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CCC v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust – Case Note

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Citation: [2024] 1 WLR</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Judge: Ritchie J</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Background:</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This was a clinical negligence claim where the claimant made a single Part 36 offer comprising a lump sum and a periodical payments order (PPO), which the defendant did not accept. Following a trial on quantum, the judge awarded the claimant a lower lump sum, but a higher PPO than her offer. The claimant then sought an order for indemnity costs, the additional award and interest on costs and damages under Part 36.17.&nbsp; She contended that her judgment was at least as advantageous as her offer.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>The Claimant’s case:</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The claimant contended that the judgment obtained was at least as advantageous as her Part 36 offer, arguing that the total value of the award (if capitalised, using the agreed life multiplier) was better in money terms than the total value of her offer (if capitalised, using the agreed life multiplier).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Judgment:</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court ruled that the judgment obtained was not at least as advantageous as the claimant's Part 36 offer, as the lump sum part of the judgment was not better in money terms than the lump sum part of the offer.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court found that there was no unfairness to the Claimant, as she could have made Part 36 offers as to each part, as individual offers.&nbsp; It was up to the Claimant as to how the offer was made.&nbsp; In this case she would have beaten her PPO offer and the Part 36 consequences would follow, as to that element.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The system for determining the value of a Part 36 offer should be ‘kept simple and clear’ in order to encourage good practice by using a series of sanctions and rewards.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In short, it was found (paragraph 18):</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>“For an offeror to beat her Part 36 combined offer, she has to beat both parts.&nbsp; If she wishes protection for each part then individual offers can be made.”</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This is a useful case, which clarifies a point for which there was previously no authority.  It may lead to more offers being made comprising of the individual elements in the future.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Success at Trial for Leila Benyounes in Birth Injury Clinical Negligence

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila Benyounes has succeeded at trial in a birth injury clinical negligence claim, at which breach of duty and causation were in dispute.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The claim involved serious injuries suffered by the Claimant during the birth of her first child.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>During the delivery, the Claimant suffered a significant and life-threatening post-partum haemorrhage, and she sustained multiple tears including a third-degree internal perineal tear. The Claimant required blood and plasma transfusions and suffered a prolonged recovery period with significant pain and the development of a psychological injury.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant’s case, as found by the judge at trial, was that she sustained an uncontrolled delivery due to the negligence of the Defendant. Liability had been denied by the Defendant throughout the claim.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The trial was heard over five days in which disputed oral expert evidence on liability, causation, and quantum from six experts was heard, including in the disciplines of midwifery and obstetrics.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila acted for the Claimant throughout this successful claim, including at trial, in respect of pleadings and conducting conferences with the experts. It was successfully argued that the Defendant was negligent in the particular circumstances of the delivery, based on the expert evidence heard on breach of duty and causation, and it was found that the negligence materially contributed to the Claimant’s injuries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant was successful in her causation and quantum arguments resulting in her beating her own Part 36 offer and obtaining favourable consequences for her damages, interest, and the Claimant’s costs pursuant to Part 36.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Leila was instructed by Hayley Collinson at Hudgells Solicitors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Leila is a specialist in the fields of Clinical Negligence and Inquests. She is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as a leading junior in Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Clinical Negligence and Inquests and Inquiries. Her full profile can be accessed </em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes"><em>here</em></a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Secondary victims: the Supreme Court provides guidance for clinical negligence claims

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>Paul, Polmear and Purchase and another v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust</em> [2024] UKSC 1</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By way of three conjoined cases, the Supreme Court considered the issue of secondary victim claims in the context of medical negligence where the event giving rise to the psychiatric injury was distinct in time from the initial negligence to the patient.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>Factual Circumstances of the Cases</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Paul</em>: Mr Paul attended hospital with chest pain. One year later, whist out with his daughters, he collapsed due to a heart attack, hit his head and suffered a brain bleed and died. Mr Paul’s daughters claimed for psychiatric injuries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Polmear</em>: Esme, a 6-year-old child, was misdiagnosed and as a result collapsed 6 months later. Her parents saw Esme lying on the floor and resuscitation attempts being made. One of her parents attempted CPR. Esme’s parents suffered with PTSD and depression. &nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em>Purchase:</em> Miss Purchase was misdiagnosed with a respiratory tract infection as opposed to pneumonia. Three days later, her mother, the claimant, went out for the evening. Upon her return, she found Miss Purchase unconscious with her phone in her hand. Efforts to resuscitate Miss Purchase were unsuccessful. The claimant found that she had a voicemail from her daughter recording her last minutes. The claimant suffered PTSD, anxiety and depression.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>Court of Appeal</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Before the Court of Appeal, there was no dispute that, in principle, secondary victim claims could be made for psychiatric injuries sustained in clinical negligence claims.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal held that it was bound by the five stage <em>Alcock </em>test as applied by the Court of Appeal in <em>Taylor v A </em>Novo [2013] EWCA Civ 194<em>. </em>This therefore meant that a claim could not succeed where the shocking event that gave rise to a secondary victim’s injuries was removed in time and space from the negligence that gave rise to that eventual shocking event.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On that basis, the claims in each of these cases failed before the Court of Appeal but permission was granted to appeal to the Supreme Court.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong><em>Supreme Court</em></strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Supreme Court provided a lengthy judgment addressing secondary victim claims. This is a very significant judgement that clarifies a number of aspects of the test applied in secondary victims cases, but also suggests that the reasoning in many previous cases has been flawed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><strong>The Requirements for a Claim to Succeed</strong></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Supreme Court endorsed the requirements established in <em>Alcock</em> as set out in <em>Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire </em>[1999] 2 AC 455 that a claimant:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Must have a close tie of love and affection with the person killed, injured or imperilled;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The claimant must be close to the incident in time and space; and</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The claimant must have perceived the accident themselves.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Supreme Court has clarified that there is no requirement for there to be:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>A ‘sudden shock’ giving rise to psychiatric injury.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Nor does the event have to be horrifying, noting that this inevitably involves an undesirable comparison of different traumatic events.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court has also narrowed what is likely to be viewed as the immediate aftermath, criticising the extension of that principle. The court commented that the focus on whether there had been a single sequence of events gave rise to difficulties with interpretation and was an artificial exercise in separating out the index event and the aftermath.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><strong>There must be an ‘accident’</strong></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Supreme Court has made clear that the witnessing of an accident or the immediate aftermath is integral to secondary victim claims and the Court of Appeal had erred in failing to treat the issue of whether there was the occurrence of an accident as material.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court clarified that an accident is “an external event which causes, or has the potential to cause, injury”. The Court affirmed that a claimant must witness the accident itself or the immediate aftermath for a secondary victim claim to succeed.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>This need for an accident was held to be because:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true} --> <ol><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>An accident is a discrete event, which could provide clarity and certainty in determining who is and is not a relevant claimant. &nbsp;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Most people would accept that the correct line to be drawn in identifying claimants is to distinguish between those who witnessed an accident and those who did not.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>It can be difficult to distinguish between primary and secondary victims in accident cases where, for example, a mother and child are both put in danger and the mother would therefore fear for herself and her child.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court also noted that it would be undesirable for end-of-life decisions to be complicated by questions of whether allowing a family member to see and be with a patient might give rise to potential liability.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><strong>Duty of Care</strong></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court indicated that there has been insufficient focus in secondary victim claims in a medical negligence context on the question of whether doctors owe a duty of care to the family of patients.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The majority in this case held that it cannot be said that a doctor treating a patient has entered into a doctor patient relationship with any of the patient’s family and responsibility for their health is thereby assumed.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court stated that the imposition of such a responsibility would go beyond what would be reasonably regarded as the nature and extent of the role of hospitals and doctors in current society.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><strong>Judgment Conclusion</strong></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court concluded that it was necessary to restrict the class of claimants whose claims might succeed to those who are more closely and directly connected to the accident caused by the defendant and apply restrictions capable of being understood by ordinary people. This means, that for secondary victims to succeed, they must have been “present at the scene, witnessed the accident and have a close tie of love and affection with the primary victim”.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court expressly stated that it was not expressing a view about claims where there was an accident that took place in a medical setting, such as the injecting of an incorrect drug or dose causing a witnessed adverse reaction.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><strong>Discussion</strong></em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>On the face of the judgment, it would appear that the Supreme Court has limited secondary victim claims in a medical negligence context with its finding that doctors do not owe a duty of care to the family of patients.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Nonetheless, the specific issue of whether or not a doctor owes a duty of care to a family member in a medical accident scenario has been expressly stated to have not been determined. In order for such a claim to succeed, a claimant will have to satisfy the criteria set out in <em>Frost. </em>This willinclude proving physical proximity to the accident or the immediate aftermath, along with establishing that there had been the assumption of a duty of care by the doctor to those family members.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Importantly, in a clinical negligence context, very few claims arise out of ‘accidents’. As such, it is likely that defendants will take a more robust approach in defending these claims and dispute the basic existence of a duty of care owed to the family members.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Even in claims where there are potential accidents, the definition of what will or will not amount to an accident is likely to remain contentious and disputed, and what is likely to be held to be within the immediate aftermath will now be much narrower.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Moreover, a claimant will still have to prove they are worse off than they would have been as a result of bereavement alone and can only recover damages in respect of that portion of the injury (<em>Hinz v Berry </em>[1970] 2 QB 40)<em>.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In reaching their decision, the majority judgment (6-1) has effectively overturned much of the reasoning of previously decided medical negligence claims. It appears to be a judgment in line with other recent authorities by the Supreme Court in the field of clinical negligence and personal injury claims: adopting a more traditional less expansive approach to the law including a shift away from paternalism.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Parklane Plowden Chambers ranked across seven practice areas in the Chambers and Partners 2024 rankings

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Band 1 set across five practice areas and a Band 2 set across two further areas in the Chambers and Partners 2024 rankings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers has been ranked as Band 1, the highest ranking a Chambers can achieve, across the Chancery; Clinical Negligence; Employment; Family: Children and Personal Injury practice areas.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for both Family: Matrimonial Finance and Inquests &amp; Public Inquiries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The individual barrister members received 65 rankings in this year’s edition across:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Chancery</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Clinical Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Costs Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Employment</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Children </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Matrimonial Finance </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests &amp; Public Inquiries</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Motor Insurance Fraud</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury: Industrial Disease</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Professional Negligence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Real Estate Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In addition to his Band 1 Personal Injury ranking, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/andrew-axon/">Andrew Axon</a> has once again retained his individual Clinical Negligence ranking of 'Star Individual'.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Parklane Plowden Chambers named as a Tier 1 barristers’ set across five practice areas in the Legal 500 2024 rankings

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Tier 1 set across five practice areas and a Tier 2 set across one area in The Legal 500 2024 rankings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers has been named as Tier 1, the highest ranking a Chambers can achieve, across chancery, probate and tax; clinical negligence; employment; family and children law and personal injury practice areas.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden is also the only set to be ranked for chancery, probate and tax and clinical negligence on the North Eastern circuit.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for inquests &amp; inquiries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The individual barrister members received 79 rankings in this year’s edition across:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Court of Protection and Community Care </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Chancery, Probate and Tax</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Clinical Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Commercial Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Employment</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Children and Domestic Violence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Divorce and Financial Remedy </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Property and Construction</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Professional Negligence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests and Inquiries</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

May Martin successful in claim for delayed diagnosis of lung cancer

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/may-martin/">May Martin</a> acted for the Claimant in a multi-track clinical negligence claim before HHJ Richardson.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>May was instructed by <a href="https://www.hudgellsolicitors.co.uk/our-people/chris-moore/">Chris Moore </a>of <a href="https://www.hudgellsolicitors.co.uk/">Hudgell Solicitors</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Factual Background</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Claimant had successful surgery for lung cancer in 2014 and was to be subject to regular follow-up thereafter. After attending follow-up appointments for approximately a year, the Trust failed to send the Claimant a letter informing her of the date of her next appointment. As the Claimant was unaware that a further appointment had been made, she did not attend. The Trust then discharged the Claimant from its care. The Claimant had no further follow-up in respect of her lung cancer. &nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In 2019, the Claimant attended A&amp;E with acute shortness of breath. She was diagnosed with recurrent lung cancer and given a life expectancy of 18-24 months.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Proceedings</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Trust admitted that it had acted negligently in discharging the Claimant from its care. The claim was defended on causation grounds on the basis that, even with regular follow-up, the recurrence of the Claimant’s lung cancer would not have been diagnosed at an earlier stage.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The expert evidence in the case was that follow-up monitoring by way of chest x-ray would not have led to an earlier diagnosis, but that follow-up monitoring by way of CT scan would have led to an earlier diagnosis. The Trust’s case was that the Claimant would have received an annual chest x-ray and clinical examination. The Claimant’s case was that she would have been monitored by way of CT scan.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The experts agreed that if the recurrence had been detected earlier, the Claimant would have avoided hospital admission and treatment in 2019, but her prognosis and life expectancy would have remained the same.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><strong>Judgment</strong></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>HHJ Richardson found that the Claimant’s follow-up appointment in 2017 would have involved a chest x-ray and thus recurrence would not have been detected at that stage. However, the Judge also found that the Claimant would have mentioned that she was experiencing increasing shortness of breath at her appointment in 2017. There would have been investigations done into the shortness of breath, but not a CT scan at that stage.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Judge found that, at the Claimant’s appointment in 2018, a further chest x-ray would have been undertaken. That chest x-ray would not have shown any abnormalities. The Claimant would again have mentioned the increasing shortness of breath which, by this point, had become considerably worse. At this stage, with the investigations in 2017 not having identified a cause of the shortness of breath, the Claimant would have been referred for a CT scan. The CT scan would have shown recurrence of the Claimant’s lung cancer and palliative treatment would have commenced shortly thereafter. The Claimant would therefore have avoided the further symptoms and need for hospital admission and treatment in 2019. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

AXS v South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust &#8211; Interim Payment of £1.8 million awarded to brain damaged claimant

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Howard Elgot acted for the Claimant in AXS v South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust before Master Cook on 31<sup>st</sup> July 2023. An anonymity order was made. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Howard was instructed by <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/our-people/david-bradshaw">David Bradshaw</a> of <a href="https://www.hay-kilner.co.uk/">Hay and Kilner</a> Solicitors.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The case is noteworthy for value of the interim payment and for the short period of time from the first admission of liability to the successful resolution of a substantial contested interim payment application. AXS was admitted to the James Cook University Hospital, Middlesbrough, on 24<sup>th</sup> November 2021.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>During the course of an operation that day AXS suffered a severe anaphylactic reaction. Notwithstanding an early differential diagnosis of anaphylaxis by the Defendant’s doctors, the doctors failed to start and continue CPR, failed to administer glucagon, and failed to administer vasopressin. As a result, AXS suffered a serious hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury, leaving AXS with permanent brain damage and a requirement for 24 hour waking care.<br><br>Breach of duty and causation were hotly contested until after service of the Particulars of Claim, but the Defendant consented to judgment, which was entered on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2023.<br><br>An application for an interim payment to fund a family house and a substantial care and rehabilitation regime was made on 28<sup>th</sup> March 2023, and the solicitors, having laid the groundwork earlier, and following conferences with counsel, were able to obtain and serve up to date reports from a rehabilitation consultant, an accommodation expert and a nursing expert exactly 4 weeks before the return date of the hearing.<br><br>The Trust offered £750,000 in addition to an £150,000 interim payment already made. This offer was refused, and Master Cook awarded an interim payment of £1.8 million payable in 21 days, to bring the total interim payments up to £1.95 million.<br><br>Master Cook held that the value of the interim payment sought was too high to allow him to make the award under stage 1 of the well-known Eeles criteria, but held that having regard to stage 2 of the Eeles criteria there was a real need for non-care home accommodation immediately and certainly before any quantum trial might take place.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>He considered that that part of the amount of interim payment requested for the property acquisition was reasonable. In line with Eeles itself, the Master noted that the court did not have to decide whether any particular property would be a reasonable purchase. The award would allow the Deputy to have adequate funds immediately available if and when the ideal property became available.<br><br>The full claim is pleaded as being in excess of £10 million pounds and therefore falls outside the costs budgeting provisions of the CPR.<br></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->