Delegation or deference? The significance of coronial decision-making for other public bodies
When does taking account of a Coroner’s view become an unlawful abdication of another body’s own responsibilities?
R (Przybys) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2026] EWHC 1159 (Admin) provides one answer to that question, with Coppel J concluding that GMP was entitled to take account of the absence of coronial concern when deciding not to investigate an allegation of gross negligence manslaughter.
Background
The Claimant’s 87-year-old mother died at North Manchester General Hospital in January 2024. He alleged serious failings in her care, including in relation to dehydration and the management of medication, which he believed had contributed to her death (§§6–9).
The Claimant asked the Senior Coroner for Manchester City to investigate. Following enquiries of the hospital, the Coroner concluded that the death was natural and that there was no evidence that any suspected failings had contributed to it. No inquest was held (§10).
More than a year later, the Claimant reported the death to Greater Manchester Police (“GMP”), alleging gross negligence manslaughter. GMP declined to investigate and advised him to pursue his concerns with the GMC (§§11–16). Following complaints and a subsequent review, GMP maintained its position. Among other matters, it relied on the fact that neither the Coroner nor the GMC had identified anything suggesting criminal conduct (§§20–21).
The Claimant challenged the refusal to investigate by judicial review.
The decision
The challenge faced a high threshold.
Coppel J emphasised that decisions about whether to investigate an alleged offence attract considerable latitude. A decision not to investigate is especially difficult to challenge, since it involves questions of resources, priorities and appropriate lines of enquiry. It would take a “wholly exceptional case on its legal merits” to justify judicial review of such a decision (§25).
There was a further difficulty. Gross negligence manslaughter itself sets an exceptionally high threshold. In the clinical setting, even very serious mistakes or errors of judgment will not necessarily be enough (§§26–27).
Against that background, Coppel J held that GMP’s decision was “far from irrational” (§32). That was despite some obvious shortcomings in how the matter had initially been handled. The documents first supplied by the Claimant had been returned to him and could not be uploaded through the online reporting system. As a result, the officer who decided not to investigate did not have that evidence (§31). GMP also provided no evidence from that officer clarifying the reasoning behind the original decision, an omission which Coppel J described as “unfortunate” (§30).
Nevertheless, it was rational for GMP to take account of the position of other bodies which had considered, or were considering, the death. In particular, the Judge considered that the Coroner’s lack of concern supported a measured “wait and see” approach. The fact that the GMC was considering the Claimant’s complaint was also relevant. The police were not medical experts and were entitled to wait to see whether those with relevant expertise identified anything which might warrant police involvement (§32(i)–(iii)).
Importantly, this did not amount to an unlawful delegation of GMP’s responsibilities. The decision remained GMP’s own. If the GMC had identified possible criminal conduct, or if other information had later emerged, the police may reconsider whether an investigation was required (§32(v)).
The claim was dismissed.
Comment
At first blush, Przybys might be regarded as little more than a vindication of common sense, not least from GMP’s perspective.
The judgment is, however, of wider interest. It raises the question of how far one public body may rely on another’s expertise and conclusions without unlawfully delegating its own functions.
That question was particularly acute here. The officer who made the original decision had not seen the medical evidence relied upon by the Claimant and GMP provided no evidence explaining that officer’s reasoning (§§30–31). Nevertheless, Coppel J considered it rational for GMP to consider whether bodies with relevant expertise had identified cause for concern before embarking on its own investigation.
The distinction is between deference and delegation. GMP was not entitled to treat the Coroner’s conclusion as determining whether a criminal offence had occurred. That was a question for the police. But it was entitled to give weight to the fact that the Coroner had considered the circumstances of the death, concluded that an inquest was not required and had not sought police involvement. Similarly, GMP could await the outcome of the GMC’s consideration rather than undertake its own assessment of complex medical evidence at the outset (§32).
As Coppel J put it, this was not an illegitimate delegation but GMP “exercising its own functions”, while leaving open the possibility of exercising them again if new information came to light (§32(v)).
That is the wider significance of Przybys. Coronial decision-making does not bind other public bodies, but the Coroner’s expertise may mean they need not replicate that assessment before exercising their own functions. The line is crossed where reliance becomes substitution: the Coroner’s conclusion may inform another body’s decision, but it cannot make that decision for it.
The judgment can be found here.
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