<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers are delighted to announce that we have been shortlisted for the Barristers’ Chambers of the Year award at the <a href="https://britishclaimsaward.co.uk/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">British Claims Awards</a> 2026.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The winners will be announced at the awards ceremony on 4th June.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Congratulations to all the nominees!</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Ian Pennock considers the decision in <em>Drake (Margaret) Application for Judicial Review’ [2025] NIKB 70 </em>on when a coroner can compel disclosure of an expert report</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Summary</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case arose after a family obtained a psychiatric report on issues central to the death, then declined to disclose it to the coroner when the report proved unhelpful. The coroner issued a notice under section 17A of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 requiring production of the report. The family challenged that decision by way of judicial review.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The High Court upheld the coroner’s decision. It confirmed that a coroner may adopt a “two-stage” approach:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"start":1} --> <ol start="1" class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>first requiring production of a document to the coroner; and</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>only afterwards deciding whether the document should be disclosed to other properly interested persons (“PIPs”).</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case is important because it makes clear that there is no automatic immunity for privately commissioned inquest expert reports. Solicitors acting for bereaved families, state bodies and other interested persons should proceed on the basis that an expert report obtained solely for an inquest may have to be produced to the coroner even if the commissioning party later decides not to rely upon it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case concerned the death of Stephen Moore, who died in hospital after being found suspended by a shower cord. A central issue in the inquest was whether he had been suffering from delirium, whether staff recognised it, and whether any failure to diagnose or treat it contributed to his death. The coroner had already obtained psychiatric evidence from Professor Palazidou. The Belfast Health and Social Care Trust later obtained its own psychiatric report from Dr Armstrong.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The family considered that Dr Armstrong’s report undermined aspects of the coroner’s expert evidence and sought an adjournment so that they could obtain their own psychiatric evidence. The coroner agreed, expressly stating that she did not yet have a sufficiently clear picture on the central issue of delirium and that additional expert evidence would assist her.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The family then obtained a report from Dr Husain. However, they informed the coroner that they did not intend to rely upon it and would not disclose it. In response, the coroner issued a notice under section 17A requiring production of the report. The family applied for revocation of the notice. When that application failed, judicial review proceedings followed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Relevant Legislation and Comparison with England and Wales</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case turned on sections 17A and 17B of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, which were inserted by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Section 17A gives a coroner the power to require a person to:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>attend to give evidence;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>produce documents or other material; or</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>prepare a written statement.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Section 17A also allows the recipient of a notice to apply to revoke or vary it on the basis that the requirement is unreasonable in all the circumstances.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Section 17B preserves ordinary civil law protections. A person cannot be compelled to provide evidence or documents if they could not be compelled to do so in civil proceedings. Public interest immunity principles also continue to apply in the inquest context.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>These provisions are closely analogous to the powers available to coroners in England and Wales under Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In practical terms, the powers are materially the same. The importance of Drake is therefore not confined to Northern Ireland. Its reasoning is likely to be influential in England and Wales where coroners are considering whether to compel production of privately obtained expert evidence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>One important feature of the legislation is that sections 17A and 17B concern production of material to the coroner, rather than onward disclosure of that material to other interested persons. That distinction became central to the outcome of the case.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Earlier Decision in <em>Ketcher and Mitchell [2020] NICA 31</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Much of the argument in Drake centred on the earlier Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decision in Re Ketcher and Mitchell.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Ketcher involved soldiers who had died in barracks. The coroner had obtained psychiatric reports. The families obtained their own reports but declined to disclose them. The Court of Appeal held that litigation privilege did not apply because inquests are investigative rather than adversarial proceedings. It followed the reasoning in <em>Three Rivers Distict Council -v- Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.5) [2005] 1 AC 610</em> &nbsp;that litigation privilege only applies where proceedings are adversarial in nature.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>However, the Court of Appeal in Ketcher had also observed that coroners should be cautious about compelling disclosure of family-commissioned expert reports because doing so might discourage families from obtaining their own evidence in future. Those comments were obiter, but they were relied upon heavily by the applicant in Drake.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Applicant’s Grounds for Judicial Review</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The applicant advanced two principal grounds of challenge.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Ground 1: The Coroner Could Not Adopt a “Two-Stage” Approach</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The applicant argued that the coroner had been wrong to treat production to the coroner and later disclosure to PIPs as separate questions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It was submitted that once the coroner saw the report, onward disclosure to PIPs would become effectively inevitable because the threshold for disclosure in inquests is only “potential relevance”. The applicant argued that the coroner was therefore wrong to assume that she could later revisit the public interest balance after seeing the report.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The applicant further argued that there was no decided authority recognising a public interest in protecting families who commission expert evidence for inquests from later disclosure to other PIPs. It was said that any public interest in encouraging families to investigate a death applied only at the stage of production to the coroner and not at the later stage of onward disclosure.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Ground 2: The Coroner Had Misapplied Ketcher</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The applicant also argued that the coroner had wrongly distinguished Ketcher.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It was submitted that Ketcher provided a “strong steer” that coroners should generally decline to compel disclosure where:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>there was already one or more expert report on the issue;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the coroner was prepared to proceed with the existing evidence; and</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the family had commissioned an expert report but did not wish to disclose it.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The applicant contended that those features were all present in Drake. It was also argued that the differences between the reports of Professor Palazidou and Dr Armstrong were relatively limited and that the coroner did not genuinely need to see Dr Husain’s report.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Coroner’s Decisions</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner rejected the family’s arguments and issued the section 17A notice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>She considered that Dr Husain’s report might materially assist with the central issues in the case, particularly in resolving differences between the existing psychiatric experts. She emphasised that the role of delirium in Mr Moore’s death was the key issue in the inquest and that she still lacked a sufficiently clear understanding of several matters, including:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>whether Mr Moore was suffering from delirium;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>the causes of that delirium;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>whether the causes were treated appropriately;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>whether alternative action should have been taken; and</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>whether healthcare staff properly understood delirium and its causes.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner considered that Dr Husain’s report might be “more than modest” in significance and potentially very important. However, she stated that she could not properly determine its relevance without reading it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>She also drew a distinction between:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>disclosure to herself; and</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>disclosure to PIPs.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>She regarded the public interest in withholding a report from PIPs as stronger than the public interest in withholding it from the coroner. She reasoned that a coroner, as an independent judicial figure, is the guardian of the public interest in the inquest and cannot use the material to the detriment of a PIP in later proceedings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner therefore decided to require production of the report to herself first and to leave the question of onward disclosure for later consideration.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Decision of the High Court</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The High Court dismissed the judicial review.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It held that sections 17A and 17B concern production of material to the coroner and do not govern onward disclosure to PIPs. The court concluded that there was nothing in the legislation preventing a coroner from adopting a two-stage approach. On the contrary, such an approach was entirely consistent with long-established coronial practice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court emphasised that coroners have a broad discretion in how they conduct an inquest and that their duty is to investigate the facts “fully, fairly and fearlessly”. The gathering of potentially relevant evidence is therefore central to the coronial function.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judge also held that the applicant’s fear that disclosure to PIPs would become inevitable was overstated. Even after inspecting the report, the coroner could still decide that it should not be disclosed at all, or should only be disclosed in redacted form, after balancing the competing public interests.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court held that Drake was materially different from Ketcher because in Drake the coroner had already identified specific areas in which the undisclosed report might assist. She had adjourned the inquest specifically to allow the family to obtain further expert evidence. She had also made clear that the central issue of delirium remained insufficiently resolved.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court accepted that Ketcher did not create a general rule against disclosure. Rather, it required an individual balancing exercise in each case. The judge warned against creating a special class of documents immune from disclosure merely because they had been commissioned by the next of kin. That, he said, would effectively create a form of privilege which did not otherwise exist in inquests.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court also noted that such a rule could have serious consequences. If expert reports could simply be withheld from the coroner, it might allow both inculpatory and exculpatory material to remain hidden. In some cases it could distort the course of an inquest or undermine the state’s ability to discharge its Article 2 investigative obligations.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Commentary</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The decision in ‘<em>Drake (Margaret) Application for Judicial Review’ [2025] NIKB 70’</em> is likely to become one of the leading authorities on when a coroner can compel disclosure of an expert report obtained by a family but not intended to be relied upon at an inquest.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Drake is likely to be welcomed by coroners because it reinforces the inquisitorial nature of inquests. It confirms that a coroner’s task is not simply to referee between competing parties but to obtain the evidence necessary to answer the statutory questions.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The decision also reflects a realistic understanding of how modern inquests operate. Although inquests are formally inquisitorial, many of them — especially Article 2 cases —which involve allegations of state responsibility for a death, inevitably involve protection and advancement of interests of PIPs. Families, NHS bodies, police forces and prisons frequently obtain their own expert evidence. In practice, some of that evidence will be helpful and some will not. Drake makes clear that parties cannot assume they may selectively deploy only the material which supports their position.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>At the same time, the judgment does contain important safeguards. It does not mean that every report obtained by a family must automatically be disclosed to everyone else. The two-stage approach endorsed by the court means that coroners retain flexibility. They may inspect the report privately, consider whether it is genuinely relevant, and then determine whether onward disclosure is necessary and proportionate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>For solicitors, that may be the most important aspect of the case. The real battleground may no longer be whether the coroner can see a report at all. Instead, it may become whether the report, or parts of it, should later be disclosed to other PIPs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Practice Points</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Solicitors should advise clients at the outset that a report obtained solely for the purposes of an inquest may later have to be produced to the coroner.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The question of dominant purpose remains important. A report obtained principally for contemplated civil litigation may still attract litigation privilege. A report obtained only for the inquest may not.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>If a family wishes to resist disclosure, it is unlikely to be enough simply to rely on Ketcher. Practitioners will need to show why the report is unlikely to add anything meaningful to the evidence already available.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The strongest arguments against disclosure are likely to be case-specific: that the coroner already has adequate expert evidence, that the undisclosed report is unlikely to assist, and that there is a genuine public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the report.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>If a section 17A notice is issued, practitioners should make an application to revoke or vary the notice under section 17A(4)(b) before commencing judicial review proceedings. The courts are likely to expect that route to be pursued first.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Solicitors should also focus carefully on the distinction between production and onward disclosure. Even if a report must be produced to the coroner, it may still be possible to argue that it should not be disclosed more widely, or should only be disclosed in redacted form.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Parties commissioning expert evidence should assume that coroners may ask why the report was commissioned, what issue it addresses, and whether it may assist with disputed issues already identified in the inquest.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The clearer the coroner’s reasons for wanting the report, the more difficult it will be to resist production. Drake is especially likely to apply where the coroner has already adjourned proceedings specifically to permit a party to obtain additional expert evidence.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Ian Pennock is a member of the Inquests and Inquiries Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers His full profile can be accessed <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/ian-pennock/" type="link" id="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/ian-pennock/">here</a></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:embed {"url":"https://www.youtube.com/embed/ER7e2LPAlGM","type":"rich","providerNameSlug":"embed-handler","responsive":true,"className":"wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"} --> <figure class="wp-block-embed is-type-rich is-provider-embed-handler wp-block-embed-embed-handler wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio"><div class="wp-block-embed__wrapper"> https://www.youtube.com/embed/ER7e2LPAlGM </div></figure> <!-- /wp:embed --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden’s ‘Law with Lunch’ webinars bring you the latest law updates.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On 2nd December 2025, PLP’s Jade Ferguson hosted our latest “Clinical Negligence Law with Lunch” session. The discussion focused on <strong>Litigation Capacity</strong>, offering valuable insights into its complexities and practical implications for clinical negligence cases.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Click the video to watch the webinar recording.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The next webinar in our ‘Law with Lunch’ series of bitesize, lunchtime talks covering legal issues of the moment is not to be missed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Tuesday 2nd December 2025 | 12:30 – 13:30</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Clinical negligence specialist Jade Ferguson will provide an insightful session on&nbsp;<em><strong>“Litigation Capacity: A Practical Guide,</strong></em>” where she will explore the legal framework, practical challenges, and key considerations when assessing a client's capacity to litigate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><a href="https://events.teams.microsoft.com/event/1d449035-b0fd-4852-85e7-7dc8e914acbf@74f7d406-fa82-40a5-b607-8370c07b24d6" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Please register for this event via Teams</a></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>DXC v South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust - 24^th October 2025</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On 24^th October 2025 the High Court in London approved a settlement at 90% of the full value of her claims in favour of a child who had contracted E. Coli 157 in 2011 during an outbreak at the Playdays Nursery, Middlesbrough, owned and operated by the South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust. The claim had been listed for a 12 day High Court Trial with 12 Expert Witnesses and 15 Lay Witnesses.<br><br>Five children and a nursery nurse became infected. As a result of her infection the Claimant suffered permanent severe brain and renal damage and she has had to undergo a kidney transplant. The claim is likely to be worth several million pounds.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/howard-elgot/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Howard Elgot</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/abigail-telford/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Abigail Telford</a> instructed by <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/our-people/david-bradshaw/">David Bradshaw</a> of <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/">Hay and Kilner</a>, appeared for the successful Claimant.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The name of the Claimant has been anonymised by an order of the High Court to DXC.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Infectious disease claims create novel problems of causation. Few similar cases have succeeded. The only case relatively similar to the instant case, i.e. a case dependent upon showing an avoidable transmission of infectious disease in a workplace or communal setting that has reached the higher courts, is Sanderson v Hull [2009] EWCA Civ 1211, a case involving the campylobacter bacterium infection of a woman working as a turkey plucker. The infection was contracted from an infected turkey. Somewhat surprisingly on the facts of that case, the claimant lost.<br><br>It is obvious that child to child transmission of E. Coli in a nursery cannot be prevented if the nursery nurses are unaware that one of the children was or might be infected with a diarrhoeal illness.<br><br>The somewhat simplified summary below demonstrates the difficulties the Claimant faced when bringing her claim.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In the week of the E. Coli outbreak DXC attended the nursery on 3^rd and 4^th August. On the facts of her case the Claimant had to show that that on a balance of probabilities another child (or nursery nurse) introduced the bacteria into the nursery on a date before 3^rd August 2011, that child (or nursery nurse) did not attend the nursery at the same time as DXC, that there was environmental transmission to DXC at the nursery, rather than person to person transmission, and that environmental transmission to DXC would have probably have been prevented had reasonable precautions been taken at the nursery.<br><br>There was a second part to the Claimant’s claim. DXC was eventually admitted to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Newcastle, but unfortunately her bowel perforated on 26th August. There was an admitted delay in diagnosis, and the surgery that the Claimant urgently required was not caried out until 22.30 on Monday 28th August 2011. On the Claimant’s case there was a delay of 47.5 hours; on the Defendant’s case there was a delay of 33.5 hours.<br><br>Up to the meeting of the paediatric neurologists the Newcastle Trust denied that either period of delay made any difference to the Claimant’s brain or renal injuries, but the experts agreed that the severe systemic illness with sepsis (also termed critical illness) suffered by the Claimant after her bowel had perforated made a material contribution to the extent of the brain damage suffered by the Claimant, and that even the shorter delay admitted by the Defendant was sufficient to make a further material contribution.<br><br>Thus in relation to the brain injury suffered by the Claimant, but not in relation to her renal injuries, she was able to rely upon the principle in Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board 2016 AC 888 that where on the balance of probabilities an injury had been caused by two or more factors operating cumulatively, one or more of which was in breach of duty, the Claimant will succeed in full unless the injury can be categorised as a divisible injury.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Band 1 set across five practice areas and a Band 2 set across one further area in the Chambers and Partners 2026 rankings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers has been ranked as Band 1, the highest ranking a Chambers can achieve, across the Chancery; Clinical Negligence; Employment; Family: Children and Personal Injury practice areas.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for Inquests &amp; Public Inquiries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The individual barrister members received 70 rankings in this year’s edition across:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Chancery</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Clinical Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Commercial Dispute Resolution</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Court of Protection: Health and Welfare</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Employment</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Children </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Matrimonial Finance </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests &amp; Public Inquiries</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury: Industrial Disease</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Professional Negligence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Real Estate Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In addition, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/andrew-axon/">Andrew Axon</a> has been elevated from Band 1 to 'Star Individual' status for Personal Injury, having once again retained the higher accolade in Clinical Negligence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/andrew-sugarman/">Andrew Sugarman</a> has also been elevated from Band 1 to receive his first appearance as a 'Star Individual' in Employment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This year's Parklane Plowden rankings can be viewed on the Chambers &amp; Partners website <a href="https://chambers.com/law-firm/parklane-plowden-uk-bar-14:10330">here</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Tier 1 set across five practice areas and a Tier 2 set across two practice areas in The Legal 500 2026 rankings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers has been listed as Tier 1, the highest ranking a set can achieve, across the chancery, probate and tax; clinical negligence; employment; family and children law and personal injury practice areas.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden is also the only set to be ranked for both chancery, probate and tax and clinical negligence on the North Eastern circuit.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for both inquests &amp; inquiries and court of protection.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Individual members received 82 rankings and 8 clerk rankings in this year’s edition across:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:list --> <ul class="wp-block-list"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Court of Protection (Health and Welfare)</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Private Wealth, Probate and Tax</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Clinical Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Commercial Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Employment</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Children and Domestic Violence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Divorce and Financial Remedy</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Property and Construction</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Professional Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests and Inquiries</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The next webinar in our ‘Law with Lunch’ series of bitesize, lunchtime talks covering legal issues of the moment is not to be missed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Thursday 25th September 2025 | 12:30 – 13:30</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Join Parklane Plowden’s clinical negligence specialists Howard Elgot and Megan Crowther as they explore the recent judgment in&nbsp;<em>HQA v Newcastle NHS</em>&nbsp;-&nbsp;a case&nbsp;in which they achieved a successful outcome for&nbsp;a young mother who suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury following open heart surgery.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The 5-day trial determined issues of surgical negligence, inadequate surgical planning and informed consent. During the trial, a number of practical issues arose about the absence of written and oral witness evidence. Howard and Megan will discuss adverse inferences that might be drawn against a party who fails to call an important witness, what to do when an important witness is unable attend trial in person and also cannot give evidence by video link, “chaotic” consenting, and the catastrophic failure of a surgeon to prepare for a serious, foreseeable risk in a major operation. For more information about the case prior to the talk, please visit the PLP website to view the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/trial-success-for-howard-elgot-and-megan-crowther-hqa-v-newcastle-upon-tyne-hospitals-nhs-foundation-trust/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">article here</a>.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Please register via <a href="mailto:events@parklaneplowden.co.uk" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">events@parklaneplowden.co.uk</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/howard-elgot/">Howard Elgot</a> and <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/megan-crowther/">Megan Crowther</a> of Parklane Plowden Chambers, instructed by David Bradshaw of <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/">Hay &amp; Kilner LLP</a>, acted for the Claimant in her claim against the Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, in a 5-day High Court trial at the Royal Courts of Justice, in June. The trial was to determine breach of duty and causation. Liability had been strongly contested by the Trust; but the Claimant succeeded on issues of<br>(1) informed consent;<br>(2) breach of duty by the surgeon in the planning of the operation; and also<br>(3) in establishing that 13 minutes of cerebral hypoxia would have been avoided had the operation been planned appropriately.<br>The matter will proceed to an assessment of damages hearing in due course.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The claim was brought after the Claimant, who can be referred to only as HQA because of an anonymity order made by the High Court, suffered severe brain damage after undergoing open heart surgery at the Freeman Hospital, Newcastle. The Claimant had suffered congenital heart problems from birth and had undergone many operations and other procedures over her lifetime.<br><br>In order to gain access to her heart, the surgeon used an oscillating saw. The saw slipped, and instead of the saw cutting through only the anterior section of the Claimant’s sternum, the saw went fully through the sternum and into her aorta, causing catastrophic bleeding &nbsp;which led to the cutting off of the blood supply to her brain.<br><br>It then took so long for the surgeons to put the Claimant on cardio-pulmonary bypass that she suffered very severe hypoxic brain damage. The time was prolonged in part because another surgeon, who had been called in because of the emergency, attempted to cannulate one femoral artery, but the artery dissected, and another femoral artery had to be prepared and cannulated.<br><br>Following the operation, HQA’s family were told to expect the worst, but the Claimant has at least made a partial recovery.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court held that the Defendant failed to obtain the Claimant’s informed consent for her surgery and further, that the surgeons failed to plan adequately for the possibility of the catastrophic event that occurred.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court accepted the general thrust of the Claimant’s expert’s evidence that the Claimant’s aorta was sufficiently close to the rear of her sternum, at least in places, to mean that no surgeon could be confident, in a re-do sternotomy, of being able to open the sternum without causing injury to the enlarged aorta. As a result, the minimum level of precaution required was to expose and prepare the relevant groin vessels as a preparatory step, in case emergency bypass was required. The Defendant failed to take this step. The Court held that more than half of the time taken to establish cardiopulmonary bypass would have been saved, but for the negligence. As a result, the Claimant sustained a prolonged period of hypoxia.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Furthermore, the Court found that the above mitigating steps should have been discussed with the Claimant during the consenting process: “It is not for the surgeon to determine, for the Claimant, what the Claimant’s risk appetite should be”. It was also held that in this case, it was “unacceptable practice” for the surgeon to see the patient for the first time on the day of the intended surgery in order to explain the risks of the operation for the purposes of seeking to obtain informed consent. The Court agreed with the Claimant’s expert’s view that the consenting process was “chaotic”.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The claim is estimated to have a value of over £5,000,000.<br></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila Benyounes represented the Claimant in a clinical negligence claim arising from a delay in diagnosing breast cancer, resulting in permanent physical and psychological symptoms, and a loss of fertility.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>As a result of the delay in diagnosis, the Claimant required a double mastectomy, chemotherapy and radiotherapy which would all have been avoided but for the negligence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Permanent physical symptoms included bilateral breast deformity and asymmetry, chronic lymphoedema, peripheral neuropathy and chronic back pain. The Claimant developed an anxiety and depressive order and suffered loss of fertility and a reduced life expectancy as a result of the negligence.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Causation of the Claimant’s injuries and the permanent symptoms resulting in an inability to return to work was strongly contested by the Defendant. Ten disciplines of expert evidence were relied upon, and the case was listed for a 10-day trial of causation and quantum.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila acted for the Claimant throughout this claim in respect of pleadings and conducting conferences with experts.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Settlement in the sum of £1,545,000.00 was eventually reached at a joint settlement meeting before trial.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila was instructed by Lindsay Clark at <a href="https://www.switalskis.com/people">Switalskis</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Leila is a specialist in the fields of Clinical Negligence and Inquests. She is Head of the Inquests Team&nbsp;at Parklane Plowden Chambers and&nbsp;is ranked as a leading junior in Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Clinical Negligence and Inquests and Inquiries. Her full profile can be accessed </em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes"><em>here</em></a><em><u></u></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --><!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->