharat&nbsp;Jangra</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Pupil barrister Bharat&nbsp;Jangra examines the decision of Deputy District Judge Ayers in the case of <em>Crompton v Meadowcroft</em> [2021] EW Misc 20 regarding the exceptionality test under CPR 45.29J and the fixed costs regime.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Factual Background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This claim arose following an RTA on 7 January 2017. The claim was entered into the portal on 9 January 2017, and exited 15 days later. Liability was admitted on 8 March 2017.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Proceedings were issued in early 2020, in July 2020 the Claimants agreed to the Defendant’s settlement offer. However, whilst settlement negotiations were ongoing the court had sent out directions questionnaires, which were completed and filed with the court. On 10 September 2020, the court allocated this matter to the multi-track.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The issue before the Court was whether the Claimant’s solicitors were limited to the fixed costs regime or whether they would be able to obtain their costs on the standard basis.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Parties’ Submissions</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>CPR45.29B provides the following:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“Subject to rules 45.29F, 45.29G, 45.29H and 45.29J, and for as long as the case is not allocated to the multi-track, if, in a claim started under the RTA Protocol, the Claim Notification Form is submitted on or after 31st July 2013, the only costs allowed are—</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>(a) the fixed costs in rule 45.29C;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>(b) disbursements in accordance with rule 45.29I.”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The phrase <em>“and for as long as the case is not allocated to the multi-track”</em> being added following the decision in <em>Qader v Esure Services Limited</em> [2016] EWCA Civ 1109.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Defendant’s contention was that as this case had been issued in the portal and had settled prior to allocation to the multi-track, the fixed costs regime should therefore apply. Here it may have been <em>“…</em><em>the case that the claimant’s representatives carried out an amount of work that was greater than will be properly reimbursed under the fixed costs regime, but they have to take that on the chin because that is the nature of the scheme</em><em>…” </em>(para. 9)</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>However, the Claimant contended that the costs in this case should not be restricted to the fixed costs regime on the basis that the case was ‘exceptional’ further to CPR45.29J, which states:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“(1) If it considers that there are exceptional circumstances making it appropriate to do so, the court will consider a claim for an amount of costs (excluding disbursements) which is greater than the fixed recoverable costs referred to in rules 45.29B to 45.29H.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>(2) If the court considers such a claim to be appropriate, it may—</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>(a) summarily assess the costs; or</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>(b) make an order for the costs to be subject to detailed assessment….”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant submitted that this was not a straightforward case and met the exceptional circumstances, a high bar as per <em>Ferri v Gill</em> [2019] EWHC 952 (QB), due to the following:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:group --> <div class="wp-block-group"><!-- wp:group --> <div class="wp-block-group"><!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>The number of experts involved;</li><li>Extensive medical disclosure;</li><li>The Claimant’s solicitors had to consider that the Claimant may suffer disablement as a result of her injuries;</li><li>Reference had to be made to the Ogden tables to calculate future losses; and</li><li>The agreed settlement figure was outside the fast-track limit.</li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --></div> <!-- /wp:group --></div> <!-- /wp:group --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Decision</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In these circumstances, the Court did consider that the exceptionality bar had been met and <em>“</em><em>that the work required by those representing the claimant was significantly greater than might have been anticipated … I&nbsp;do deem it appropriate to allow the claimant to depart from the fixed costs regime so as to be properly reimbursed in respect of the work done and the costs incurred on their client’s behalf.” </em>(para. 13)</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Author </strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bharat&nbsp;Jangra</a></span> is a pupil barrister currently undertaking a pupillage with Parklane Plowden Chambers.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers offer specialist pupillages based within either our Civil &amp; Employment teams, our Family&nbsp;Team&nbsp;or our Commercial and Chancery teams. We also have pupillages based in Leeds or Newcastle, with the opportunity to spend time in each of our bases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden?</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If you are interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden join us at our virtual open evenings to hear from our former pupils and barristers: an opportunity to learn from our experiences, to hear our application advice, and to ask any pupillage queries you may have.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>More information on available at <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/pupillages/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/pupillages</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<em>Celine Martin v Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust </em>: the question of double recovery in care claims when there is a pre-existing state funded care package

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/anna-datta/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Anna Datta</span></a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The central issue in this assessment of damages case was whether the provision of state-funded care was a sufficient reason to refuse to award future care costs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As a result of the Defendant’s negligence, the Claimant had suffered physical injuries and a brain injury that had resulted in severe neurological impairment. The Claimant also had a pre-existing diagnosis of Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder and paranoid schizophrenia which had led to an extensive psychiatric history.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant’s care requirements could be separated into her mental health needs (which the Defendant was not responsible for) and her physical needs (which were as a result of the negligence). The Claimant was in receipt of a package of care, funded through s.117 Mental Health Act 1983, which supported both her mental health and physical needs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Quantum</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Although there were several quantum issues, the most interesting was in respect of the Claimant’s future care package.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant brought a claim for a privately funded care package, which would meet both her mental health and physical needs. The Defendant contended that as the Claimant would continue to receive s.117 funded care, which also covered her physical needs, an award for future care would result in double recovery.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Judge Bird considered whether the Claimant’s s.117 care was sufficient to put her in the position she would have been in had the negligence not occurred. He noted that the Claimant had a good relationship with carers and that she was happy with the care provided. The Judge, however, applied weight to the evidence that she had also requested a more extensive package of care at home. Judge Bird accepted the Claimant’s evidence that she wanted <em>‘more support than the package provides her with’</em> and concluded that the s.117 care package was not sufficient to put her in the position she would have been in but for the negligence. He therefore found that she was entitled to an award for care for the entirety of her expected lifetime.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With regard to the Defendant’s argument in respect of double recovery, Judge Bird commented that <em>‘I am satisfied that any possibility that Miss Martin might continue to take advantage of section 117 provision for her physical care, whilst it cannot be entirely discounted, is not sufficient for me to make any adjustment to the award.’</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Capacity</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>There was an issue as to whether the Claimant had capacity to manage and control any money awarded.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It was accepted by all parties that the Claimant had an impairment of the mind or brain. Judge Bird preferred the expert opinion who had assessed the Claimant in a ‘<em>real life setting’</em> rather than a <em>‘controlled clinical setting’</em>. In Judge Bird’s opinion, this allowed the expert to see the Claimant <em>‘balance the demands on her time, recall details, juggle facts and make decisions’ </em>and was preferrable to psychometric testing.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Judge accepted the Claimant was vulnerable, he found however that this was due to her personality disorder rather than her brain injury. The Judge applied substantial weight to the Claimant’s father’s evidence that his daughter had sought his advice regarding lending £10,000. In the Judge’s opinion, this showed that she had retained information (as she had been able to relay it to her father), that she had insight into her vulnerability (as she had sought her father’s advice) and that she was then capable of accepting and acting on that advice. &nbsp;The Judge therefore concluded the Claimant had capacity and thus was not entitled to Court of Protection and Deputy costs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Comment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The adequacy of the state funded care is crucial to the assessment of double recovery. In many cases, state funded care is unlikely to be sufficient to place the Claimant in the position they would have been but for the negligence, especially if there is a requirement for expensive care costs such as overnight care.&nbsp; Where the state funded care is not adequate, it seems that double recovery will not be a barrier for a claim for a more extensive care package even if there is an overlap in the care provided.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case is also a useful reminder of the evidence required in capacity cases. Significant weight is likely to be placed on an assessment which follows a pragmatic rather than theoretical approach to the Claimant’s ability to understand, retain and weigh up information.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Author</strong> </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden barrister, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/anna-datta/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Anna Datta</span></a>, specialises in Clinical Negligence and Court of Protection work and has experience in cases where there are an overlap in these two areas. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Covid-19 Vaccinations for Looked After Children: C (Looked After Child) (Covid-19 Vaccination)[2021] EWHC 2993 (Fam)

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/chloe-branton/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Chloe Branton</span></a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Introduction</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>C, a boy almost 13 years old, is a looked after child following the making of a care order in 2015. C wishes to be vaccinated with the winter flu and Covid-19 vaccines. On 12 September 2021 it was announced that Covid-19 vaccination would be offered to 12-15 year old children, and the winter flu vaccine for school years 7-11 was added to the flu vaccine programme on 13 October 2021. C informed his Mother at supervised contact on 22 September 2021 that he wished to be vaccinated for Covid-19, and confirmed this to his social worker the next day. The LA and CG considered it in C’s best interests, with C’s Father supporting C’s decision.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>C’s Mother was strongly opposed to him being vaccinated and had informed CSC of her opposition to the Covid-19 vaccine on 13 September 2021. She wrote to the LA on 23 September 2021 and enclosed a signed “Vaccine Refusal Declaration”. The Mother’s case remained that she wanted compelling evidence that the vaccines were both safe and effective for C. She did not accept that the national programmes were based on sound evidence, and she did not accept that either vaccine would be effective in protecting C or other children. The Mother also stated she would hold the court responsible if C suffered an adverse reaction, whilst acknowledging that he had no known health conditions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The LA sought confirmation from the High Court that it is authorised to exercise PR and consent to vaccinations under s33 Children Act 1989. The LA’s application for a declaration under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was issued on 25 October 2021. The case was brought because of: (i) the Mother’s implacable opposition, (ii) the point on these specific vaccinations not having yet been tested in Court, and (iii) for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to declare it in C’s best interests to have the vaccinations if the LA does not have the power under s33.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Law</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court considered s33 Children Act 1989 regarding the exercise of PR by an LA, in line with the current authorities around vaccination, including <em>Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination)</em> [2020] EWCA Civ 664. It was agreed that the Court of Appeal held in <em>Re H</em> that an LA with a care order can arrange and consent to vaccination of a child in its care where it is satisfied that it is in the best interests of that individual child, notwithstanding the objections of parents. The parties were unable to identify a judgment in a public law case concerning either the Covid-19 or winter flu vaccination programmes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judgment of MacDonald J in the private law vaccination case of <em>M v H and PT</em> [2020] EWFC 93 was also considered. This judgment, it was noted, was confined to the vaccines of the NHS vaccination schedule. At the time of that judgment the adult Covid-19 vaccination programme was in its early stages with no such programme on the vaccination of children. MacDonald J’s obiter comments at [4] were raised, however, given he had stated:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“… it is <u>very</u> difficult to foresee a situation in which a vaccination against COVID-19 approved for use in children would not be endorsed by the court as being in a child’s best interests, absent peer-reviewed research evidence indicating significant concern for the efficacy and/or safety of one or more of the COVID-19 vaccines or a well evidence contraindication specific to that subject child.” </em>[emphasis in the original]</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Finally, the court considered the “Gillick Competence” test as per<em> Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority </em>[1985] 3 WLR 830. In this case, Poole J noted the child was almost 13 and strongly in favour of being vaccinated. Poole J examined <em>Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination)</em> and noted that that particular case dealt with very young children. &nbsp;The court reiterated that the assessment of whether a child is indeed Gillick competent is both child-specific and decision-specific, and that the decision of a Gillick competent child will not necessarily be determinative and can be overridden by the court. Finally, a 12-year old cannot be conclusively be presumed Gillick competent in relation to a vaccination decision.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Judgment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In terms of the question of Gillick competence, Poole J noted that if a Gillick competent child were to refuse vaccination it would raise different questions than that to be looked at here (overriding the views of a parent). He noted that the LA overriding a child’s decision would be a different situation. However, Poole J declined to determine this issue any further as in the present circumstances it would be an academic activity.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court found it would not be appropriate to investigate the merits of whether a national programme for vaccination of children (Covid-19 and winter flu) was in the best interests of children in general. It was about whether the best interests of the particular child were served by the vaccination. The Court should only consider expert evidence around the vaccines where there is new peer-reviewed research evidence focused on the safety or efficacy of the vaccine(s), or where there is a well-evidenced concern that the vaccine is contraindicated for that particular child. In most cases, therefore, expert evidence is not necessary or appropriate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court confirmed under s33(3)(b) Children Act 1989, where an LA has a care order (including an interim care order), they can arrange and consent to vaccination of a child in its care for the Covid-19 and winter flu vaccines despite the objections of the child’s parents. The basis for this was (i) the vaccination is part of an ongoing national programme; (ii) the child is Gillick competent and consents or is not Gillick competent; and (iii) they are satisfied it is necessary to safeguard or promote that individual child’s welfare. The Court reiterated there is no requirement for an application to be made for authorisation by the Court before vaccinating in those circumstances. Instead, a parent opposing vaccination would need to apply to prevent vaccination as per <em>Re H.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For completeness, it was recognised that s33(3) Children Act 1989 does not provide total freedom for an LA to arrange and consent to vaccinations in every case. LAs should not rely on s33(3)(b) to make grave decisions with profound or enduring consequences for that child. “Individualised” welfare decisions must be taken for each child, and it also cannot be discounted that there is a possibility an individual child’s circumstances may make such a decision “grave”. In the vast majority of cases, however, no application is necessary even with parental objection.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Commentary</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>We now have a High Court authority specifically addressing the Covid-19 and winter flu vaccine programmes. Whilst the judgment essentially reiterates the law from the previous cases, the judgment is particularly welcome given the Court had previously chosen not to consider the Covid-19 vaccination scheme. Together, <em>Re C (Looked After Child) </em>and <em>Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination)</em> confirm that the LA need not apply for a declaration that it is in a child’s best interests to have such vaccinations. Despite being a public law judgment, this case is also likely now to assist in private law disputes as it goes a step further than <em>M v H and PT</em>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whilst the Court again confirmed that the LA need not in most cases apply for a declaration, (and reiterated that the onus is on the parent opposing vaccination to apply instead,) it is likely that LAs will continue to bring such applications. LAs remain cautious about their powers in the face of strong opposition, particularly with something as emotive as vaccination. It will be interesting to see whether any cases come before the Court following this decision where a child’s Gillick competence is to be assessed and potentially overridden.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Related Articles</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>To read more about <em>Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination)</em> [2020] EWCA Civ 664 and <em>M v H and PT</em> [2020] EWFC 93 please see the following articles also on the website.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/vaccinating-children-in-local-authority-care-re-h-a-child-parental-responsibility-vaccination-2020-ewca-civ-664/"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Vaccinating Children in Local Authority Care: Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA </span></a><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/vaccinating-children-in-local-authority-care-re-h-a-child-parental-responsibility-vaccination-2020-ewca-civ-664/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Civ 664.</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/specific-issue-order-for-vaccination-including-covid-19-m-v-h-private-law-vaccination-2020-ewfc-93-15-december-2020/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Specific Issue Order for Vaccination-including COVID-19: M v H (Private Law Vaccination) [2020] EWFC 93 (15 December 2020)</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.bailii.org_ew_cases_EWHC_Fam_2021_2993.html&amp;d=DwMGaQ&amp;c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&amp;r=8uBzih0l3lFPvxkaiRwrCdYQtl_IWM7KgIilUB5S9L1VUq46hBNvUyJKhk2GW4mY&amp;m=NwxqdV-Cc6hi9J8tloJul8cWxFT61sqLI4VHA7-q7v4&amp;s=bUBGEHwcV8CN-UiIC0GPQgsFbvsxnrb_Fy8qMD72eK0&amp;e="><span style="text-decoration: underline;">C</span></a><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.bailii.org_ew_cases_EWHC_Fam_2021_2993.html&amp;d=DwMGaQ&amp;c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&amp;r=8uBzih0l3lFPvxkaiRwrCdYQtl_IWM7KgIilUB5S9L1VUq46hBNvUyJKhk2GW4mY&amp;m=NwxqdV-Cc6hi9J8tloJul8cWxFT61sqLI4VHA7-q7v4&amp;s=bUBGEHwcV8CN-UiIC0GPQgsFbvsxnrb_Fy8qMD72eK0&amp;e=" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;"> (Looked After Child) (Covid-19 Vaccination) [2021] EWHC 2993 (Fam) (09 November 2021) (bailii.org)</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Author</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden barrister, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/chloe-branton/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Chloe Branton</span></a>, specialises in children law work, both public and private law. She undertakes both public and private law children work and is regularly instructed for Local Authorities, Children’s Guardians and parents. Chloe has a particular interest in cases involving: vaccination, FGM and forced marriage, and the removal of parental responsibility.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Pension Loss &#8211; Withdrawal Factors

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers barrister, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/gareth-price/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Gareth Price</span></a>, was called in 2009 and specialises in employment and clinical negligence. He authored the below article in regards to withdrawal factors in relation to pension loss.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Introduction</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Pension loss claims of any complexity often fill employment lawyers with dread.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Other than short periods of lost employer pension contributions into a direct contribution pension, such claims can be time-intensive, difficult to analyse and costly to calculate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Delays in acquiring information from pension administrators, annual revaluation under CARE schemes, Ogden table calculations and the possible need for expert evidence are just some of the hurdles in presenting or defending such claims.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Tribunals Principles for Compensating Pension Loss (‘the Principles’), now in its 4<sup>th</sup> edition (most recently revised as of 2021), provides a ‘how-to’ guide for undertaking calculations.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For more straightforward cases, the Basic guide to Compensation for Pension Loss, exists.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>With a cold towel and a cup of tea, the thicket of calculating a loss is more manageable than it may first appear.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>But one aspect of such claims that attracts relatively little attention, and yet is the area where employment lawyers might be expected to add most value to a case, is what ‘withdrawal factors’ a Tribunal might apply to such a claim.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>What is a withdrawal factor?</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A ‘withdrawal factor’ is a factor that provides for other contingencies that arise in the case, and which may affect how long employment would have continued but for the dismissal (i.e. whether the claimant would have ‘withdrawn’ from the pension scheme, for different reasons, at a future date).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is conceptually the same as the <em>Polkey</em> principle.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The purpose of this article is to explore this concept, consider its use in pension loss claims and look at some examples of its application.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Pension Loss claims concepts</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>To put matters in context, the following is important.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>First</strong>, most employees will be members of occupational pension schemes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Those pension schemes are typically described as either direct contribution schemes or defined benefit schemes.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Direct contributions</strong> schemes are ubiquitous in the private sector. Each pay period, the employee and employer contribute a portion of pay into the pension scheme. That money is invested and the pot at the end of the employee’s involvement in the scheme is the pension.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Defined benefit</strong> schemes come in different guises, but the most common are final salary or career average revalued earnings (CARE) schemes. They are more common in the public sector.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>VERY simplistically, final salary schemes calculate the pension by multiplying the employee’s salary in their final year of employment by a fraction that reflects their years of employment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Also very simplistically, CARE schemes add a fraction of an employee’s annual earnings (a ‘slice’) up over the course of their employment, with each slice being revalued for inflation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In each case, that pension is then an annual income for life.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Second</strong>, when calculating pension loss claim, the Tribunal is guided by the Principles as to different methods of calculating pension loss claims.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For employees dismissed from positions benefiting from a direct contribution pension scheme, the ‘contributions method’ should be used.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For employees who had a defined benefit (‘DB’) pension scheme, their cases might be ‘Simple DB cases’ or ‘Complex DB cases’.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For simple DB cases, the contributions method may be appropriate. For instance, if a Tribunal, applying <em>Polkey</em>, considers that the likelihood that the Claimant would have remained in employment until retirement (and therefore a member of the pension scheme at that point) is low, the Principles suggest that even where the employee was a member of a defined benefit scheme, the contributions method is a ‘better choice.’</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For Complex DB cases, the Principles suggest either using the ‘seven steps model’ (involving Ogden table calculations) or using expert evidence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Under the seven steps model, the first step is to calculate the ‘multiplicand’. The multiplicand is the annual income amount that the Claimant would have received had they reached retirement whilst still an employee under the ‘old job’ and still a member of the DB scheme.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Third</strong>, ‘complex’ cases include career loss cases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A career loss case is one where the employee contends that, whatever their future career path, the loss of pension benefits from their old job occupational pension will never be replaced. Consequently, on retirement, the employee will (save for any mitigation by way of other pension schemes to which they become members) have a pension loss for life.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Whether an employee in fact will not be able to mitigate this loss is of course subject to Tribunal assessment of fact.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>However, it is these career loss cases which most commonly generate the need to engage in assessing whether any withdrawal factors should apply to the pension loss claim.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Where and how do withdrawal factors come in?</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>After calculating the multiplicand, the Principles guide Tribunals to then:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>‘…<em>take account of any withdrawal factors that may apply. The analysis is like the one done when applying the ‘Polkey’ principle; the tribunal consider the ‘old job facts’ and engages in a degree of speculation about what the future may have held</em>.’</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Factors relevant to a <em>Polkey</em> reduction may also be relevant withdrawal factors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Of course, Tribunals must avoid double-discounting (and, within the Principles, step seven explicitly considers this risk and how to avoid it), but the reality is that if a Tribunal considers that on a proper application of the <em>Polkey</em> principle any loss might be relatively short, further consideration of withdrawal factors is unlikely to be necessary.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Should the Tribunal reach the stage of considering withdrawal factors however, the Tribunal must then engage in the sliding-doors world of what might have happened had the employee not been dismissed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is not a binary, balance of probabilities assessment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is a future loss under <em>Mallet v. McMonagle</em> principles and is therefore the loss of a chance - what is the chance (or likelihood) that X may have happened?</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Once that assessment of chance has been made, the Tribunal must then endeavour to reduce the likelihood to a fixed percentage and apply that to the multiplicand.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>How does one assess the likelihood of a withdrawal factor?</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This question is, really, the most difficult to advise clients on.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For instance, in any given case, what is the percentage reduction appropriate to reflect the likelihood that, for instance, the employer will become insolvent and be liquidated?</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>That, of course, is entirely fact dependent and, ultimately, down to the Tribunal hearing the case.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As employment lawyers, whilst we are tasked with analysing facts and applying the law to them in order to provide advice, the reality is that accurately predicting whether a Tribunal will consider there to be a 5% or 50% chance that an employer will become insolvent is – in all but the rarest of cases – very, very difficult.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Perhaps the only constant guiding principle (commonly reflected in <em>Polkey</em> assessments) is that the further away in time from assessment (i.e. the remedy hearing) the prediction is made, the less confident the Tribunal should be about any status quo remaining true or any change occurring.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal in <em>Griffin v. Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust<sup>1</sup></em>, however, did make it clear that the higher the likelihood of the withdrawal factor occurring, the more likely it is that engaging in the process at all is wrong:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>‘<em>The question is whether the uncertainties that would have to be reflected in such a discount are so great that they undermine the point of assessing the hypothetical whole-career loss in the first place</em>’.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Further, remarking that ‘…<em>experience shows that in most cases the relevant uncertainties are indeed too great</em>’, demonstrates that it will be only rarely that a career long loss is best analysed in this way.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In such circumstances, the Tribunal might consider the contributions method more appropriate. &nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>What are typical examples of withdrawal factors?</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The following are all factors that may be more or less relevant depending on the facts of the case.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The common theme for all these factors is that they affect the likelihood of the employee being a member of the occupational DB scheme on retirement or affect their benefits under any such scheme.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Remember, the question is ‘what is the chance that [the following] would have happened?’:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li>The employer would have restructured, become insolvent or otherwise dismissed the employee for redundancy<ul><li>This might be in the context of, or reflect, wider economic factors, technological progress in the sector, the history of the business or the financial health of the business</li></ul></li><li>The employee would have left the role, resigned or taken early retirement<ul><li>This might be in the context, or reflect, prior length of employment, general employment history of the claimant, retention rates within the relevant industry, the particular role occupied and common career progression from that role, prospects of working in a different sector (including moving from public to private sector for enhanced salary), the relevant facts giving rise to the Tribunal litigation<sup>2</sup> in the first place and the employee’s health or that of their immediate family</li></ul></li><li>The employee would have been dismissed fairly<ul><li>This, of course, may be the approach taken by the Tribunal under a <em>Polkey</em> assessment. If not, then (for instance) relevant evidence about the employee’s health and likelihood of losing their employment for ill-health capability reasons might constitute a withdrawal factor</li></ul></li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It should also be added that, of course, evidence for the above will be needed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The nature of that evidence need not come solely from parties and witnesses. Subject to matters of proportionality, expert evidence on these factors may be appropriate. For instance, geographical factors, industry-specific matters not within the usual competency of a Tribunal or medical evidence about the long-term effects of a medical condition may all be appropriate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Lastly, a more nuanced withdrawal factor might also be that the employee would have reduced their working hours or salary whilst nonetheless remaining within the pension scheme.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Similarly, many people take sabbaticals, take career breaks or take secondments – but then later return to the employer and pension scheme.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The likelihood of each of these factors might be informed by the employee’s home / family life, caring responsibilities, qualifications or desired career progression.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Such adjustments will likely have an impact on the employee’s pension benefits come retirement.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Moreover, such adjustments ‘bite’ at different stages of the employee’s career.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The nature and impact on pension benefits of these adjustment would be set out in the pension scheme terms and evidence from the pension scheme administrator may be necessary – rather than simply ascribing a percentage reduction to the multiplicand. &nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:separator --> <hr class="wp-block-separator"/> <!-- /wp:separator --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>1- Albeit in the context of the pension guidance applicable at the time, from 2003, which recommended adopting either a ‘simplified’ or ‘substantial loss’ approach. This dichotomy was not retained in the 2017, 4<sup>th</sup> edition.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>2- For which see Plaistow v. SoS for Justice, in which the claimant’s resilience to previous work incidents supported a finding that he would have remained in employment until retirement</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:image {"width":300,"height":300,"sizeSlug":"large"} --> <figure class="wp-block-image size-large is-resized"><img src="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2021/09/gareth-price-34.jpg" alt="Gareth Price" width="300" height="300"/><figcaption><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/gareth-price/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Gareth Price</span></a>&nbsp;was called in 2009 and specialises in employment and clinical negligence.</figcaption></figure> <!-- /wp:image -->

Thorley v Sandwell &#038; West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust [2021] EWHC 2604 (QB)

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Pupil barrister Bharat Jangra examines the outcome of Thorley v Sandwell &amp; West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust [2021] EWHC 2604 (QB) whereby the case was dismissed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Factual Background</strong><br><br>The Claimant suffered a stroke as a result of his anti-coagulation medication (Warfarin) being stopped whilst undergoing an angiogram in April 2005. Mr Justice Soole’s judgment considered: breach of duty; the Wisniewski principles regarding adverse inferences; causation and material contribution.<br><br>The Claimant advanced two breach of duty arguments:<br><br>• Prior to the angiogram, the Claimant was told to not take any anti-coagulation medication for four days, contrary to the ‘guidance’ document; and<br>• Following the angiogram, the Claimant should have been advised to re-start his Warfarin on the evening of the angiogram.<br><br>The Defendant submitted that the guidance document was not strictly applicable to angiograms and so there was no breach of duty. In response to the second claim, the Defendant submitted that this course of action was not contrary to Bolam or Bolitho and that there was a reasonable body of competent practitioners who would have delayed re-starting Warfarin until the day after the procedure rather than the same day.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Breach of Duty, the Guidance Document, Wisniewski Principles and Adverse Inferences</strong><br><br>The guidance document was titled ‘Anticoagulation and Surgery (Sandwell)’ and had not initially been disclosed by the Defendant as it was their position that it was not directly applicable. The Defendant did not bring any factual evidence regarding this document, either from those who were responsible for drafting the document or from those who had clinical responsibility for Mr Thorley.<br><br>During the trial, the Claimant’s expert advanced the position that the guidance was applicable and should have been followed in this case reducing the period prior to the angiogram without anti-coagulation medication to three days rather than four. He also also accepted that it was only a guideline and could be departed from on clinical grounds [para. 46].<br><br>In contrast, the Defendant’s expert stated it was not applicable as angiography was not a surgical procedure and therefore not covered within the scope of the document. Further, as it was not a protocol or policy, and absence a protocol relating specifically to angiography, it was not reasonable to apply guidance relating to surgery to angiography [para. 43]. The Judge also accepted the position that in 2005 guidance documents were much less common.<br><br>To support their breach of duty arguments, the Claimant sought an adverse inference due to the failure by the Defendant to call any evidence regarding the document, in line with the principles from Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324, being:<br><br>“(1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.<br><br>(2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.<br><br>(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue.<br><br>(4) If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satisfies the court then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.”<br><br>Soole J did not seek to apply these rules strictly, in reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Efobi v. Royal Mail Group Ltd [2021] UKSC 33 where Lord Leggatt JSC (with whom the other JSC agreed) observed at [41]:<br><br>‘…Without intending to disparage the sensible statements made in that case, I think there is a risk of making overly legal and technical what really is or ought to be just a matter of ordinary rationality. So far as possible, tribunals should be free to draw, or to decline to draw, inferences from the facts of the case before them using their common sense without the need to consult law books when doing so…'<br><br>Whilst this was an employment case, Soole J interpreted the above to have the widest possible application.<br><br>Soole J agreed with the Defendant expert’s interpretation regarding the guideline document, in that it did not apply to angiography and it was contrary to the ample material cited to the court advocating a four or five day period without anticoagulation medication. There were no adverse inferences to be drawn by the Court from the Defendant’s failure to call any factual evidence on this issue. Therefore, there was no breach of duty in failing to follow the guideline [paras. 57 - 67].<br><br>The Court went on to discuss that the expert evidence provided no basis to conclude that a three day period was better than a four or five day period of omission without Warfarin. Consequently, regardless of the guideline, there was no breach of duty in the treatment to Mr Thorley [paras. 75 – 77].<br><br>Regarding the second breach of duty claimed around the delay in resuming warfarin, Soole J did acknowledge and accept that some practitioners, with supporting independent publications, would have restarted Warfarin later on the day of the angiogram.<br><br>However, Soole J preferred the Defendant’s expert evidence, in that this position had to be read in the context of the assessment of the Claimant and risk of post-operative haemorrhage. There was a risk of bleeding following the angiogram, which may have been delayed or would not have been immediately apparent after the angiogram, especially considering that the Claimant was obese. The delay in resuming anti-coagulation medicine the day after the angiogram carried a risk, but provided extra safety to the Claimant should a late bleed have occurred [para. 79]. This approach was supported by a reasonable body of competent practitioners, including the Defendant expert himself. Therefore, there was no breach of duty in not resuming Warfarin in the evening on the day of the angiogram.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Causation and Material Contribution</strong><br><br>The Claimant’s causation case was brought on two grounds: ‘but for’ causation and material contribution.<br>Regarding ‘but for’ causation, Soole J found difficulty in accepting the Claimant’s expert evidence in relation to the applicability of the study he produced to the Claimant’s position, or the points raised regarding the relevance of the study relied on by the Defendant’s expert. Instead, he preferred the evidence of the Defendant’s expert and the way in which he extrapolated the evidence he brought and applied it to the Claimant’s condition. On that basis, he did not find that there was any ‘but for’ causation and that the Claimant would have suffered a stroke in any event.<br>Soole J undertook a comprehensive review of the case law regarding material contribution, and in agreement with the Court of Appeal in both Ministry of Defence v AB [2010] EWCA Civ 1317 and Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 86, material contribution is not an issue that can be raised when there is one defendant and an indivisible injury.<br><br>The claim was therefore dismissed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Conclusions</strong><br><br>The Court will not restrict themselves to a formulaic test when considering the Wisniewski principles, and in line with Efobi it will take a holistic and common sense approach to the evidence. Further, material contribution cannot be raised as an issue where there is an indivisible injury and one defendant.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Author</strong><br><br>Bharat Jangra is a pupil barrister currently undertaking a pupillage with Parklane Plowden Chambers.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers offer specialist pupillages based within either our Civil &amp; Employment teams, our Family Team or our Commercial and Chancery teams. We also have pupillages based in Leeds or Newcastle, with the opportunity to spend time in each of our bases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden?</strong><br><br>If you are interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden join us at our virtual open evenings to hear from our former pupils and barristers: an opportunity to learn from our experiences, to hear our application advice, and to ask any pupillage queries you may have.<br><br>Please click <strong><em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/future" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">here</span></a></em></strong> to read more.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Campbell (By His Litigation Friend) v Advantage Insurance Company Limited

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/sophie-watson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Sophie Watson</span></a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Pupil barrister Sophie Watson examines the outcome of Campbell (by his litigation friend) v Advantage Insurance Company Limited whereby the Court of Appeal upholds that a Claimant cannot rely on his own intoxication when accepting a lift from a drunk driver to avoid a finding of contributory negligence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Background Facts</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant and his friends had been drinking in a nightclub. The Claimant became very drunk and was assisted into the front passenger seat of his friend’s car where he fell asleep. After leaving the Claimant in the vehicle, the Claimant’s friends went back to the nightclub and continued drinking.&nbsp; When they returned to the car, it would not start and one of them went to borrow jump leads.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The other friend managed to start the vehicle and then began driving with the Claimant as a rear seat passenger, having moved position from the front passenger seat. A collision occurred with an oncoming lorry on the wrong side of the road.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant’s head collided with the driver’s seat, and he suffered a catastrophic brain injury. The driver was killed, and the other friend provided a witness statement, but killed himself prior to the trial.&nbsp; Therefore, there was limited evidence in respect of the events of the night.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>First instance Judgment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Judge made reference to the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 and stated that section 1(2) sets out ‘<em>a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.’&nbsp;</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Judge found that the Claimant must have been aware of what was happening when he moved from the front passenger seat to the rear seat. He concluded that given the Claimant’s size/height it would have been highly improbable that the driver moved the Claimant without the Claimant assisting. The Judge found this was consistent with the Claimant being aware that the driver was intoxicated and therefore, consenting to remaining in the car as it was driven away.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Judge applied an objective test of the ‘reasonable man’ when deciding whether, by virtue of being drunk, the Claimant was contributorily negligent. He made a finding of contributory negligence of 20% against the Claimant.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Appeal Decision</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant appealed this finding of contributory negligence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal identified 4 key issues:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"type":"1"} --> <ol type="1"><li>Whether the Judge had wrongly applied the test of capacity under MCA 2005 and reversed the burden of proof for contributory negligence.</li><li>Whether the Judge’s findings were properly made.</li><li>Whether the Judge wrongly applied a test of the objective reasonable, competent and prudent passenger; and</li><li>Whether the judge’s assessment of 20% reduction in damages should be reduced.</li></ol> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Firstly, in respect of capacity, the Court of Appeal considered that the Judge at First Instance had correctly applied the test under MCA 2005. It was held that the Judge did not reverse the burden of proof.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Secondly, the Court of Appeal found there was no evidence that any justiciable errors were made that would entitle interference with the findings of fact. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that, on the basis of the limited evidence, the Judge had made proper findings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The main issue determined was the application of the objective test.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant’s Counsel had made reference to a number of Australian authorities. In <em>McPherson v Whitfield </em>[1996] 1 Qd. 474it was concluded that where the Claimant was lacking relevant conscious awareness, the Claimant should not be held responsible for failing to take reasonable care of his own safety. The Court of Appeal rejected this approach.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal considered the case of <em>Owen v Brimell </em>[1977] QB 859which sets out twoscenarios in which contributory negligence could be found, namely: if the passenger accepted the lift knowing the driver was intoxicated or the passenger had known that he would be given a lift and then drunk to excess so that he could not make an assessment of the driver’s ability to drive<em>. </em>The Court of Appeal acknowledged that there were only two situations identified but found that this did not restrict contributory negligence to only these distinct situations.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the Judge at First Instance had rightly concluded that the Claimant should be assessed to the standards of a reasonable, prudent and competent adult.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is notable that in agreement, Lord Justice Underhill considered an example of a person who was unconscious would be in a state where they were incapable of making a decision and could not consent. Therefore, in this scenario they would not be contributorily negligent.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Comment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case re-affirms the objective test to be applied. It is clear that the question of voluntary and involuntary conduct will turn on the facts and the assessment of the evidence by the trial judge.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Author</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/sophie-watson/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Sophie Watson</span></a> is a pupil barrister currently undertaking a pupillage with Parklane Plowden Chambers.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers offer specialist pupillages based within either our Civil &amp; Employment teams, our Family Team or our Commercial and Chancery teams. We also have pupillages based in Leeds or Newcastle, with the opportunity to spend time in each of our bases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If you are interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden join us at our virtual open evenings to hear from our former pupils and barristers: an opportunity to learn from our experiences, to hear our application advice, and to ask any pupillage queries you may have.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Please click <span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/future" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a></span> to read more.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Worker status and the obligation of personal performance 🗓

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>In this article, Parklane Plowden Barrister, Roger Quickfall, considers the approach to determining when a limited right of substitution is consistent with the obligation of personal performance following the recent guidance of the Court of Appeal in </em>Stuart Delivery v Augustine<em>.</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Introduction</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On 19/10/21, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) delivered its latest decision on worker status: <em>Stuart Delivery Ltd v Augustine</em> [2021] EWCA Civ 1514 (“<em>Augustine</em>”).&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On this occasion, the CA was dealing with the obligation of personal performance when there is a fettered right of substitution.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The issue on appeal was whether an employment tribunal (“ET”) was entitled to find that a self-employed courier (“C”) delivering goods by moped for Stuart Delivery Ltd (“R”) was a ‘worker’ for the purposes of s. 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”).&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>The facts</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>R had developed a technology platform connecting couriers with retailers via an app.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Couriers who entered into arrangements with R could accept individual delivery jobs and be paid a fixed fee for that job by reference to the distance travelled and the mode of transport.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Couriers could also sign up for one or more time slots via the app.&nbsp; The slots covered the zones with the highest concentration of users at the times of projected highest demand.&nbsp; Couriers were encouraged to sign up for these slots and 93% of couriers worked on these slots.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Once signed up for a slot, couriers committed to be in a particular zone for 90% of the time of the slot, not logging off for more than 6 minutes per slot and not refusing more than one delivery job during a slot.&nbsp; If they satisfied these requirements, they were guaranteed a minimum £9 an hour for each slot (regardless of whether they undertook any deliveries).&nbsp; If they did not satisfy these requirements, they would not receive the minimum payment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Couriers were also paid delivery rewards if they achieved a certain number of deliveries in a week, but they would not qualify for the reward if they failed to take up two or more slots in a week.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>There was no written substitution clause.&nbsp; However, if a courier did not wish to work a slot he had accepted, he could notify other couriers on R’s app who could opt, if they chose, to fill the unwanted slot.&nbsp; C did not know which courier would be taking up the slot and he could not put forward any given individual.&nbsp; If one of the couriers did not take up the slot, C would have to do it or face penalties for missing the slot.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The right of substitution was conditional upon another courier on R’s app agreeing to take up C’s slot.&nbsp; The other courier had to have the same mode of transport and was subject to the same requirements as C of having to stay in the area for 90% of the time, not logging off for more than 6 minutes per slot and not refusing more than one delivery job per slot, to avoid losing the guaranteed payment and suffering the other consequences.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The CA agreed with the ET and the EAT that this was not a sufficient right of substitution to remove the obligation of personal performance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>The law</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As employment lawyers are aware, the definition of a worker in s. 230(3)(b) ERA provides, <em>inter alia</em>, that the individual “<strong><em>undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract …</em></strong>”.&nbsp; This is known as the obligation of personal performance.&nbsp; Anyone seeking to establish themselves as a worker must establish that they are subject to the obligation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>If the individual must perform the work themselves, there is no difficulty: there is an obligation of personal performance.&nbsp; If the individual can send whoever they wish to carry out their work, i.e. the right of substitution is unfettered, there is also no difficulty: there is no obligation of personal performance.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The difficulty arises where the right of substitution is fettered or conditional, i.e. limited or occasional.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Whether a conditional right of substitution is consistent with personal performance&nbsp;</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As was held by the CA in <em>Pimlico Plumbers v Smith</em> [2017] EWCA Civ 51, [2017] ICR 657 (“<em>Pimlico Plumbers</em>”) (§84), whether a conditional right of substitution is consistent with personal performance depends on the conditionality; in particular, the nature and degree of any fetter on the right of substitution.&nbsp; In other words: the extent to which the right is limited or occasional.&nbsp; In the same paragraph, the CA gave three examples:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><li><em>a right of substitution only when the contractor is unable to carry out the work will, subject to any exceptional facts, be consistent with personal performance. </em><em></em></li><li><em>a right of substitution limited only by the need to show that the substitute is as qualified as the contractor to do the work, whether or not that entails a particular procedure, will, subject to any exceptional facts, be inconsistent with personal performance. </em><em></em></li><li><em>a right to substitute only with the consent of [the employer] who has an absolute and unqualified discretion to withhold consent will be consistent with personal performance.</em><em></em></li></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On appeal in <em>Augustine</em>, R argued that the ET wrongly found that C’s right of substitution was consistent with (iii) above when it should have found that it was consistent with (ii).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The above examples were stated by the Master of the Rolls and approved of by the Supreme Court.&nbsp; There has therefore been a tendency for practitioners to regard them as categories into which the facts of a case can be shoehorned to determine whether there is an obligation of personal performance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>However, the CA in <em>Augustine</em>, held that this was the wrong approach because it was unreal to attempt to shoehorn the facts of a case into one of the examples to see whether a right of substitution was consistent with the obligation of personal performance.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The CA held that, to treat the examples as categories, addresses the wrong issue.&nbsp; The issue is not whether the case can be fitted into one of the examples; it is whether there is an obligation of personal performance (§38).&nbsp; Where the right of substitution is conditional, the issue is whether the nature and degree of any fetter on the right or ability to appoint a substitute is inconsistent with any obligation of personal performance (§55).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>An important factor is the dominant purpose of the work arrangement when there is a limited right of substitution.&nbsp; Is the employer only concerned that the work is done and uninterested in who does it? Or do they want the individual they have contracted to do it?</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As the SC explained in <em>Pimlico Plumbers</em> <em>v Smith</em> [2018] UKSC 29, [2018] ICR 1511, at §32, where there is a right of substitution, it may be helpful to assess its significance by reference to whether the dominant feature of the contract remains personal performance on the part of the person contracted to carry out the work.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In <em>Pimlico Plumbers</em> the SC proceeded on the basis (without deciding) that the claimant had the right to appoint another Pimlico plumber to do particular work where the claimant had subsequently been offered a more lucrative job.&nbsp; The SC held that this was a significant limitation on the right of substitution and was the converse of the situation in which the employer was uninterested in the identity of the substitute, provided only that the work was done.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In <em>Augustine</em>, the system set up by R was intended to ensure that C carried out the work and, in particular, that he turned up for the slots for which he had signed up and did the delivery work during those slots.&nbsp; That was necessary for R’s business model.&nbsp; The limited right or ability to notify other couriers via the app that he wished to release his slot for take up by others was insufficient to remove from him the obligation of personal performance.&nbsp; This was not a situation in which R was uninterested in who performed the work.&nbsp; R wanted to ensure that the courier who took the slot was subject to the same constraints as C to ensure that there were sufficiently reliable couriers available in hot zones at peak times.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The CA observed that there is no rule that a right or ability to substitute only from R’s pool of operatives is necessarily consistent with personal performance.&nbsp; But the CA acknowledged that the courts have recognised that this is a conclusion that employment tribunals can reasonably reach in broadly similar circumstances.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Finally, the CA observed that, in considering whether there is an obligation of personal performance, it may not be necessary to determine whether the substitution arrangements are contractual or merely a practice permitted by R.&nbsp; It was observed that, following <em>Uber v Aslam</em> [2021] UKSC 5, [2021] ICR 657 (“<em>Uber</em>”), the question may be whether, looking at the contractual terms and the way the arrangements operated in practice, there was an obligation of personal performance given the extent and nature of any practice permitting substitution.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In <em>Uber</em> it was held that the contract is not the starting point in determining employment / worker status because employment rights are not contractual but statutory.&nbsp; Whether an individual has statutory rights is therefore a matter of ‘statutory’ rather than ‘contractual’ interpretation.&nbsp; It is therefore necessary to have the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions in mind, i.e. the protection of the vulnerable / those in a position of dependency on the employer, when determining whether an individual has particular statutory rights.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><u>Conclusions</u></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>When considering whether an individual is a ‘worker’ where there is a limited ability to appoint a substitute, the issue is whether the nature and degree of any limit is consistent with any obligation of personal performance.&nbsp;&nbsp; In addressing this issue, it is necessary to consider the extent to which the employer is interested in who carries out the work.&nbsp; Trying to shoehorn the facts into one of the so-called <em>Pimlico</em> examples will not be conclusive.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Roger Quickfall</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Barrister at Parklane Plowden</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>November 2021</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->