Bharat Jangra Archives - Parklane Plowden

Case Report: R (On the application of Jada Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin)

Jaden was an individual who had been killed on 8 January 2019. An inquest to his death was formally opened on 18 January 2019. The inquest process was then overtaken by the criminal proceedings which took place, and the inquest was adjourned on 2 April 2019. Ayoub Majdouline was convicted of Jaden’s murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 21 years on 18 December 2019.  On 24 December 2019, the Coroner issued a certificate that the inquest was not to be resumed. The Claimant applied to the Coroner to resume the inquest in June 2023 and a decision not to resume the inquest was issued in a document dated 18 March 2024. Jaden’s mother, Jada Bailey (the “Claimant”), sought to judicially review that decision on three points:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>The decision not to resume the inquest gives rise to a breach of the procedural obligation under ECHR Article 2;</li>  <li>The Coroner’s conclusion not to resume the inquest rested on two errors of law as to the likely utility of the resumed inquest; and</li>  <li>The decision was contrary to a duty to investigate arising at common law (this was abandoned in submissions as there is no separate common law source of either power or obligation for a Coroner to investigate – they are statutory under the Criminal Justice Act 2009). This was then adapted that the Coroner had failed to have regard to relevant considerations, namely: <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>the public interest in holding an inquest;</li>  <li>the purpose pursued by sections 5(1) and (2) of the 2009 Act;</li>  <li>that an inquest can serve to allay any public concern arising from a death; and</li>  <li>the possibility of making a regulation 28 report.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>  The decision not to resume the inquest gives rise to a breach of the procedural obligation under ECHR Article 2  The Coroner had accepted the Claimant’s basic premise that there was an obligation to investigate under ECHR Article 2. In the usual course of inquests, the holding of an inquest discharges the investigative duty as required under the provisions of the 2009 Act. The Coroner in this case had considered that the investigative duty had been discharged already by the time the Claimant had sought to resume the inquest, as a Serious Case Review had been commissioned by the Safeguarding Children’s Board for Waltham Forest, published in May 2020.  The Claimant’s submitted that there were concerns regarding the scope and content of the SCR report; there were criticisms regarding the form of the investigation; the author of the SCR report lacked independence; the Claimant did not have sufficient opportunity to be involved in the SCR exercise; and it did not meet the requirement for public scrutiny. Further, following the SCR report, complaints raised about the conduct of the Metropolitan Police had not been properly addressed in an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.  As to the SCR report, Swift J commented:  It is readily apparent from the SCR report that it is a thorough and thoughtful consideration of all relevant matters. To my mind the SCR report is a highly impressive piece of work that should provide valuable assistance to all public authorities concerned. By identifying very clearly things they did and things they failed to do the SCR report ought both to promote accountability for what happened and to provide valuable guidance to those public authorities as regard their future conduct. Whenever considering a document such as this SCR report it will always be possible to point to further questions that could have been considered or further detail that could have been looked for. But that is not the test of whether the investigation that has been undertaken meets the requirement arising under article 2. In the circumstances of this case the investigation needed to consider the actions of the public authorities in Nottinghamshire and in London that had responsibilities that, if performed, would have served to safeguard C against the risk of falling victim to criminal exploitation. The SCR report, as written, evidences an effective investigation of the actions and omissions of those public authorities.  …  The purpose of an article 2 investigation is to consider what did happen; to establish a picture of past events. Often it will be readily apparent from findings on what did happen, what other steps should have been taken. That is so in the present case since it is clear from the SCR report that certain steps that were not taken should have been taken. But that is a by-product of the investigation.  Swift J considered that there was no principle reason why the SCR report, and the way in which the investigation had been conducted, was incapable of satisfying the article 2 duty to investigate. Swift J found that the author of the SCR report was independent and there was no suggestion that the investigation was not independent either. There was no requirement for an inquest to compel witnesses to give evidence or for certain documents to be provided, and so the argument that the SCR process did not do this had to fall away.  As to the lack of public scrutiny, Swift J held:  The requirement arising from article 2 for sufficient public scrutiny of either the investigation or its results or both, exists to ensure accountability, to promote public confidence in adherence to the substantive obligations arising under article 2, and to prevent any appearance of collusion or tolerance of unlawful acts. What is appropriate to meet these objectives is not fixed. There is no requirement that an investigation must be conducted through public hearings. I do not consider that the investigation that Mr Drew undertook was impaired by the absence of such hearings. Considered in the round, the SCR report identifies and then scrutinises the acts and omissions of the relevant public authorities.  Moreover, as to the lack of the Claimant’s involvement:  Given the factual circumstances… “I do not consider any of this shows that the Claimant was insufficiently involved in the investigation or lacked an effective opportunity to participate in and comment on the formulation of the SCR report. Rather, opportunities to participate were available from the outset of the investigation in early 2019 and, given the assistance available to the Claimant from the experienced and able solicitors who advised her, the opportunities to participate were real and substantial.”  The Coroner’s conclusion not to resume the inquest rested on two errors of law as to the likely utility of the resumed inquest  The Claimant submitted that the Coroner had failed to consider a narrative conclusion in their decision and their comments in relation to regulation 28 reports indicated a misdirection on the law.  As to the first point, Swift J remarked:  The suggested distinction between "short-form" and "narrative" conclusions that is the premise of this submission is a distinction without a difference. There is no material difference between a conclusion expressed using any of the terms listed in Note (i) and one that is in the "brief narrative" form anticipated by Note (ii). Each is intended to be descriptive: to describe the outcome of the inquest. For example, a conclusion of "unlawful killing" could be given either by simply using those words or through a narrative to the same effect.  The Coroner had referred to regulation 28 reports as ‘toothless’, and whilst Swift J considered that this was a rather colourful description; the Coroner had not misdirected himself on the law in relation to regulation 28 reports; and therefore this ground also failed.  Failure to have regard to relevant considerations  Swift J found that the Coroner did have regard to the possibility of making a regulation 28 report and that reading the decision in the round it had specifically considered and took the relevant considerations into account. This ground therefore failed.  Takeaways and practice points  The most interesting part of this decision is that the duty of the State to investigate does not have to be via the traditional inquest route and can be discharged via different avenues – there is no automatic right to an inquest. If other investigations have taken place in/around an incident one must take a holistic view of everything and consider whether it meets the article 2 duty; if so, there may not be a need for an inquest.  Bharat Jangra is part of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden. Bharat’s profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/">here</a>.

REPLAY: Updates in Employment Law: What you might have missed and what’s coming up? | 27 March 2024

<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Q-pYI23rW04" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>   Parklane Plowden's Employment Law with Lunch seminars bring you the latest law updates.  Employment specialists <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/tim-wilkinson/">Tim Wilkinson</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/">Bharat Jangra</a> explore the recent updates and new regulations upcoming in Employment Law.  Click on the above video to watch the webinar recording.

WHIPLASH (AND MORE): Taking stock of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hassam & Anor. v. Rabot & Anor. [2023] EWCA Civ 19

The Court of Appeal’s much anticipated judgment in Charlotte Victoria Hassam & Anor. v. Yoann Samuel Rabot & Anor.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> was handed down on Friday 20 January 2023.  The Court set out guidelines as to how to deal with concurrence of tariff and non-tariff injuries.  Two cases were heard together on appeal: Rabot v. Hassam and Briggs v. Laditan.  Both arose out of road traffic accidents.  Both concerned the claimant having suffered whiplash and non-whiplash injuries.<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a>  Whiplash injuries<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a> now attract a tariff award, pursuant to the Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021 as enacted by the Civil Liability Act 2018.<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a>  Rabot  Yoann Rabot had suffered various tariff injuries including whiplash, alongside soft tissue injuries to the knees, for which no tariff applied.<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a>  The tariff award at first instance was assessed at £1,390 and the non-tariff £2,500, totalling £3,890.  Hennessy DJ, sitting in the County Court at Birkenhead, then ‘stepped back’ to consider whether adjustment was necessary, applying the ‘totality principle’ identified by Pitchford LJ in Sadler v. Filipiak.<a href="#_ftn6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a>  ‘It is in my judgment always necessary to stand back from the compilation of individual figures, whether assistance has been derived from comparable cases or from the JSB guideline advice, to consider whether the award for pain, suffering and loss of amenity should be greater than the sum of the parts in order properly to reflect the combined effect of all the injuries upon the injured person's recovering quality of life or, on the contrary, should be smaller than the sum of the parts in order to remove an element of double counting...’<a href="#_ftn7" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a>  Following this application, Rabot’s overall award was reduced to £3,100.  Briggs  Similarly, Briggs, whose claim was heard by the same judge, suffered tariff-caught soft tissue injuries, alongside elbow, knee and hip injuries for which Parliament had not prescribed a set remedy.  The tariffed injuries amounted to an award of £840, with non-tariff at £3,000.  Hennessy DJ, stepping back and identifying an overlap between the two sets of injuries, reduced the award by £1,040 to give a total of £2,800.  The Appeal  The question for the Court to determine was this: what approach should be taken when coming to assess a combination of tariff and non-tariff injuries where a given claim involves both?  On that question, the Court of Appeal was divided.  Nicola Davies LJ, with whom Stuart-Smith LJ agreed, held by majority that on interpretation of the whiplash regulations, the assessments at first instance were correct.  At paragraph 38 of her judgment, Nicola Davies LJ set out the approach to be taken by the Court:  ‘It follows that the approach of the court to an assessment of damages in respect of a tariff and non-tariff award where concurrently caused PSLA is present is that the court should:  <ul> <li>assess the tariff award by reference to the Regulations;</li> </ul>  <ul> <li>assess the award for non-tariff injuries on common law principles; and Judgment Approved by the court for handing down Rabot v Hassam; Briggs v Laditan;</li> </ul>  <ul> <li>“step back” in order to carry out the Sadler adjustment, recognising that the sum included in the tariff award for the whiplash component is unknown but is smaller than it would be if damages for the whiplash component had been assessed applying common law principles’</li> </ul>  ‘There is one caveat, namely that the final award cannot be less than would be awarded for the non-tariff injuries if they had been the only injuries suffered by the claimant.’  In essence, consider each injury as intended by statute or at common law, then step back to determine totality.  The caveat provided is noteworthy.  The total award would be no lower than what the PSLA would have been in a given case for the non-tariff injuries by themselves.  In other words, a claimant cannot walk away with a lesser sum by bringing both claims together.  Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, dissenting, determined that the parliamentary award represented full compensation for the injuries taken together. The consequence of that approach would mean the award for any non-tariff injury would only amount in a small uplift on the original sum. Stuart-Smith LJ suggested it was hard to reconcile such an application of the law with the conclusion reached:<a id="_ftnref8" href="#_ftn8">[8]</a>  ‘The Master of the Rolls starts with an acceptance that the 2018 Act “removed certain claimants’ rights to full compensation for whiplash injuries, but not for other kinds of injury”; but he reaches the conclusion that “Parliament has legislated for the reduction of general damages for non-whiplash personal injuries in cases where whiplash injuries have been sustained, even though the statute does not appear specifically to be directed at non-whiplash cases.” (My emphasis). There is an obvious tension between these two statements. Since it is accepted that the 2018 Act does not remove any claimants’ rights to full compensation for other kinds of injury, the conclusion can only be supported if the terms of the statute effect the change by necessary implication and the consequential alteration to the common law was necessary and no more than necessary: see Lachaux at [13], cited by Nicola Davies LJ above.’  Comment  The dissenting view mirrors the approach taken by many insurance companies when defending such claims.  Following Rabot, insurers are likely to review their position.   Courts across the country now have a methodology upon which to value these claims.  But is that the final word on the subject?  We await to see whether leave to appeal will be sought to take the matter up to the Supreme Court in due course.  The full judgment can be found <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2023/19">here</a>.  The tariffs found within the Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021 can be found <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/642/regulation/2/made">here</a>.  <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/">Bharat Jangra</a>, called 2019, is a junior member of the civil and employment teams in Chambers.  He is regularly instructed in representing parties at hearings in relation to assessment of quantum and in drafting advices on quantum.  <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/robert-allen-pupil/">Robert Allen</a> is a pupil in Chambers currently under the supervision of <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/jim-hester/">Jim Hester</a>.  He will be accepting instructions in second six from 3 April 2023.  <hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>  <a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> [2023] EWCA Civ 19  <a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Para 2 ibid  <a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> So long as they do not exceed, or are not likely to exceed, two years – Section 3(1)(b)(i) Civil Liability Act 2018  <a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> Section 3  <a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> In quantifying PSLA for non-tariff injuries, the common law principles apply – see Attorney General of St Helena v. AB [2020] UKPC 1.  <a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> [2011] EWCA Civ 1728  <a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> Para 34 ibid  <a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a> Para 43 ibid

REPLAY: Time out? Time Limits & Extension of time in the employment tribunal, 31 October 2022

<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/u1lgN6f80Ac" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>   Parklane Plowden 'Law with Lunch' webinars bring you the latest law updates.  Barrister and employment specialists, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bryony-clayton/">Bryony Clayton</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/">Bharat Jangra</a> discuss 'Timed out? Time Limits & Extension of time in the employment tribunal - A summary of the legal principles including recent case law and practical tips'  Click the video to watch the webinar recording.

Crompton v Meadowcroft [2021] EW Misc 20

Written by <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bharat Jangra</a>  Pupil barrister Bharat Jangra examines the decision of Deputy District Judge Ayers in the case of Crompton v Meadowcroft [2021] EW Misc 20 regarding the exceptionality test under CPR 45.29J and the fixed costs regime.  Factual Background  This claim arose following an RTA on 7 January 2017. The claim was entered into the portal on 9 January 2017, and exited 15 days later. Liability was admitted on 8 March 2017.  Proceedings were issued in early 2020, in July 2020 the Claimants agreed to the Defendant’s settlement offer. However, whilst settlement negotiations were ongoing the court had sent out directions questionnaires, which were completed and filed with the court. On 10 September 2020, the court allocated this matter to the multi-track.  The issue before the Court was whether the Claimant’s solicitors were limited to the fixed costs regime or whether they would be able to obtain their costs on the standard basis.  The Parties’ Submissions  CPR45.29B provides the following:  “Subject to rules 45.29F, 45.29G, 45.29H and 45.29J, and for as long as the case is not allocated to the multi-track, if, in a claim started under the RTA Protocol, the Claim Notification Form is submitted on or after 31st July 2013, the only costs allowed are—  (a) the fixed costs in rule 45.29C;  (b) disbursements in accordance with rule 45.29I.”  The phrase “and for as long as the case is not allocated to the multi-track” being added following the decision in Qader v Esure Services Limited [2016] EWCA Civ 1109.  The Defendant’s contention was that as this case had been issued in the portal and had settled prior to allocation to the multi-track, the fixed costs regime should therefore apply. Here it may have been “…the case that the claimant’s representatives carried out an amount of work that was greater than will be properly reimbursed under the fixed costs regime, but they have to take that on the chin because that is the nature of the scheme…” (para. 9)  However, the Claimant contended that the costs in this case should not be restricted to the fixed costs regime on the basis that the case was ‘exceptional’ further to CPR45.29J, which states:  “(1) If it considers that there are exceptional circumstances making it appropriate to do so, the court will consider a claim for an amount of costs (excluding disbursements) which is greater than the fixed recoverable costs referred to in rules 45.29B to 45.29H.  (2) If the court considers such a claim to be appropriate, it may—  (a) summarily assess the costs; or  (b) make an order for the costs to be subject to detailed assessment….”  The Claimant submitted that this was not a straightforward case and met the exceptional circumstances, a high bar as per Ferri v Gill [2019] EWHC 952 (QB), due to the following:  <div class="wp-block-group"> <div class="wp-block-group"> <ul><li>The number of experts involved;</li><li>Extensive medical disclosure;</li><li>The Claimant’s solicitors had to consider that the Claimant may suffer disablement as a result of her injuries;</li><li>Reference had to be made to the Ogden tables to calculate future losses; and</li><li>The agreed settlement figure was outside the fast-track limit.</li></ul> </div> </div>   Decision  In these circumstances, the Court did consider that the exceptionality bar had been met and “that the work required by those representing the claimant was significantly greater than might have been anticipated … I do deem it appropriate to allow the claimant to depart from the fixed costs regime so as to be properly reimbursed in respect of the work done and the costs incurred on their client’s behalf.” (para. 13)  Author  <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bharat-jangra/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bharat Jangra</a> is a pupil barrister currently undertaking a pupillage with Parklane Plowden Chambers.   Parklane Plowden Chambers offer specialist pupillages based within either our Civil & Employment teams, our Family Team or our Commercial and Chancery teams. We also have pupillages based in Leeds or Newcastle, with the opportunity to spend time in each of our bases.  Interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden?  If you are interested in applying for Pupillage at Parklane Plowden join us at our virtual open evenings to hear from our former pupils and barristers: an opportunity to learn from our experiences, to hear our application advice, and to ask any pupillage queries you may have.  More information on available at <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/pupillages/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/pupillages</a>

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Case Report: R (On the application of Jada Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin)

REPLAY: Updates in Employment Law: What you might have missed and what’s coming up? | 27 March 2024

WHIPLASH (AND MORE): Taking stock of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hassam & Anor. v. Rabot & Anor. [2023] EWCA Civ 19

REPLAY: Time out? Time Limits & Extension of time in the employment tribunal, 31 October 2022

<em>Crompton v Meadowcroft </em>[2021] EW Misc 20

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Case Report: R (On the application of Jada Bailey) v HM Senior Coroner for East London [2025] EWHC 1637 (Admin)

REPLAY: Updates in Employment Law: What you might have missed and what’s coming up? | 27 March 2024

WHIPLASH (AND MORE): Taking stock of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hassam &#038; Anor. v. Rabot &#038; Anor. [2023] EWCA Civ 19

REPLAY: Time out? Time Limits &#038; Extension of time in the employment tribunal, 31 October 2022

<em>Crompton v Meadowcroft </em>[2021] EW Misc 20

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9th September 2025 | Employment Law with Lunch

Parklane Plowden Podcast – A closer look at burial disputes

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WHIPLASH (AND MORE): Taking stock of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hassam & Anor. v. Rabot & Anor. [2023] EWCA Civ 19

REPLAY: Time out? Time Limits & Extension of time in the employment tribunal, 31 October 2022