Sowing Promises, Reaping Nothing: The Fall of a £43m Farm Claim

On 29 October 2025, the High Court released Mr Justice Richards’ judgment in the high-value case of Scott v Scott and Others [2025] EWHC 2796 (Ch), a matter which has caught  the newspaper headlines, and concerns a £43 million estate.  

Background

The deceased, Richard Norman Scott (the so-called “Car Boot King”), was a farmer, who fathered at least 19 children from multiple relationships. Of these children, Adam Clive Scott (the Claimant) spent most of his life working hard on the farm. Adam was Richard’s second eldest child from his first marriage to Janet, with whom he had five other children. Adam brought a claim in proprietary estoppel to give effect to promises that he alleged his father had made to him, regarding his interest in the farm. Jennifer is one of the Defendants, Richard’s widow, and the mother of seven of Richard’s children.

Adam brought three separate claims, all of which were dismissed. These were in relation to: propriety estoppel, probate, and sham tenancies. I deal solely with the proprietary estoppel claim.

Judgment

Early in the judgment, the Judge provided a detailed consideration of the witness’ reliability based upon their behaviour during the course of the trial. The Judge proceeded to continually refer to these findings throughout his judgment, and the weight attributed to the credibility of the evidence was, in some respects, determinative. This highlights the importance of reliable and credible witnesses and illustrates the weight that is given to the witness evidence of seemingly honest witnesses.

For a claim in proprietary estoppel to succeed, Adam was required to prove that first, there were representation/assurances/promises made by Richard to Adam. Second, Adam had reasonably relied upon them. Third, Adam had suffered a detriment, as a result of his reliance. Quoting Robert Walker LJ in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 at 225, the Judge pointed out that these ingredients are not “watertight compartments”, meaning that a finding on the first element will often inform findings on the others. The quality of a promise for example, could impact the extent to which the promisee relied upon it. Even if all three elements are present, it is not necessary that the court will provide a remedy. The outcome will be one that will “shock the conscience of the court”, for there to be a remedy [189].

Adam’s case was that Richard had promised him that the farm would be his, in reasonable reliance of which, Adam continued to work hard on the farm. The detriment which Adam claims to have suffered is that he had given a “whole-life” commitment to the farm, working long-hours for low remuneration, at the expense of his personal and family relationships.

One of the representations on which Adam relied, was a promise made by his father in 1985, which was to “set [Adam] up in farming”. Another representation was a testamentary disposition in a 1995 will. The Judge found that the former promise was not related to Adam’s ownership of land, but rather, it was related to farming opportunities. The latter promise had since been withdrawn. This conclusion was reached in light of:

1. The context in which the promise was made – Regarding the first promise, Richard had just been released from prison. During his imprisonment, Adam had taken a leading role on the farm, and was therefore aggrieved when upon his father’s return, Adam was treated like just another worker. If Richard had responded to this grievance by promising Adam the farm after Richard’s death, this would not have addressed the problem. Adam was looking for current opportunities, which the promise was referring to. Indeed, Richard honoured this promise [100] – [109].
2. Evidence of testamentary intention – Richard had written multiple wills throughout his lifetime. Wills written in 2003 and 2007 were not legally valid, owing to the absence of formalities. Nevertheless, these wills demonstrated that Richard was apportioning his wealth between all of his children and aiming to balance competing interests, thereby evidencing a change of testamentary intention from the 1995 will. Importantly, the Judge found that Adam was aware of these wills, and Richard’s changing intentions, thereby preventing the Judge from finding that Adam had relied on any previous inconsistent promises [122] – [127].
3. The deceased’s character and relationships – Had Richard promised to leave the entire farm to Adam, this would have been to the detriment of his other children. The Judge found that this was unlikely, given that Richard had shown a constant preoccupation throughout his life, of reconciling the competing interests of his many children [105(111)], even though he was not always fair or balanced.

When considering whether Adam had relied on the promises, the Judge applied the standard set out by Robert Walker LJ’s judgment in Gillett v Holt [2000] EWCA Civ 66, that it is necessary only to establish a “sufficient causal link”. On this approach, even if Adam would have acted as he did, due to for example, his love of farming, then the necessary reliance will not be present [195] – [199]. The promises must be “an” inducement, at least. However, promises can only be relied on after they have been made. Notwithstanding this, the Judge highlighted that Adam’s conduct in working on the Farm in his childhood, and before the promises were made, may still be relevant because the elements are not “watertight”. Consequently, that conduct may shed light on the meaning and quality of the promises, demonstrating that proprietary estoppel involves an almost circular evaluation.

Given the above, the Judge concluded that Adam had reasonably relied on Richard’s promise in 1995, but ceased to rely in 2003, when he was made aware of the 2003 will. Considering only this period of around eight years, the Judge proceeded to weigh the detriment that Adam suffered with the benefits that he received from this reliance, concluding that Adam had not suffered a net detriment. In doing so, the Judge applied the approach as put by Newey LJ at [40] of Winter v Winter [2024] WTLR 1559, which follows that the “Court must weigh any non-financial disadvantage against any financial benefit, even where the disadvantage is not susceptible to quantification”. This exercise must therefore be undertaken even if it is difficult to attribute a financial value to some of the detriment incurred (such as the positioning of one’s life on a farm).

As a result, the proprietary estoppel claim failed.

Commentary

This judgment is an illustration of the importance of context, evidence of testamentary intention, and the deceased’s personality and relationships, in determining a proprietary estoppel claim. The Judge analysed each alleged representation against not only the contextual background in which they were made, but also the likelihood of the deceased having actually made such a promise, given the promisor’s personality. Therefore, evidence pertaining to the promisor’s nature and relationships with the interested parties may be crucial to the eventual outcome of a case. Moreover, even though wills which were subsequent to a binding promise were invalid due to formalities, their evidential weight was substantial. This case also highlights that the detriment of committing one’s whole life to a farm should be weighed up against benefits. The Judge should delve further into a costs-benefits analysis to determine whether the claimant has suffered a ‘net detriment’ or in other words, suffered more than he gained, whether or not some forms of detriment are financially quantifiable.