Life expectancy evidence: an evidential gap not an analytical one

Jade Ferguson

Jade Ferguson

Jade Ferguson
18 November 2026

The recent decision in CRE (A Protected Party by her Litigation Friend MHL) v SNY [2026] EWHC 2825 (KB) provides useful further guidance on when the court will permit specialist life expectancy evidence in serious injury litigation. In doing so, it reinforces, and arguably develops, the approach taken in Dodds v Arif [2019] EWHC 1512 (QB).

The key point is a relatively simple one: the fact that a specialist life expectancy expert can provide a more sophisticated or composite analysis does not mean that their evidence is reasonably required. There must be a genuine evidential gap, rather than simply an analytical one.

Background

CRE concerned a claim arising from a traumatic brain injury. Liability had been admitted and the remaining dispute concerned quantum and causation.

One of the issues was whether the Claimant’s injuries and associated conditions had reduced her life expectancy.

The parties already had evidence from experts in neurology, rehabilitation medicine and neuropsychiatry. Those experts had addressed life expectancy, but from their respective clinical perspectives. None had undertaken an overall assessment combining the various medical and lifestyle factors with epidemiological evidence and statistical modelling.

The Defendant sought permission to rely upon a specialist life expectancy expert, Dr Brooks. His proposed role was to bring together the various factors affecting longevity and provide what was described as a “composite assessment” of the Claimant’s overall life expectancy.

HHJ Malek refused permission.

The starting point: Dodds

The judgment provides a helpful review of the existing authorities. Of particular importance is Dodds v Arif and Chaplin v Pistol [2020] EWHC 1543 (QB).

In Dodds, Master Davison emphasised that life expectancy will ordinarily be addressed by the clinicians whose expertise relates directly to the conditions said to affect longevity. Specialist evidence should not become routine simply because a life expectancy expert can undertake a more detailed or statistically sophisticated analysis.

That does not mean specialist evidence will never be justified. Dodds identified examples including cases where the clinicians cannot express an opinion on life expectancy, themselves identify the need for specialist assistance, or where there is a dispute about statistical methodology. HHJ Malek regarded those as illustrations of circumstances giving rise to a genuine evidential need, rather than rigid gateways which must be satisfied.

The important question is the one posed by CPR 35.1 i.e. is the additional expert evidence reasonably required to resolve the proceedings?

Why was the specialist evidence refused?

The Defendant’s argument was that no individual clinical expert was undertaking the overall exercise which Dr Brooks proposed to perform. Some of the clinicians recognised the limitations of their own expertise and deferred to a specialist life expectancy expert.

However, the court considered that this did not go far enough. The relevant clinicians could provide evidence about the Claimant’s medical conditions and the effect, if any, of those conditions upon her longevity. What was missing was somebody to bring those various strands together into a single analysis.

HHJ Malek drew an important distinction that “the application identifies a gap in analytical methodology rather than a gap in available evidence.”

The court already had the necessary “evidential building blocks”. The fact that another expert could assemble and interpret those building blocks using statistical and epidemiological material did not establish that further expert evidence was reasonably required.

Similarly, the fact that specialist evidence might be useful was not enough. Both Dodds and Chaplin demonstrate the distinction between evidence which could assist the court and evidence which is actually necessary for the fair determination of the claim.

A specialist cannot replace the underlying clinical findings

A specialist life expectancy analysis will frequently depend on the clinical findings which underpin it. In CRE, the life expectancy analysis depended on matters including the consequences of the traumatic brain injury, obesity, psychiatric factors and other aspects of the Claimant’s medical history.

Those underlying clinical issues still had to be determined by reference to the evidence of the relevant medical experts. The specialist life expectancy opinion did not exist independently of those findings. As the judge observed, it proceeded from them.

That was another reason why the absence of a single expert prepared to conduct the final synthesising exercise did not amount to an evidential lacuna.

Comment

The significance of CRE lies in the distinction between an evidential gap and an analytical gap.

It is tempting, particularly in higher-value claims, to think that the existence of several potential mortality factors itself justifies specialist life expectancy evidence. After all, a specialist may be better placed than any individual clinician to draw the different strands together and produce a more sophisticated overall calculation. However, CRE makes clear that this is not enough.

If the clinicians can address the medical conditions within their expertise, explain whether those conditions affect longevity and provide the necessary evidential foundation for the judge to determine life expectancy, the fact that a specialist could perform a better or more sophisticated synthesis does not necessarily justify another expert.

The focus is not simply on whether life expectancy evidence would be helpful, or whether a specialist has expertise which the clinicians do not. The question is whether there is an identifiable gap in the evidence which prevents the issue from being fairly determined.