Our Expertise

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.

Parklane Plowden Chambers named as a Tier 1 barristers’ set across five practice areas in the Legal 500 2024 rankings

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden Chambers has been ranked as a Tier 1 set across five practice areas and a Tier 2 set across one area in The Legal 500 2024 rankings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Chambers has been named as Tier 1, the highest ranking a Chambers can achieve, across chancery, probate and tax; clinical negligence; employment; family and children law and personal injury practice areas.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Parklane Plowden is also the only set to be ranked for chancery, probate and tax and clinical negligence on the North Eastern circuit.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Additionally, the set has been ranked as Tier 2 for inquests &amp; inquiries.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The individual barrister members received 79 rankings in this year’s edition across:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Court of Protection and Community Care </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Chancery, Probate and Tax</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Clinical Negligence</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Commercial Litigation</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Employment</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Children and Domestic Violence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Family: Divorce and Financial Remedy </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Personal Injury</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Property and Construction</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Professional Negligence </li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests and Inquiries</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Bronia Hartley represents family of Melvyn Blount who took his life after the onset of an acute episode of mental ill-health

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/bronia-hartley/">Bronia Hartley</a>, instructed by <a href="https://www.leighday.co.uk/">Leigh Day</a>, represented the family of Melvyn Blount (known as Mel) who took his life after the onset of an acute episode of mental ill-health.  </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>HM Assistant Coroner Susan Evans found that there were missed opportunities by Mel’s GP practice in the days before his death to explore whether he was suffering an acute psychotic episode, to refer him to the crisis team or A&amp;E and to warn his family not to leave him alone.&nbsp;These missed opportunities were found to have contributed to Mel’s death.&nbsp; </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Coroner issued a Prevention of Future Deaths report in relation to the GP surgery’s practices in relation to warning patients about the potential side effects of medication.&nbsp;The inquest heard that Mel was not told about a drug alert which included information relating to the potentially increased risk of suicidal ideation in patients taking the sedative/hypnotic sleep medication that he was prescribed four days before his death. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Further detail can be found <a href="https://www.leighday.co.uk/news/news/2023-news/inquest-into-the-death-of-melvyn-blount-aged-64/">here</a>. </p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Inquests and the Fixed Recoverable Costs Reforms: To Be or Not to Be?

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Access to representation in the inquest process in relation to costs recoverability presently hangs in the balance as the final government proposals following the July MoJ consultation on Fixed Recoverable Costs (FRC) are awaited. Amongst other issues, the recoverability of inquest costs in Fatal Accident Act cases is part of the FRC consultation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The consultation opened on 21 July 2023 and closed recently on 08 September. The MoJ has indicated a provisional view that a new rule should provide that for cases allocated to the Fast Track and to the Intermediate Track, the costs of inquests should be separately recoverable to the FRC, and subject to assessment, if these costs were reasonable and proportionate.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The FRC will come into force imminently on 01 October for cases issued, or a cause of action accruing, after this date and there is still no decision in respect of a new or amended rule regarding the recoverability of inquest costs.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The consultation highlighted recognition by the MoJ that as part of any proper investigation process, an inquest will typically pre-date, and may (to an extent at least) enable the litigation.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In the multi-track, where FRC will not apply, the costs involved in an inquest can be recoverable.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The MoJ has acknowledged as part of the consultation that without the addition of a new rule in the CPR to provide for the separate recoverability of inquest costs in FRC cases that the level of costs involved in the inquest will make the pursuit of any claim for compensation uneconomic.&nbsp; Indeed, in such circumstance if a bereaved individual’s claim is pursued, they will need to fund most of (if not all) of the costs involved in the representation at the inquest.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The MoJ welcomed general views on its proposals. The Bar Council and the Personal Injuries Bar Association (PIBA) provided a joint response indicating agreement with the MoJ that this is an issue which needs to be addressed and an amended rule should allow for inquest costs to be separately recoverable to FRC subject to assessment.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The joint response of the Bar Council and PIBA was that:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list --> <ul><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Inquests are an integral part of the process for investigating unnatural deaths and will inform and facilitate decisions taken about civil proceedings. The rules should allow for such costs to be recovered in a civil claim to which FRC applies, bringing the Fast and Intermediate Tracks into line with the Multi Track in which such costs are recoverable.&nbsp;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>It would be wrong to be overly prescriptive in defining the cases when inquests costs ought to be recoverable. Those claims that may be made following an inquest are not limited to claims for dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. There will be claims on behalf of the estate under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934; and accidents involving fatalities which found claims for family and non-family members for psychiatric injury as primary and secondary victims. Claims involving the deaths of children and young adults can be complex, but the damages recoverable can be limited to the levels set out in the Fast and Intermediate tracks.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Many cases involving inquests will be complex, and they should fall outside both the Intermediate and Fast Tracks. The CPR have recognised that claims brought by dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act are complex, and these should be excluded from the Fast Track. The Bar Council would support a rule to that effect. The Bar Council is less sure about to what extent such cases should also be excluded from the Intermediate Track. There will be some cases when the facts of an inquest greatly assist the determination of civil liability, and admissions may be made, and judgment entered. These cases may be suitable for the Intermediate Track as a result. It is important that the CPR allow for inquest costs to be recovered in these circumstances.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The Bar Council appreciates that drafting such a rule is not straightforward but is particularly concerned that it is important the recoverability of inquests costs is dealt with promptly so such costs can be recovered when the new rules take effect on 01 October 2023.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ul> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It is clear that implementation of FRC will have a significant impact on litigation. The MoJ has acknowledged that the FRC rules as currently drafted may impede solicitors’ ability to pursue claims, and therefore may equally impact on the future ability of bereaved families to obtain representation unless they are able to fund this, wholly or in part, themselves. Therefore the final outcome for the FRC proposals and the rules in relation to inquests are eagerly awaited.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p><em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/leila-benyounes/">Leila Benyounes</a> is Head of the Inquests Team at Parklane Plowden Chambers and is ranked as a leading junior in Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for Inquests and Inquiries. Leila’s full profile can be accessed </em><a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/barristers/leila-benyounes"><em>here</em></a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Treating physical illness in mental health patients

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Richard Copnall represented the family of Corinne Haslam at the inquest in March 2023.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner has now issued a prevention of future death report to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The inquest explored the challenges typically faced by patients who are detained under the Mental Health Act (and in the care of NHS Trust A), but who also require treatment for a physical condition (provided by NHS Trust B).</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In the present case, both trusts operated on the same site at Tameside Hospital, but from different buildings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mrs Haslam suffered from a respiratory condition. On a number of occasions, Trust A’s doctors sent Mrs Haslam to Trust B’s A&amp;E department only for her to be discharged back to Trust A. On the final occasion, her condition deteriorated in A&amp;E and Mrs Haslam died.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner’s report identified the following concerns:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"type":"a"} --> <ol type="a"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>The difficulty faced by Trust A’s doctors in obtaining the input of Trust B’s doctors, without having to transfer the patient to A&amp;E;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>A&amp;E departments are typically busy environments which may not be conducive to delivering care to patients experiencing severe and enduring mental illness;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Trust A and Trust B operate incompatible systems for their medical records which obstructed the transfer of information and is inherently risky.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The division of care for physical and mental health conditions between two different NHS trusts is the norm and the difficulties highlighted in the coroner’s report are typical.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Secretary of State’s response, which is required by 15 September 2023, is eagerly awaited.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The prevention of future deaths report can be viewed <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/prevention-of-future-death-reports/corinne-haslam-prevention-of-future-deaths-report/">here</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Richard was instructed by <a href="https://www.isonharrison.co.uk/our-people/gareth-naylor/">Gareth Naylor</a> of Ison Harrison.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Court Of Appeal Clears Article 3 LOGJAM

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal has now handed down its long-awaited decision in the case of <em>AB v Worcestershire County Council and others</em> [2023] EWCA Civ 529. The decision provides important clarification of the Article 3 duties owed by local authorities to children in their area. However, the court did not take the opportunity to provide any guidance on the “threshold” of seriousness required for a breach of Art3.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The claim was brought against two local authorities. AB lived in the defendants’ areas, with his mother until he was accommodated by the local authority, aged 11 and taken into care aged 12. Whilst in the care of his mother he was subjected to a number of incidents of abuse and neglect, which were recorded by the local authorities.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>At first instance, the judge accepted the second defendant’s submission that a local authority owed no duty to children in its area under Art3, who were not under its “care and control.” This finding had been a surprise to most practitioners, flying, as it did, in the face of longstanding ECtHR authority (<em>E and others v The United Kingdom (33218/96), DP &amp; JC v The United kingdom (38719/97)</em>. Very sensibly, the defendants conceded this issue on appeal and that concession was endorsed by the court as having been correctly made [85]. Although not surprising, this development brings to an end 16 months of unwelcome uncertainty and will allow many cases to be resumed, which had been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The judgment is the first occasion on which a domestic appeal court has considered the application of Article 3 to a local authority’s duty to protect a child from neglect and abuse. It provides a clear and concise statement of the test [57-63], which is likely to be useful to practitioners and trial judges.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The court also noted [82] that: “<em>This is not a negligence claim where a court would be considering whether a …social worker had acted in accordance with a body of expert opinion…the question was whether “judged reasonably” [the defendants] had failed to take appropriate steps to avoid a real and immediate risk of Article 3 ill-treatment.. was a question for the court, not for expert evidence.</em>” This principle might prove useful for Claimants, particularly in historic cases, where social work practice at the time might now be thought&nbsp; to be woefully inadequate but might have satisfied the <em>Bolam</em> test.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The appeal failed on its facts. The court upheld the finding that, whilst the Claimant was “<em>vulnerable and at risk of being subjected to poor and inconsistent parenting and neglect</em>”, he was not at a “real and immediate risk” of treatment of the kind prohibited by Article 3. In other words: his mis-treatment had not met the Art3 “threshold”.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The appeal was determined on the basis that the Claimant had suffered only seven relevant incidents over a period of nine years. The particular circumstances of those incidents should be ascertained from the judgment, but many practitioners might conclude that the frequency and severity of the incidents is towards the lower end of the range of cases with which they are involved. As such, the failure of this appeal on its facts is likely to have little, if any, effect on most claims.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In summary, the judgment:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"type":"a"} --> <ol type="a"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Confirms that a local authority owes an Art3 operational duty to children within its area, irrespective of the extent or absence of “care and control” and restores the law to its position prior to the decision at first instance;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Thereby removes the “logjam” caused by cases that had been stayed pending the outcome of that decision;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Sets out, and applies, the (well established) test for Art3 in the context of a “failure to remove” case against a local authority;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Notes that the assessment of the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions is a matter for the court, not expert opinion, and that, in effect, the defendant cannot avail itself of a <em>Bolam</em> defence;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Provides an illustration of a case in which the frequency and severity of incidents falls below the Art 3 “threshold”;</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li>Does not take the opportunity to provide any guidance on the frequency and severity of abuse/neglect that would meet the “threshold.” This will be a matter of regret, but perhaps not surprise, for practitioners. The level of the “threshold” remains an open question and is one that will probably only be answered as a body of decided cases emerges over time.</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list -->

Dove v Assistant Coroner for Teesside [2023] EWCA Civ 289 (17 March 2023)

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mrs Dove’s daughter took her own life after DWP benefits were withdrawn.&nbsp;In September 2021, the Divisional Court refused her application under s13 of the Coroners Act 1988 to quash the Coroner’s determination and direct a new inquest. The Divisional Court considered that the question of <strong>'how'</strong> someone died in a <em>Jamieson</em> inquest was directed only to the means by which the deceased died, and did not encompass the wider circumstances of their death. In this case, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of <strong>‘by what means’</strong>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In <em>Middleton </em>the House of Lords considered that a coroner determining <strong>‘how’</strong> a person died in a non-Art 2 inquest need only determine <strong>‘by what means’</strong> they died and not the broad circumstances.&nbsp; The meaning of <strong>‘by what means’</strong> has, however, remained elusive.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>By way of background, Jodey Whiting died as the result of suicide having taken an overdose of prescription medication. She had a history of mental health problems, including depression and emotionally unstable personality disorder, and was in receipt of Employment and Support Allowance (‘ESA’).&nbsp; It was known to the DWP that she was vulnerable and had previously had suicidal thoughts. &nbsp;&nbsp;At her inquest, Mrs Dove expressed the view that the cessation of her daughter’s ESA, housing benefit and council tax benefit had contributed to the mental distress that led to her suicide.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner held that Art 2 procedural obligations were not engaged and that the actions and decisions of the DWP fell outside the scope of her investigation, albeit on returning a suicide conclusion, the coroner did note within her factual findings that “Jodey had her ESA claim turned down in the weeks before her death” and that her family believed that “this caused extra stress that was a contributing factor in her death.”</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Two pieces of evidence were obtained by Mrs Dove following the inquest: (1) a report from an Independent Case Examiner (the ‘ICE Report’) which found shortcomings in the handling of Ms Whiting’s case by the DWP and (2) an expert psychiatric report that expressed the opinion that there was likely to have been a causal link between the cessation of Ms Whiting’s benefits and her state of mind immediately before her death.&nbsp; It was in the light of this fresh evidence that Mrs Dove had sought a fresh inquest.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>In dismissing the s13 application, the Divisional Court considered that the question of <strong>how</strong> someone died in a <em>Jamieson</em> inquest was directed only to the means by which the deceased died and did not encompass the wider circumstances of their death, meaning that ‘how’ Ms Whiting died had been properly recorded at the brief inquest.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Divisional Court’s view regarding the psychiatric report was that whilst it postulated a causal link between the DWP’s failings and Ms Whiting’s state of mind immediately before her death, it did not establish a causal link with the death itself.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Divisional Court considered that Art 2 obligations were not engaged.&nbsp; There was no <strong>operational duty</strong> owed to Ms Whiting as: (i) the DWP had not assumed responsibility for her; (ii) her vulnerabilities were not exceptional; and (iii) the risk to her life by suicide was long-standing. &nbsp;There was no arguable breach of the <strong>systems duty</strong> because the DWP’s failings had been individual in her case and not structural or systemic in nature.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>When the case came before the Court of Appeal, it was no longer asserted that the coroner needed to carry out an inquiry into the DWP’s systems and policies since the ICE report served that purpose.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mrs Dove argued that the Divisional Court had (1) adopted the wrong approach to causation by looking at whether the DWP’s failures directly caused Ms Whiting’s death rather than whether those failings were a <strong>more than trivial cause</strong> of her mental health deterioration and (2) drawn an artificial distinction between Ms Whiting’s mental health and her ultimate death since the former resulted in the latter.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Mrs Dove sought (1) a fresh <em>Jamieson</em> inquest to investigate the issue of causation in respect of the deterioration in her daughter’s mental health just before she took her own life, and (2) a finding that Art 2 obligations were engaged in any event.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The coroner’s position was that to direct a second inquest would result in coroners having to explore ‘why’ rather than ‘how’ someone died, &nbsp;necessitating inquiry into the causes of a person’s psychiatric problems in suicide cases, which would be a controversial task and fell outside the required scope of an inquest in any event.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal agreed that the specifics of the DWP’s errors and policy breaches lay beyond the scope of any <em>Jamieson</em> inquest, &nbsp;however the question was whether the inquest should now consider the causative impact of the DWP’s admitted failings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The threshold for causation of death is of course that on the <strong>balance of probabilities</strong>, the conduct must have <strong>more than minimally, negligibly or trivially </strong>contributed to it.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Divisional Court was wrong to approach causation on the basis of whether the death would have occurred “but for” the particular act or omission.&nbsp; Causation in inquests is a broader concept, encompassing acts or omissions which contribute more than minimally, negligibly or trivially to death. &nbsp;It is therefore open to a coroner in a suicide case to consider the extent to which acts or omissions contributed to the deceased’s mental health deterioration, which in turn led them to take their own life.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Divisional Court’s error was that they suggested that mental health deterioration could be separated from death, the latter being the end point of the former.&nbsp; The way in which the abrupt cessation of benefits was likely to have affected Ms Whiting’s state of mind was an issue that was ‘well within the scope of a <em>Jamieson</em> inquest’. &nbsp;It not only went to the issue of <strong>intention</strong>, but would assist the coroner in the formulation of a <strong>narrative conclusion</strong>, to reflect the particular anxiety and distress suffered by Ms Whiting before she took her own life.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>It would be open to a coroner presiding over a fresh inquest to find that the sudden withdrawal of benefits contributed to a deterioration in Ms Whiting’s mental health and record a <strong>brief, neutral, factual narrative conclusion</strong> such as: “The deceased took her own life as a result of a deterioration in her mental state exacerbated by the abrupt cessation of her ESA by the DWP”<em>.</em></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The wide discretion conferred on coroners includes establishing the background facts and considering contributory factors before determining whether those facts were or were not causative of death. &nbsp;Restricting a coroner’s discretion to conduct whatever investigations are appropriate within the ambit of a <em>Jamieson</em> inquest to establish ‘how’ the deceased came by their death would be undesirable.&nbsp; Moreover, where suicide is raised as a possible conclusion, part of the coroner’s role is to investigate whether the deceased intended to take their own life and whether the deceased acted while their mind was disturbed (with that fact being recorded if it is established). &nbsp;The cause or causes of disturbance of the mind may be closely connected to the matters which are already before the coroner.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal went on to consider whether it was necessary or desirable to have a<strong> fresh inquest</strong>.&nbsp; Having established the discretion to consider the impact of events on Ms Whiting’s mental health, the Court of Appeal went on to consider whether in this particular case it was <strong>‘necessary and desirable’</strong> to hold a fresh inquest (applying the s.13 <strong>‘Hillsborough test’</strong>).&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The function of an inquest is to seek out and record as many of the facts concerning the death as the <strong>public interest</strong> requires and to establish the <strong>‘substantial truth’</strong>. &nbsp;In this case the extent to which the DWP’s actions contributed to Ms Whiting’s mental health was part of determining the ‘substantial truth’ and if the death was connected to the abrupt cessation of benefits, the public had a legitimate interest in knowing that.&nbsp; The judges were unanimous that the interests of justice required Mrs Dove to have the opportunity to invite a coroner, at a fresh inquest, to make a finding of fact that the DWP’s actions contributed to her daughter’s deteriorating mental health.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Court of Appeal held that Art 2 was not engaged on the basis that the basic ingredients of an Article 2 <strong>operational duty</strong> (as outlined in <em>Rabone</em>) were not present. &nbsp;The fact that the DWP is the agency responsible for administering the welfare benefits system does not of itself involve any assumption of responsibility to safeguard against the risks of suicide or self-harm by all those with whom it has dealings.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Takeaways:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>1) The discretion as to an inquest’s <strong>scope</strong> remains with the coroner.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>2) Whilst the touchstone of causation is important, when setting their investigation’s scope, it is still for the coroner to decide what <strong>‘by what means’</strong> actually means for each inquest.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>3) When addressing the <strong>‘how’</strong> question a coroner may, and in some cases should, in the exercise of their discretion, go beyond a bare determination of the mechanism of death. A more detailed exploration of causation may be required to meet the interests of justice.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>4) <strong>Causation</strong> in the context of an inquest means making a material (i.e., more than trivial) contribution, of which there must be evidence.&nbsp; The subjective opinion of the family is not evidence and will not suffice without more.&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>5) Where it is said that the state of mind of someone who killed themselves was contributed to by their partner’s infidelity, the interests of justice are not likely to require the affairs of individuals to be investigated in public at an inquest.&nbsp; However, where the <strong>shortcomings of a public body</strong> are said to have contributed to a deterioration in mental health, it is harder to see why a coroner would exercise their discretion so as to ignore this factor.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>6) Even where Art 2 is not engaged, the bereaved family and the public have a legitimate interest in knowing how public bodies’ actions impact on citizens’ mental health.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>A copy of the Court of Appeal judgment is <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__email.coronersociety.org.uk_c_eJxkzj1uxCAQQOHTQBcEMwM2BUWavcaKnyFGu2ssTGTl9tFK6VJ9zSteCcl6a53kYNziCWhdjdzCajIunJB85WqQQefqTKzRFl-5FMEmULoAE1gjGrJdJK11IwYXKOlojeC9K5j77zOHtuPH9UH1-5Fq-2DyGfYZvzOAV-2DCrgJuF3Xpf6XAm739npztHy-2DKfX-2DtwjkPjyROkqVIzziaPvFz3MTpNNs-2D-2DSx81S5v34DAAD-5F-5F-2DC-2DREQ&amp;d=DwMFaQ&amp;c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&amp;r=BRZ95pjmCh-tfCekrLZ-l8USk2pXHnZA-0k36JQ6wsA6ebOyTWGcER0g81JbdmB_&amp;m=NRa0P0pKarMeglsijZ49R7PSeWCoBXVi1ceokXvnuu4&amp;s=AgC-VPu73P4tEckfG05gPJCpOIXAPFOszkWvCVadadA&amp;e=" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

Parklane Plowden Podcast &#8211; Understanding coroner inquests and the role of lawyers

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Listen to Parklane Plowden’s latest podcast: <a><em>Understanding coroner inquests and the role of lawyers</em>.</a></p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Head of our Inquests and Inquiries Team and Assistant Coroner for Gateshead and South Tyneside, <a href="https://www.parklaneplowden.co.uk/our-barristers/leila-benyounes/">Leila Benyounes </a>is joined by the Deputy Chief Coroner for England and Wales and Senior Coroner for the City of Sunderland, Derek Winter DL, to discuss the role of the coroner service and the inquest process.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The two also discuss the role of lawyers in coroner courts and how effective legal representation can support different participants throughout the inquest process. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>Helpful resources and further reading:</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:list {"ordered":true,"type":"1"} --> <ol type="1"><!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/coroners-courts/office-chief-coroner/">Office of the Chief Coroner</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guide-to-coroner-services-and-coroner-investigations-a-short-guide">Guide to coroner services for bereaved people</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/coroners-statistics-2021/coroners-statistics-2021-england-and-wales#:~:text=In%202021%2C%2055%25%20of%20deaths,mortem%2C%20no%20change%20on%202020.&amp;text=In%20the%20majority%20(79%25),a%20post%2Dmortem%20was%20held.">The latest coroner statistics for England and Wales</a> (2021)</li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/resources/practising-coroners-court/">Solicitors Regulation Authority Coroner inquest toolkit</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/for-barristers/resources-for-the-bar/resources-for-practising-in-the-coroners-courts.html">Bar Standards Board Coroner Inquest toolkit</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/coroners-courts/coroners-legislation-guidance-and-advice/coroners-guidance/">Chief Coroner Guidance and Law Sheets</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GUIDANCE-No-44-DISCLOSURE-final.pdf">Disclosure requirements for coroner inquests</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/chief-coroners-guidance-no-33-suspension-adjournment-and-resumption-of-investigations-and-inquests1/">Resumption guidance</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/chief-coroners-guidance-no-41-use-of-pen-portrait-material1/">Pen Portrait material guidance</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/law-sheets-no-2-galbraith-plus.pdf">Galbraith Plus</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --> <!-- wp:list-item --> <li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/coroners-courts/reports-to-prevent-future-deaths/">Prevention of Future Deaths</a></li> <!-- /wp:list-item --></ol> <!-- /wp:list -->