Family Archives - Parklane Plowden

Pensions after Standish: HHJ Hess Reaffirms Fairness Over Formula in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20 (B)

BS v HC provides a helpful illustration of the approach to be taken to matrimonialisation where pensions form a key part of the asset base. This case also sets out and reaffirms the rightfully exacting standard required for an add-back argument to succeed.  Background  The husband (“H”) was aged 63 and had been previously married with four children. That marriage ended in 2005 and a final order was granted in 2006. H had ongoing obligations to his first wife until 2019 when further capital provision was made.  The wife (“W”) was aged 60 and unlike H had not been previously married. She had no children. H and W met in 2008 and started cohabiting in April 2009, marrying in August 2009. From April 2009 until early 2014 the parties lived in a flat in East London which was owned by W’s father, having previously been W’s home prior to the parties meeting. No rent was charged. From 2014 to 2023 they lived together in Gloucestershire and then in Devon from 2023 to 2024.  The wife received a gift in July 2013 from her father amounting to £1,500,000 which was used to purchase a property in Gloucestershire in the parties’ joint names for £838,000. H worked in a family-owned business until his retirement in 2021. From then on, he provided consultancy services on a limited basis. W had previously worked as an interior designer, however she had not done so for approximately 13 years. At the time of proceedings, W lived in the family home in Bristol.  The parties separated on 31 March 2024 (H’s case) or 19 May 2024 (W’s case). The marriage was one of medium length being 15 years. W issued a divorce application on 24 June 2024, with a Conditional Order being made on 15 January 2025.  Add-back  H had made gifts to his adult children amounting to £102,330 between May 2024 and December 2025. W sought to receive an add-back of that value. The argument put forward on behalf of W was that these funds ought to be added back into H’s column of the asset schedule as “it is unfair if one of them makes substantial non-consensual gifts prior to a division of assets because the mathematical effect is that the non-consenting party is paying for half of the gift” ([14]).  Comparatively, H argued that the payments were part of a habitual wish to help his children and highlighted a high degree of reciprocal spending on the part of W in the last year or so. W had acknowledged that high level of spending in her oral evidence, justifying having spent that amount due to the trauma and distress of the instant proceedings.  HHJ Hess reiterated that “the legal test for add-backs is a high one – only dissipations which are wanton or reckless and where the spending was deliberately targeted towards diminishing the share of the party will justify such an add-back” ([15]). It was made clear that it is wholly correct for courts to analyse with sufficient scrutiny claims that any financial remedies litigant has engaged in manipulative spending to diminish the sharing claim. However, considering the matter in the round, although some of the payments by H were deemed to have come “close to the line”, the spending of W was to be “properly treated as neutralising the position” ([16]). Therefore, this was not a suitable case for an add-back.  Pensions  H had pensions of substantial value (£3,063,941) whilst W had pensions of limited value (£35,363). H joined a defined benefit salary scheme for his employers on 1st February 1988. H’s rights under the scheme were accrued by reference to a multiplier which was subject to a maximum cap of 20 years of service. In 2006, H’s first wife received a 50% pension sharing order, taking an external transfer of £130,000.  During proceedings a PODE report had been produced by Mr Nobbs who set out that at the point at which H and W began cohabiting in April 2009, the pension would have had a cash equivalent (“CE”) value of around £180,000. By 2008, and therefore before the parties met, that cap had been reached. The scheme closed in 2012 meaning that no further rights accrued after that date.  By March 2021, the full CE value of H’s rights was £2,407,990 subject to an 8% reduction on transfer (£2,215,351). One of the reasons for the significant uplift was because substantial contributions had been made to the scheme from H’s company to address previous underfunding, with between £1,000,000 - £2,000,000 being contributed yearly. The scheme also benefited from macro-economic financial conditions and changes in the actuarial methodology for pension valuation. In March 2021, H transferred out of the scheme to a Quilter Self-Invested Personal Pension with a CE of £2,215,351.  The central dispute revolved around whether or not Hs pensions could be considered as matrimonial property – therefore being subject to the sharing principle – or non-matrimonial property and hence only to be drawn upon on a needs basis.  Approach to Apportionment  A number of methodologies can be adopted when looking at the issue of apportionment, with the Pensions Advisory Group’s most recent report (“<a href="https://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/A-guide-to-the-treatment-of-pensions-on-divorce-2nd-edition.pdf">PAG2</a>”) setting out three main methodologies: (i) ‘the deferred pension methods’, (ii) ‘the CE method’, and ‘the Straight-Lined method’.  In producing the PODE report in the instant case, Mr Nobbs had adapted the methodologies, instead opting for (i) ‘the service approach’ (similar to ‘the deferred pension methods’); (ii) ‘the funding approach’; and (iii) ‘the CE approach’.  For these purposes, W argued that HHJ Hess ought to adopt the CE approach given that that vast majority of the CE value of the pension had accrued during the period of the marriage. It was put on behalf of W that this amounted to approximately 91.5% of the CE value. This was argued on the basis that during the period in which substantial payments were being made by H’s company, this dampened other payments which H may otherwise have received from the company. Further, H was the CEO during this period and would have therefore had sway on this. This was suggested as being “a classic example of marital endeavour” ([28]).  Alternatively, H argued that the appropriate way to look at apportionment was ‘the service approach’. Namely, looking at when the service was performed by H leading to the accrual in pension rights. On H’s case, only 14.4% of the pension accrued during the marriage. Or, in the alternative, at most 38.1% owing to company contributions whilst the remaining growth could be attributed to actuarial matters not owing to the marital endeavour.  HHJ Hess reiterated that the Court’s approach however is not to “identify a clear mathematical demarcation lie, where (as here) there is a complicated continuum” ([30]). His Honour went on to make clear that “[a]lthough the mathematical analysis is a helpful and important ingredient, the search for fairness requires a broader weighing of the competing   arguments. In some cases one of the formulaic approaches might seem fairer, in other cases a different formulaic approach might seem fairer and in other cases a blend of approaches might be fairest.” (Ibid). Looking at all the factors holistically, HHJ Hess determined that 55% of H’s pensions had been accrued during the marriage.  The extent / applicability of matrimonialisation  HHJ Hess began by referring to the words of the Supreme Court in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 on the issue of matrimonial property. By way of reminder, the Supreme Court set out the following:  “Non-matrimonial property is typically pre-marital property brought into the marriage by one of the parties or property acquired by one of the parties by external inheritance or gift. In contrast, matrimonial property is property that comprises the fruits of the marriage partnership or reflects the marriage partnership or is the product of the parties’ common endeavour.”     A clear demarcation was drawn between cash or property and rights in pensions. The latter “rarely become ‘mingled’ during a marriage. They remain in the sole name of the person who earned the pension rights” ([34]). The Court made clear that as well as the actual use and enjoyment of an asset, “a common intention to put the asset into use and enjoyment in the future” may also give rise to matrimonialisation (ibid).  The parties had a conversation in 2013 when W received the gift from her father that the Gloucestershire property was to be placed in their joint names. HHJ Hess accepted W’s evidence that H had said words to the effect of ‘it doesn’t matter that I am not contributing to the purchase price because we will share everything equally in our marriage, everything comes and goes out of the same pot’. Whilst His Honour made emphasised that this broad statement could have been, and likely was, referring to other assets such as H’s company shares, it was of note that no express reference had been made to the pension. This form of wording was not deemed sufficient to have given rise to the matrimonialisation of H’s pension rights. More, His Honour deemed, would be necessary to meet the test in Standish.  The Court’s Conclusion  The Court conducted an evaluation of the s.25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 factors, determining that in light of the standard of living which the parties enjoyed during the marriage, the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage and respective contributions, W’s housing needs could be met by remaining at the Bristol property. H would be able to afford something similar if he so chose.  HHJ Hess turned to consider the parties’ respective earning capacities. Given W’s absence from work, her age and her health related issues, and the fact H had substantially decided to retire at the same age W is now, His Honour determined that it would “not be appropriate for met to place into these calculations any figure for an earning capacity and it is reasonable to assume that she will have no earned income in the future.” ([39])  The Court determined that W’s case could not fairly justify a needs claim beyond the level of the sharing claim. A reasonable figure for W to meet her reasonable spending needs fell in the range of £60,000 - £65,000 per annum. A pension sharing order for 27.5% of H’s pension was deemed appropriate, with a lump sum payment from H to W of £724,654. The Devon property was to be transferred to H or be subject to an order of sale with 100% of the proceeds going to H.  Practical Takeaways  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Wanton or reckless dissipation targeted at reducing the other party’s claim is required to meet the high threshold for an add-back</li>  <li>Whilst pensions can be subject to matrimonialisation following Standish, more specificity as to the mingling of the pensions themselves is needed beyond broad acknowledgement of ‘everything coming and going out of the same pot’</li>  <li>Pensions are subject to a holistic fairness assessment, blending mathematical formulae with the broad brush of fairness</li> </ul>  The judgment can be found <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2026/20.html">here</a>.

Julia Nelson Qualifies as Arbitrator for Financial Remedies Matters

Parklane Plowden is pleased to announce that Julia Nelson is now fully qualified as an Arbitrator for both Financial Remedies and Children matters. This dual accreditation strengthens our ability to offer effective, constructive alternatives to court for families seeking resolution.  This is a great achievement not only for Julia personally, but for Chambers as a whole. Her qualification further strengthens Parklane Plowden’s position as a leading Chambers for innovative and forward‑thinking solutions in family justice.  Julia’s ability to offer arbitration will provide a faster, flexible and cost‑effective alternative to litigation, delivered with the expertise and authority for which she is known.  For Chambers, Julia’s dual accreditation enhances our overall ADR offering and expands the range of routes to resolution available to those instructing our Family Team. It reinforces PLP’s commitment to providing modern, constructive options for disputes, and supports our wider strategy of increasing access to specialist dispute resolution services across the North and beyond.  Join us in congratulating Julia on this fantastic achievement.

A return to first principles – evaluating proportionality of placement orders following Re N (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541

Background  The case concerned an unusual set of circumstances. The relevant child (‘L’) was born in October 2023 following assisted overseas conception. The mother, aged 55 at the time of L’s birth, was a Japanese national who had lived in the UK for numerous years. After L’s birth, the Local Authority had concerns about the mother’s ability to care for him, leading to the mother agreeing to support in a placement under s.20 CA 1989. They remained in placements for 21 months, moving from a semi-independent placement to mother and baby foster placements, before the Local Authority successfully applied for care and placement orders.  Decision at First Instance  Threshold  The recorder determined that L was at risk of significant physical harm if he was to be cared for by his mother as:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>There had been numerous small incidents involving L, such as L falling after the mother fell asleep with him on her lap and the mother placing a rubber mat under L’s highchair making it unstable; and</li>  <li>The mother failed to demonstrate a capacity to recognise and protect from those physical risks which if left unmanaged could have “potentially catastrophic” consequences ([146]).</li> </ol>  It was also determined that L was at risk of significant emotional harm because:  <ol class="wp-block-list"> <li>The mother demonstrated “significant emotional dysregulation” ([149]), including aggressive and inappropriate behaviour towards professionals; and</li>  <li>As a result of the mother’s “personality and combative style of interaction” ([153]), the recorder was anxious that professionals may not feel comfortable raising concerns about L in the future.</li> </ol>  Welfare  Care and placement orders were deemed necessary and proportionate to safeguard L’s welfare into the future. Attention was paid to the significant disruption which would be caused to L’s life, but it was determined that these risks could be mitigated by ongoing direct contact.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision  The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the care and placement orders. The orders were substituted by an interim care order, and the applications were remitted to the High Court for a rehearing.  Peter Jackson LJ, giving the leading judgment, began by emphasising that “[u]nusual cases prompt a return to first principles” [39]. Therefore, at paragraph [42], his Lordship set out a three-pronged approach to take in circumstances such as these:  (i) in assessing the risk of future harm, the court should consider: the type of harm that may arise; the likelihood of it arising; the severity of the consequences if it arose; and what risk reduction or mitigation steps can be taken.  (ii) Having reached its conclusion about those matters, the court should make a comparison of the welfare advantages and disadvantages of each course of action; and  (iii) finally step back and check that any interference with rights arising from its proposed decision is necessary and proportionate.  In summary: in a case that turns on risk of harm, does the risk justify the remedy?  The Court made it clear that threshold was not crossed due to extreme circumstances, instead due to the substantial and repeated concerns raised by professionals as to the mother’s parenting and dismissive attitude towards professional guidance.  It is however important when considering whether to make a placement order to “maintain a sense of proportion and keep the bigger picture in view” ([45]). The case for L’s adoption was predicated on numerous small incidents paired with the mother’s dismissiveness. In circumstances such as these, “particularly compelling justification” is required to substantiate why a placement order is proportionate and necessary ([45]).     The following were key factors which the recorder ought to have considered – and which practitioners should pay due attention to – when considering necessity and proportionality:  (1) Materialisation of harm  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>The recorder highlighted that early childhood can be a risk-laden and dangerous time for small children if appropriate supervision is not in place. In light of the evidence of the mother’s obstinacy, the recorder had no doubt that the mother could not protect L from such risks. </li>  <li>However, courts are concerned with how the likelihood of risks materialising relates to the relevant child. The recorder “did not attempt to describe the increased likelihood of L having accidents, compared to small children generally”, and resultantly “unduly elevated the significance of this element of the welfare checklist” ([46]).</li>  <li>The recorder therefore had not set out the necessary link which is central to the consideration of the increased likelihood of harm which the relevant child may suffer, as compared to those risks faced during the course of ordinary childhood</li>  <li>The Court made it clear that during the two years which the child was placed with the mother the child did not suffer any actual harm, never mind significant harm – an essential step was therefore missing in recorder’s assessment.</li> </ul>  (2) Identifying possibilities for risk management  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>The recorder accepted the view of the ISW that effective 24/7 support could not be offered to the mother, despite the mother having set out that she wanted to work, was willing to employ a nanny or childminder and had already “voluntarily accepted extensive limitations on her freedom of action for nearly two years” ([47]).</li>  <li>Peter Jackson LJ made it clear that the courts will scrutinise the availability of any alternatives, such as the employment of a nanny, community-based support or placement in a nursery, before adoption will be contemplated</li> </ul>  (3) Significance of cultural and situational factors  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>The recorder, whilst recognising these factors, failed to include them in her analysis and placed too much emphasis on the mother’s oral evidence when considering her likely future behaviour.</li>  <li>The Court emphasised that “[t]he complex cultural factors … required particular caution” in the context of the mother’s lack of insight into the concerns raised by professionals.</li>  <li>Consideration ought to have been given to “the extent to which effective protection might depend on insight, as opposed to other measures” ([49]).</li> </ul>  (4) The impact of “difficult parents”  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Significant reliance was placed on the mother’s sporadic emotional dysregulation, but L had not suffered any apparent harm from those incidents.</li>  <li>Whilst “many children have difficult parents and grow up surrounded by conflict” ([50]), what is important for the Court is a clear demonstration of how that difficulty feeds into resultant harm to the relevant child.</li> </ul>  (5) Practicality of post-adoption contact as mitigation  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>As set out above, the recorder was cognisant of the disruptions which L would likely face from separation but deemed the Local Authority’s suggestion of some gradually reducing post-adoption contact to be sufficiently mitigating. Following the separation of L and his mother on the day of the orders, no contact had however taken place for three months.</li>  <li>The Court made it clear that “on the recorder’s own assessment of the mother, it [was] hard to see how she could have expected that post-adoption contact could successfully occur” ([51]).</li>  <li>Parties must therefore be practical and realistic as to the weight that can be attached to, and the appropriateness of, any proposed contact.</li> </ul>  Commentary  The termination of a parent/child relationship by a placement order is one of the most severe and draconian steps a court can take. Only where the deficiencies in the parenting which the child is likely to receive are of a nature and degree to justify termination should such orders be made. Put simply, “only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding  requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do” (per Baroness Hale in Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33 at [198], set out by Peter Jackson LJ at [40]).  In summary:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Clear and substantial justifications are needed to evidence necessity and proportionality</li>  <li>Those justifications must be well-reasoned, looking at the case in the round</li>  <li>The test set out by Peter Jackson LJ at paragraph [42] outlined above provides a helpful framework to utilise in cases such as this</li>  <li>“where nothing else will do” remains central to the consideration of placement orders</li> </ul>  Practical Takeaways  When assessing proportionality, it is essential to:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Quantify risk</li>  <li>Explore realistic support</li>  <li>Factor in any relevant cultural context</li>  <li>Avoid over-reliance on purported parental ‘insight’</li>  <li>Consider the feasibility of any proposed contact</li> </ul>

Hannah Lynch commissioned by LexisNexis

We’re delighted to share that Hannah Lynch has been commissioned by LexisNexis, a leading resource for legal research and analysis.  <figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img src="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2025/11/Pre-disposition-is-fine-pre-determination-is-not—High-Court-rejects-challenge-to-new-Ofsted-framework-1024x576.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11678"/></figure>   Her article, “Pre-disposition is fine, pre-determination is not—High Court rejects challenge to new Ofsted framework”, provides an in-depth examination of the High Court’s decision to dismiss a judicial review challenge to Ofsted’s updated inspection framework. The case in focus is R (on the application of National Association of Head Teachers and Barbara Middleton) v Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and another [2025] EWHC 2891 (Admin), presided over by Saini J.  Full details can be found via the <a href="https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/news/pre-disposition-is-fine-pre-determination-is-not-high-court-rejects-challenge-to-new-ofsted-framework">LexisNexis website</a>.

Parklane Plowden Chambers ranked as a Top Tier barristers’ set across five practice areas in the Legal 500 2026 rankings

Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Tier 1 set across five practice areas and a Tier 2 set across two practice areas in The Legal 500 2026 rankings.  Chambers has been listed as Tier 1, the highest ranking a set can achieve, across the chancery, probate and tax; clinical negligence; employment; family and children law and personal injury practice areas.  Parklane Plowden is also the only set to be ranked for both chancery, probate and tax and clinical negligence on the North Eastern circuit.  Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for both inquests & inquiries and court of protection.  Individual members received 82 rankings and 8 clerk rankings in this year’s edition across:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Court of Protection (Health and Welfare)</li>  <li>Private Wealth, Probate and Tax</li>  <li>Clinical Negligence</li>  <li>Commercial Litigation</li>  <li>Employment</li>  <li>Family: Children and Domestic Violence</li>  <li>Family: Divorce and Financial Remedy</li>  <li>Personal Injury</li>  <li>Property and Construction</li>  <li>Professional Negligence</li>  <li>Inquests and Inquiries</li> </ul>

Giorgia Sessi appointed as a Fee-Paid Tribunal Judge

Parklane Plowden is pleased to announce that Giorgia Sessi has been appointed as a fee-paid Tribunal Judge, assigned to the Mental Health Chamber.  Chambers would like to congratulate Giorgia on her new appointment.

Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar – [2025] Fam Law 1021

Chambers is again excited to share that barrister, Chloe Branton, and pupil Avaia Williams have recently been published in Family Law Journal, sharing their analysis and thoughts on the Family Justice Council neurodiversity guidance.  In their article, Chloe and Avaia reflect on the guidance and how it will play out in the Family Justice System, and how it is already playing out. Chloe and Avaia are regularly instructed in matters acting for neurodiverse parties and share their top tips for ensuring the guidance is more than just a soundbite, including exploring:  <ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>why recognising neurodiverse needs is essential to fair access to justice;</li>  <li>the risks of flawed assessments where neurodivergence is overlooked;</li>  <li>the practical recommendations offered by the guidance, including the use of frameworks such as SPELL; and</li>  <li>the need for consistent adoption across the system, from judges to practitioners to court staff.</li> </ul>  Drawing on both professional and personal experience of working with neurodiverse clients and witnesses, they highlight how relatively simple adjustments can make a profound difference to participation and outcomes.  Understanding neurodivergence is not an optional courtesy but a fundamental requirement of fairness in family proceedings. The promises of the new guidance depend on meaningful and systemic change, and consistent implementation.  The full article is available in the August issue of Family Law, for those with subscriptions this can be found on Lexis Nexis.

Professor Jo Delahunty KC shortlisted for two awards

Parklane Plowden are delighted to announce that Professor Jo Delahunty KC has been shortlisted for two prestigious awards: 'Silk of the Year' with LexisNexis and 'DEI Champion' with Chambers and Partners.  Congratulations from everyone at PLP!

2nd October 2025 | Expert Evidence in Focus – In Collaboration with Sarah Vella, Evidence Matters

Thanks to popular demand, we are moving this event to an online-only format.  Join us for an insightful seminar exploring the effective use of expert evidence in family law proceedings.  Led by Sarah Vella - leading expert from Evidence Matters, this session will cover best practices for instructing, presenting, and challenging expert testimony in court.  The talk starts at 5pm via Teams and finishes at 6pm.  If you would like to join, please email events@parklaneplowden.co.uk.

Avaia Williams – Denying Pupil Barrister Entry

Pupillage is the Bar’s essential 'apprenticeship', yet pupil barristers are increasingly being turned away from the very hearings they need to watch in order to qualify. Avaia has recently written about this problem for The Barrister Magazine and discussed how sudden objections, from solicitors, litigants-in-person, opposing counsel or even the court, can derail training, impact confidence and leave lasting knowledge gaps, especially in practice areas where hearings are scarce.  Drawing on survey responses from current pupils, it becomes clear that refusals occur across jurisdictions exposing a profession-wide problem.  The piece highlights a regulatory vacuum: neither the Bar Standards Board, the Bar Council nor the senior judiciary has issued clear guidance on pupil attendance at hearings - a simple rule that recognises pupils as part of a party’s legal team unless a compelling reason for exclusion is given would save court time, reassure clients and protect the integrity of pupillage.  Avaia's article can be read in full <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/app/uploads/2025/07/The-Barrister-Denying-Pupil-Barristers-Entry.pdf">here</a>.

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Pensions after Standish: HHJ Hess Reaffirms Fairness Over Formula in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20 (B)

Julia Nelson Qualifies as Arbitrator for Financial Remedies Matters

A return to first principles – evaluating proportionality of placement orders following Re N (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541

Hannah Lynch commissioned by LexisNexis

Parklane Plowden Chambers ranked as a Top Tier barristers’ set across five practice areas in the Legal 500 2026 rankings

Giorgia Sessi appointed as a Fee-Paid Tribunal Judge

Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar – [2025] Fam Law 1021

Professor Jo Delahunty KC shortlisted for two awards

2nd October 2025 | Expert Evidence in Focus – In Collaboration with Sarah Vella, Evidence Matters

Avaia Williams – Denying Pupil Barrister Entry

Katherine GossCharlotte Wilce MCIArbDeborah Shield

Katherine Goss

Charlotte Wilce MCIArb

Deborah Shield

Newcastle: Pathfinder Training Event

Alisan Hogg

Alisan Hogg

Specialist Court of Protection & Inquests Barrister Alisan Hogg Joins Parklane Plowden Chambers

Justin CrossleyPeter Yates

Justin Crossley

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Clinical Negligence Law with Lunch with Justin Crossley & Peter Yates

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Pensions after Standish: HHJ Hess Reaffirms Fairness Over Formula in BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20 (B)

Julia Nelson Qualifies as Arbitrator for Financial Remedies Matters

A return to first principles – evaluating proportionality of placement orders following Re N (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541

Hannah Lynch commissioned by LexisNexis

Parklane Plowden Chambers ranked as a Top Tier barristers’ set across five practice areas in the Legal 500 2026 rankings

Giorgia Sessi appointed as a Fee-Paid Tribunal Judge

Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar &#8211; [2025] Fam Law 1021

Professor Jo Delahunty KC shortlisted for two awards

2nd October 2025 | Expert Evidence in Focus – In Collaboration with Sarah Vella, Evidence Matters

Avaia Williams &#8211; Denying Pupil Barrister Entry

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Katherine GossCharlotte Wilce MCIArbDeborah Shield

Katherine Goss

Charlotte Wilce MCIArb

Deborah Shield

Newcastle: Pathfinder Training Event

Alisan Hogg

Alisan Hogg

Specialist Court of Protection & Inquests Barrister Alisan Hogg Joins Parklane Plowden Chambers

Justin CrossleyPeter Yates

Justin Crossley

Peter Yates

Clinical Negligence Law with Lunch with Justin Crossley & Peter Yates

Georgia Banks

Georgia Banks

Complexities, Complications and Causation

Neurodiversity and the Family Courts – new guidance seeks to bridge the gap. Will it work? A view from the bar – [2025] Fam Law 1021

Avaia Williams – Denying Pupil Barrister Entry