Safeguarding vs. Gross Misconduct: Disability is a Factor, not a Shield

Lucy Evanson recently appeared for Meridian Trust, the Respondent, within the case of Jared Joseph Hart v Meridian Trust (3303173/2024), instructed by ARAG Law.

Background

The Claimant was a teaching assistant employed at one of the Trust’s schools from 2017 until his dismissal in 2023. Between 2019-2023, a number of safeguarding concerns were raised against the Claimant’s conduct, which the Tribunal felt they “point[ed] to a history of safeguarding concerns emanating from a failure to maintain professional boundaries”.

In June 2023, concerns escalated sharply. Following an investigation, the Claimant was subjected to disciplinary proceedings in relation to 4 allegations, including breaches of procedure and safeguarding protocols, interference with the investigation, and inappropriate interactions with students. Three allegations were upheld, and one was partially upheld, resulting in his dismissal for gross misconduct. He appealed the decision, leading to an appeal hearing in January 2024, whereby his dismissal was upheld.

The Claimant subsequently brought claims for unfair dismissal, discrimination arising from disability, and failure to make reasonable adjustments.

Judgment and Reasoning

All claims were dismissed.

Applying Burchell principles, the Tribunal found the Respondent genuinely believed the Claimant had committed misconduct and gross misconduct, and that belief was based on reasonable grounds following a thorough and proportionate safeguarding investigation, student evidence and the Claimant’s own admissions.

The Claimant’s evidence was described as “troubling”, particularly his continued contact with students after dismissal and his failure to appreciate the emotional impact on young people. The Tribunal noted that he appeared to prioritise “his pursuit of a spark of happiness” over safeguarding obligations and showed “limited or poor insight” into professional boundaries.

On disability, the Tribunal drew a critical distinction between knowledge at dismissal and knowledge at appeal. While the Respondent conceded the Claimant was disabled, it successfully argued that the dismissing officer did not know, and could not reasonably have known, this at the time. The evidence presented framed the Claimant’s difficulties as a reaction to his parent’s recent health issues, not a long-term impairment. The Tribunal found this described “struggles to be expected of anyone confronted with parental ill health”, rather than a disability triggering Equality Act duties.

However, by the appeal stage, occupational health evidence revealed a longer history of mental health vulnerability. The Tribunal found the appeal panel ought reasonably to have known the Claimant was disabled at that point. Nonetheless, this did not render the dismissal unlawful.

Under section 15, the Tribunal accepted that the Claimant’s misconduct did arise from his disability, noting a “marked escalation” in behaviour corresponding with a deterioration in mental health. However, dismissal was held to be a proportionate response to legitimate aims. The Tribunal was unequivocal: “Transferring the Claimant to another school would have been to transfer the problem. It does not address the safeguarding risk; it just puts the risk somewhere else.”  Alternatives such as extended leave or redeployment were rejected as inadequate, particularly given the Claimant’s lack of insight and the ongoing safeguarding risk. The Tribunal stressed that safeguarding obligations could not be displaced by mitigation where risk to children remained.

The reasonable adjustments claim failed both procedurally and substantively. It was out of time, and in any event the Tribunal found the duty was not triggered in a “fast-moving and serious safeguarding situation” requiring immediate action.

Implications for Employers and Key Learning Points

This decision provides clear guidance on how tribunals approach safeguarding-driven dismissals. Employers may rely on patterns of low-level safeguarding concerns cumulatively, even where no single incident meets the harm threshold. Further, such concerns are not neutralised by disability, even where misconduct is causally linked to mental health. In education and child-facing sectors, where legitimate safeguarding aims are engaged, dismissal may be not only reasonable but necessary, even in the face of compelling mitigation.

Secondly, knowledge of disability is decision-maker specific and time-sensitive. Employers should clearly identify who holds decision-making responsibility at each stage and ensure that information about health conditions is escalated appropriately. However, employers are not required to infer disability from acute distress or short-term reactions to personal crises.

Finally, the Tribunal made clear that alternative sanctions must meaningfully reduce safeguarding risk. Measures that merely defer, dilute, or displace safeguarding concerns, such as redeployment or extended leave, may properly be rejected. Where safeguarding is engaged, employers are not obliged to experiment with measures that leave the underlying risk unresolved.